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SUMMARY 
 
Agriculture is of inestimable value to South Africa because it is a major source of job creation 
and plays a key role in earning foreign exchange. The most significant contribution of 
agriculture, and in particular maize, is its ability to provide food for the nation. For a number of 
decades government legislation determined prices, and as such the trade of grains on the 
futures exchange requires market participants to adapt to a volatile environment. 
 
The research focuses on the ability of market participants to effectively mitigate price volatility 
on the futures exchange through the use of derivative instruments, and the possibility of 
developing risk management strategies that will outperform the return offered by the market.   
 
The study shows that market participants are unable to use derivative instruments in such a 
way that price volatility is minimised. The findings of the study also indicate that the 
development of derivative risk management strategies could result in better returns than 
those offered by the market, mainly by exploiting trends on the futures market.   
 
 
 
 
Key terms: 
Average price; benchmark; contract valuation; derivatives; indexing; price risk management; 
processors; SAFEX; soft commodities; volatility  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1     BACKGROUND 
 
South Africa has a population of more than 47 million people, of whom 628 200 work either as 
farm employees or as domestic servants on the 45 818 commercial farming units. Agriculture 
provides employment to 1.34% of the total population (National Department of Agriculture 
2007:1-4). Agriculture also plays a vital role in earning foreign exchange for the country, since 
the value of exported agricultural goods exceeds the value of agricultural products imported. 
South Africa is therefore a net exporter of agricultural products (Botha 2005:1). The projected 
amount of net farm income from agriculture in South Africa exceeded R18 514 million in 2007 
(Directorate Agricultural Statistics 2007:3).  
 
The most dominant staple food in South Africa is maize, and as such, agriculture is of 
inestimable value to all its residents (Traub & Jayne 2004:1). Since 2000, of the close to 17 
million hectares of arable land, more than three million hectares, on average, have been 
allocated to maize plantings (National Department of Agriculture 2007:5-7). Although each of 
the nine provinces makes a contribution to the total maize crop, the Free State and North 
West provinces produce more than 70% of the maize harvested in South Africa (see fig 1.1).  
 
From 2000, human consumption of maize made up more than 50% of total consumption (see 
fig 1.2), resulting in private expenditure on grain products of R54 584.1 million in 2006 
(National Department of Agriculture 2007:107). The importance of this amount is highlighted 
by the estimate that ultra poor South African households spend up to 20% of their monthly 
income on maize alone, and as such, demand is price inelastic, that is, consumers have no 
choice but to absorb price increases (NIEP 1995). This figure is of even greater concern if 
2  
one considers the fact that 37% of South Africans are in the low-income group (Vink & Kirsten 
2002:12).  
 
Figure 1.1 Distribution of maize production among provinces 
 
Source: Directorate Agricultural Statistics (2007:2)  
 
Figure 1.2 Human consumption of maize vs total consumption (million metric tons) 
 
Source: National Department of Agriculture (2007:8)  
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From the 1930s up to the mid-1990s, government controlling bodies largely dominated grain 
pricing in South Africa. As such, the estimated 4 000 large commercial farmers supplying the 
majority of grains for a population of more than 40 million people had to be content with a 
fixed price, notwithstanding the possibility of a smaller crop. Via the government-established 
Maize Board, the government appointed cooperatives to buy maize from producers and sell it 
to processors at a price fixed for the duration of the production season (Traub & Jayne 
2004:1-3). This method of price determination resulted in the formation of oligopolies through 
a concentration of a limited number of maize processors (Bernstein 1996:120-145).  
 
During this period of state intervention in the valuation of maize prices, no less than 22 
marketing schemes were introduced, starting with the Marketing Act in 1937. According to 
Vink and Kirsten (2002:2), an increase in pressure from external forces in the 1980s resulted 
in the agricultural sector being deregulated in a process consisting of two distinctive phases, 
as highlighted below. 
 
(1) The fundamental change incorporated in the first phase was the deregulation of state 
marketing schemes. This was done within the framework of the Marketing Act of 1968, 
and the change can be attributed to the amendment in fiscal and monetary policies during 
the latter stages of the 20th century. Ongoing isolation from the world market because of 
the apartheid regime meant that the deregulation steps taken were aimed at the domestic 
market only. Trade in foreign products consisted of managing imports and exports with the 
exclusive aim of manipulating domestic prices. The Marrakesh Agreement of GATT in 
1993 was the first purposeful step towards opening the South African agricultural sector to 
world markets. This was achieved by replacing direct controls over agricultural imports 
with tariffs (Vink & Kirsten 2002:2).  
 
(2) The second phase of deregulation proved to be more radical, and was brought about by 
the introduction of the Marketing of Agricultural Products Act 47 of 1996. This Act 
proposed important changes in the way in which prices of grain would be determined. It 
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was distinctly different from the autocratic method of price fixing to which producers and 
processors had become accustomed. This resulted in the agricultural sector being opened 
up to world market influences for the first time (Vink & Kirsten 2002:2).  
 
The objectives of the Marketing of Agricultural Products Act 47 can be summarised as 
follows: 
• an increase in market access for all participants in the market 
• enhanced efficiency in the determination of prices for soft commodities 
• the optimisation of earnings resulting from exports of soft commodities 
• the overall enhancement of the viability of the agricultural sector.  
(Vink & Kirsten 2000:17.)  
 
As a direct result of the implementation of the above Act, the Agricultural Markets Division 
was introduced as a separate and independent division of the South African Futures 
Exchange (otherwise known as SAFEX). Henceforth, the value of commodities such as white  
and yellow maize, bread-milling wheat and sunflower seeds was to be derived from futures 
contracts on the underlying commodity (Gravelet-Blondin 2001:1-2). A change in the method 
of price determination whereby prices could fluctuate was not welcomed by all market 
participants, and many producers and processors held the view that a futures exchange for 
soft commodities was not viable in South Africa. This view was further enhanced by the fact 
that South Africa was the only exchange in the world trading futures and options contracts 
with white maize as the underlying commodity (FMD 2005). In particular, owing to the 
negative impact on earnings stability, processors did not enjoy the high levels of price 
variability brought about by a free market. More than a decade later, however, the free market 
is flourishing under the SAFEX mission statement whereby SAFEX “seeks to provide the 
secure and efficient market for trading derivatives in South Africa” (Gravelet-Blondin 2001:4).  
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The challenge and concern remain as to whether participants in the soft commodity futures 
market have acquired the necessary knowledge and skills over the past decade to effectively 
manage the price risks inherent in the futures market in such a way that earnings are not 
affected by price fluctuations. 
 
 
1.2      PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
It is evident from the discussion in section 1.1 that over the past decade participants in the 
agricultural market, whether producers or processors, have had to adapt to a different and 
complicated method of price determination for grains.  As such, it is necessary to determine 
the success of market participants in managing their price risk in a liberalised market.  
 
Should the study indicate a lack of positive results from the market participants in the price 
risk management of agricultural commodities, it is necessary to determine whether risk 
management models can be developed to assist market participants in effectively mitigating 
price risk. The research problem can be formulated as follows: 
 
What is the need and possibility for the development of futures market price risk management 
strategies that will constantly outperform the market? 
 
As far as is known, no research has been conducted on the possibility of beating the market 
return of the South African Futures Exchange for soft commodities. A non-probability 
purposive sample will be used to refer to the procurement companies and the trading year 
over which the hedging results will be evaluated. The accurate and available historical price 
and volatility information are the main reasons why a secondary data analysis was chosen as 
the most appropriate data collection method. This historical information includes the daily 
trading range and closing prices, as well as the volatility for every commodity and contract 
month. 
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1.3      PURPOSE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
This study will be conducted with the initial purpose of determining the success with which 
participants in the soft commodity futures market mitigate price risk through the use of 
derivative instruments. Thereafter, the aim will be to develop derivative price risk 
management strategies that will outperform the return offered by the market.  In order to 
realise these aims 
 
• derivative instruments available in the futures market and their benefits to market 
participants will be described  
• the price risk management success of futures market participants will be explored 
• returns from the proposed risk management models will be compared to those offered by 
the market 
 
 
1.4      LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH 
 
In conducting the research, certain information from processors could not be obtained 
because it was regarded as confidential. This information includes: 
(1) the specific procurement strategy used for risk management purposes on SAFEX 
(2) the final realised procurement price 
 
Since the financial results of the companies chosen in the research sample indicate the net 
effect of the procurement strategies, the specific procurement strategy applied and 
procurement price achieved does not prevent conclusions being drawn from the research. 
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1.5      RESEARCH STRUCTURE 
 
This study can be divided into three distinct parts 
 
• Part 1. The first part of the research involves an extensive literature review on trading 
in the futures market and the derivative instruments available to minimise the risk of 
price fluctuations. Participants in the futures market will be identified and their price risk 
management success evaluated against a chosen benchmark. 
 
• Part 2. Empirical research will be conducted on the possibility of developing price risk 
management models, consisting of futures and/or options contracts, that will 
outperform the benchmark chosen in part 1. This will be achieved by applying these 
models to secondary (historical) data. The relevant models will ultimately be compared 
with one another in order to determine the most effective method of price risk 
management. 
 
• Part 3. Results achieved from the literature study and empirical research will be 
interpreted in order to determine whether there is a need for price risk management 
models and whether a strategy can be developed in such a way that the return offered 
by the market is outperformed. 
 
 
1.6      CHAPTER LAYOUT 
 
The ensuing chapters can be summarised as follows: 
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Chapter 2: Theoretical background: soft commodity futures market 
An extensive literature review is provided of the theoretical background of international and 
local futures markets. The chapter defines derivative instruments and their inherent margining 
system, and discusses relevant option pricing models. Market volatility, market variables and 
accounting standards pertaining to positions in the futures market are evaluated. 
 
Chapter 3: Groups susceptible to volatility in the futures exchange  
A distinction is made between the groups susceptible to price fluctuations on SAFEX and the 
effect of a volatile futures market on the relevant groups is highlighted. The chapter concludes 
by determining the need for alternative risk management strategies that will minimise price 
volatility. 
 
Chapter 4: Performance measurement through benchmarking 
Benchmarking is defined and the most appropriate market benchmark chosen. The return 
offered by the historical market benchmark is calculated as an introduction to the ensuing 
chapters.   
 
Chapter 5: Research design 
This chapter provides a literature study of the different research methodologies and research 
designs. It determines the most appropriate sampling method and research design that will 
enhance the accuracy and dependability of the results obtained from the research process. 
 
Chapter 6: The momentum strategy 
The momentum strategy is defined and applied to historical data. The results of this strategy 
are compared to the benchmark in order to determine its effectiveness. 
 
Chapter 7: The maximum price strategy 
The maximum price strategy is defined and applied to historical data. The results of this 
strategy are compared to the benchmark in order to evaluate its performance. 
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Chapter 8: The indexed strangle 
The indexed strangle strategy is defined and applied to historical data. The results of this 
strategy are compared to the benchmark in order to derive conclusions on its viability. 
 
Chapter 9: Evaluation and comparison of price risk management models 
The results of the proposed risk management models are compared in order to determine the 
most effective strategy. The results versus the benchmark are compared to that of fund 
managers in alternative markets. 
 
Chapter 10: Summary, conclusions and recommendations 
The research is summarised and conclusions drawn on the price risk management success of 
participants in the futures market and the possibility of developing models that will mitigate 
price volatility and outperform market returns. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND: SOFT COMMODITY FUTURES MARKET 
 
 
2.1     INTRODUCTION 
 
Futures trading in a wide variety of commodities and financial instruments occur worldwide in 
numerous futures exchanges. Although futures trading has been in existence for a few 
centuries, it remains a highly specialised area and a trade in which a limited number of people 
possess sufficient knowledge to participate in.  
 
In addition, few people realise the impact of the futures market on their daily existence. 
Without actively participating in the trade of futures contracts, price fluctuations in the futures 
market can have significant financial implications for the average South African as well as the 
economy as a whole. 
 
The objective of this chapter is to provide the theoretical background to futures trading. This is 
necessary, because the ensuing chapters continuously refer to matters discussed in this 
chapter. 
 
 
2.2     THE BIRTH OF THE FUTURES MARKET 
 
2.2.1 Historical commodity markets 
The futures market, as it is known today, and the underlying trading principles of commodity 
futures contracts evolved from practices that are centuries old. Formalised trading practices 
developed in the ancient Greek and Roman markets with the introduction of fixed trading 
locations and trading hours. Initially the Forum in Rome was used as the common 
marketplace, while the Agora served a similar purpose in Athens. Despite the fall of these 
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civilisations, the fundamental trading principle of a fixed marketplace survived (Teweles & 
Jones 1987:6; CBOT 1994:1). 
 
A distinctive feature of the Dark Ages was the disruption of commerce. During this period, 
merchants had to rely on scattered local markets to trade their products. This proved highly 
ineffective and the principle of a common marketplace eventually re-emerged through the 
introduction of so-called “medieval fairs”. Merchants and craftsmen, with the support of 
political authorities, organised these regional fairs by traveling from town to town to promote 
them (CBOT 1994:1). 
 
During the 12th century, the medieval fairs in England and France grew to large and complex 
markets, and by the 13th century, the principle of cash transactions with immediate delivery 
was well developed. It was during this time that the practice of contracting of merchandise for 
delivery in the future began. Samples were commonly used to establish standards of quality. 
Of all the contributions made by medieval fairs to modern commerce, the most important 
remains the principle of self-regulation and arbitration. The Law Merchant Code governed 
trading in England and set certain standards of conduct to be followed by local participants in 
the market. A violation of the Law Merchant Code prohibited a merchant from continuing 
trading activities. Commodity exchanges in the USA eventually adopted this principle of self-
regulation (CBOT 1994:1-2). 
 
The development of modern cities, better communication methods and improved 
transportation saw the importance of regional fairs declining and eventually being replaced by 
specialised market centers. The development of these market centers spread beyond Europe, 
with Japan’s commodity exchanges dating back to the 17th century. These Japanese 
commodity exchanges developed nearly one-and-a-half centuries earlier than their securities 
markets. In the USA, commodity markets came into existence during 1752, trading domestic 
produce, textiles, hides, lumber and metals. A feature of the early US commodity markets was 
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the fact that most of the trade was based upon transactions for immediate delivery (CBOT 
1994:2-3). 
 
2.2.2 Modern futures markets 
The development of commerce in Chicago and grain trade in the US Midwest was the reason 
for the establishment of modern futures trading on the Midwestern frontier at the start of the 
1800s. Chicago’s proximity to the Great Lakes, close to the fertile farmlands of the well-known 
American Corn Belt, and its proximity to the major transport routes contributed to its 
development as a grain terminal (CBOT 1994:3; Teweles & Jones 1987:9). 
 
Chaos in supply and demand was common in the early 1800s, with producers delivering 
produce to regional markets only to find the supply of grain outweighing the needs of 
processors. These processors would often bid at below-average prices because of the 
excessive supply of produce. Grains were regularly dumped in the streets for lack of buyers. 
Inevitably, the odd failure of crops and subsequent food shortages supported the prices of 
grains and forced businesses into bankruptcy because of a lack of raw materials for daily 
activities. The difficulty of transporting produce aggravated the problems for buyers and 
sellers. The dirt roads from farms surrounding the city of Chicago were impassable for long 
periods, especially during the rainy season. Snow was another factor contributing to the 
growing transportation problem. In an attempt to ease the transportation problems, roads 
made from wooden boards, otherwise known as “plank roads”, were built. This proved 
moderately effective but had a negative impact on the already expensive transportation costs. 
During the 1840s, farmers transporting grains from their lands to Chicago over a distance of 
60 miles were unable to break even since the transportation cost equaled the cost of 
producing the grains (CBOT 1994:3-4). 
 
Upon reaching Chicago, the storage of the produce bought from farmers was another 
obstacle facing processors. In addition to inadequate storage space, underdeveloped facilities 
in local harbors handicapped the shipment of grains to the East and the return of procured 
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manufactured goods to the West. These intolerable market conditions caused farmers and 
merchants to start contracting produce for future delivery. This method of price determination 
was initially used by the so-called “Merchants of the River”, who received grains in early 
winter from farmers and had to store it until the rivers and canals were free of ice and 
navigable. In order to eliminate the price risk of the grain being stored, these river merchants 
would travel to Chicago and contract grains to be delivered in spring for a specific price. In 
doing so, they guaranteed themselves a buyer for the grains as well as an agreed-upon price 
on date of delivery (CBOT 1994:4). 
 
On 13 March 1851, forward contracting was first recorded in the USA when 3 000 bushels of 
corn were contracted to be delivered in June at a price of one cent per bushel below the 13  
March price of corn (Teweles & Jones 1987:9). 
 
The Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) was formed in 1848 by 82 merchants (Teweles & Jones 
1987:9) with the objective of promoting the city of Chicago and providing a meeting place for 
buyers and sellers where commodities could be exchanged. A distinctive feature of the 
exchange’s early years was that only forward contracts were traded. In order to eliminate the 
potential drawbacks of forward contracts, the Chicago Board of Trade formalised commodity 
trading in 1865 by developing futures contracts that made provision for a standardised quality, 
quantity, place and time of delivery for the commodity being traded. During the same year, a 
margining system was introduced to reduce the risk of buyers and sellers not fulfilling their 
contracts.  Speculators quickly became interested in futures contracts and found trading these 
contracts to be an exciting alternative to trading the grain itself (CBOT 1994:5).  
 
After the introduction of the margining system, most of the underlying trading principles, as is 
evident today, were in place. Little did one know that the most successful contract in the 
futures market were yet to come, namely futures contracts on financial instruments (CBOT 
1994:5-6). The CBOT developed into one of the largest futures trading markets in the USA, 
along with the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. In Europe, the two largest futures exchanges 
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are the London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange, and Eurex. Other 
futures exchanges worth noting are the Bolsa de Mercadorias y Futuros in Sao Paulo, the 
Sydney Futures Exchange and the Tokyo International Financial Futures Exchange (Hull 
2002:1). This study will focus exclusively on the trade of derivative instruments on soft 
commodities.  
 
 
2.3      TRADING IN SOFT COMMODITIES 
 
2.3.1 What are commodities? 
Tozer (2003:xiii) defines a commodity in economic terms as “… a portion of wealth that is 
demanded because it has the power to satisfy human needs and wants”. He identifies the 
following three characteristics of commodities:  
(1) Commodities are homogeneous products. 
(2) A certain value is attached to commodities. 
(3) Commodities are limited in terms of supply.  
 
Since commodities are natural substances, they can be owned and transformed through 
processing. The supply and demand condition of a commodity is the major underlying 
variable in the determination of the inherent value of the specific commodity (Chabane 2003: 
3-4). In broad terms commodities are classified in three categories namely metals, energy 
and soft commodities (Tozer 2003:xiii). 
 
2.3.2 Soft commodities 
Soft commodities are agriculturally produced commodities. This is achieved via the well-
known term of farming which entails the manipulation of biological processes and resources 
such as land and water in combination with technological inputs. The fact that many of the 
soft commodities produced by farmers are essential to sustain humankind in the form of food 
makes it unique. The production of soft commodities through agriculture is the most 
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geographically practised economic activity known to humankind. The evolution of human 
society from nomadic hunter-gatherer to a city-based civilisation had its origins some 12 000 
years ago in the development of settled farming techniques. Through the years, the 
development of highly scientific technology underlying the production of soft commodities 
lowered the risk of crop failures. This economic activity remains subject to high levels of risk 
and uncertainty and shape the way in which commodity markets behave worldwide (Tozer 
2003:xiii-xiv). The pricing behaviour of these commodity markets can be managed and 
minimised through the use of derivative instruments.  
 
 
2.4      DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS 
 
2.4.1 Definition and characteristics 
According to Bodie, Kane and Marcus (2002:15), “Derivatives are financial arrangements 
between two parties whose payments are based on, or derived from, the performance of 
some agreed-upon benchmark”. This definition is similar to that of Brigham, Daves and 
Gapenski (1999:716) who define derivatives as instruments “… whose value is determined by 
the market price of some other asset”, as well as that of Valsamakis, Vivian and du Toit 
(2003:267) who state that a derivative instrument is a “…financial instrument of which the 
return is based on that of an underlying instrument”.  
 
Derivative instruments can be based upon an underlying asset entailing one of the following: 
• currencies 
• commodities 
• government or corporate debt 
• stocks 
• interest rates 
(Wikipedia 2007:1) 
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Internationally, the derivatives market experienced a high level of growth in both liquidity and 
prominence in the previous decade. This can be attributed to the following factors: 
• an enhanced globalization and liberalization of trade worldwide 
• better technology and communication 
• less rigorous control on capital flows  
• the development of complex strategies in order to reduce risk  
(Botha 2005:20.) 
 
Derivatives can be classified in two broad groups, namely forward-type contracts and option-
type contracts. These derivative instruments can be traded on a formal exchange (such as 
the Johannesburg Securities Exchange and the Chicago Board of Trade) or more privately on 
the over-the-counter (OTC) markets. Since exchange-traded derivative instruments consist 
mainly of futures and options contracts, it is a highly standardised market. In sharp contrast to 
this, an OTC derivative originates when a bank or securities firm enters into a private contract 
with another investor or dealer. This contract possesses features other than the derivatives 
traded on an exchange and is generally more flexible and innovative than standard futures 
and options contracts (Bodie et al  2002:15). 
 
According to Skerritt (2002:10), it is important for both economic and legal purposes to 
classify derivative instruments, for the following reasons: 
• Tax treatment. Derivative instruments have more favourable tax treatment in certain 
instances than non-derivative instruments. 
• Capital requirements. Cash instruments entail higher capital requirements than 
derivative instruments. 
• Financial ratios. Some derivative instruments are only published in the footnotes of 
financial statements. This is done when the derivative contracts are off-balance sheet 
transactions and can lead to the company experiencing improved financial ratios. 
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• Legal requirements. Legal requirements must be met when entering into certain 
derivative transactions. 
 
2.4.2 Distinction between derivative instruments 
 
2.4.2.1 Forward contracts versus futures contracts 
Even though the form and terminology of forward contracts and futures contracts differ 
substantially, the fundamental mathematics and economics of these derivative instruments 
remain the same (Skerrit 2002:30). 
 
a)      Forward contracts 
Hull (2002:462) defines a forward contract as “a contract that obligates the holder to buy or 
sell an asset for a predetermined delivery price at a predetermined future time”. Forward 
contracts are customised in order to meet the needs of both the contracting parties. Since 
forward contracts do not need to conform to the standards of a recognised futures exchange, 
it is traded in the OTC market.  
 
A distinctive feature of forward contracts is the characteristic whereby no marking-to-market 
for the particular contract exists and the contracting parties agree on settlement of cash flows 
on the specified delivery date. Since this ruling enhances credit risk, parties are required to 
provide sufficient collateral as guarantee to the fulfillment of the forward contract or any other 
type of OTC contract (Ryan 2002:224). According to Hull (2002:34), the majority of forward 
contracts are not closed out prior to delivery of the underlying asset, but the contracts are 
mainly settled at maturity through delivery of the asset or a cash settlement.  
 
As with futures contracts, two parties participate in the trading of a forward contract, namely 
long- and short-position holders (Bodie et al 2002:740). The long position holder will realise a 
profit if the asset price at maturity is higher than the delivery price of the asset. Similarly, a 
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loss will be realised if the asset price on maturity date is lower than the delivery price of the 
asset. This is graphically depicted in Figure 2.1. “A” indicates a profit realised owing to the 
asset price being higher than the delivery price (the price level where the long position is 
entered into), whilst “B” shows a loss, since the asset price is lower than the delivery price. 
 
Figure 2.I   Payoff from a long position in a forward contract 
 
Source: Hull (2002:35) 
 
Figure 2.1 indicates that an increase in the price of a commodity will result in higher profit 
margins realised by the long position holder.  
 
A short position holder in a forward contract will realise a profit if the asset price on maturity 
date is lower than the delivery price, while a loss will occur if the asset price on delivery date 
is higher than the actual delivery price of the asset (see fig 2.2). A profit is realised at “A” 
because the asset price is lower than the delivery price (price level where the short position is 
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entered into), while a loss is incurred at “B” where the asset price is higher than the delivery 
price. 
 
Figure 2.2   Payoff from a short position in a forward contract 
 
Source: Hull (2002:35) 
 
b)     Futures contracts 
According to Valsamakis et al (2003:267), “A futures contract is a notional commitment to 
take delivery (purchase) or to make delivery of (sell) a given quantity of a specific instrument 
on a specified future date at a price determined at the time of taking out the contract”. Since 
futures are exchange-traded contracts, the following characteristics are standardised: 
• the asset-type 
• the quantity of the asset 
• the quality of the asset 
• the future maturity date 
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The payoff for long and short position holders in futures contracts is similar to those of forward 
contracts (see figs 2.1 & 2.2). The fundamental differences between forward contracts and 
futures contracts are summarised in table 2.1. 
 
Table 2.I   Comparison between forward contracts and futures contracts 
Forward contracts Futures contracts 
No standardised contract terms Standardised contract terms 
Traded in OTC markets Traded on formal exchanges 
Single specified date of delivery Range of possible delivery dates 
Absence of daily margining Daily settlement of margins  
Delivery/cash settlement closes out positions Positions closed out before maturity
Source: Hull (2002:37) 
 
Futures contracts on soft commodities are quoted in a manner whereby the delivery month is 
in line with the physical crop cycle. As indicated in section 2.4.2, trading on the Agricultural 
Products Division (APD) of the JSE is limited to white and yellow maize, bread-milling wheat, 
sunflower seeds and soybeans. The tonnage per contract traded on the local exchange 
depends on the specific commodity (see tab 2.2). 
 
Table 2.2   Tonnage per contract of the underlying commodity 
Underlying commodity Tonnage per single contract
Maize (white & yellow) 100 metric tons 
Sunflower seeds 50 metric tons 
Bread milling wheat 50 metric tons 
Soybeans 25 metric tons 
Source: SAFEX (2007) 
 
2.4.2.2 Options  contracts 
The fundamental difference between an option contract and forward/futures contracts is the 
higher level of flexibility inherent in options contracts. This is because the holder of an option 
having the right, but not the obligation, to enter into the underlying futures contract (Madura 
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2000:66). In direct contrast to option contracts, forward/futures contracts entails a long 
position holder (short position holder) committing to the purchase (delivery) of a specified 
asset.   
 
Two types of option contracts exist in the futures market: call options and put options. Since a 
participant in the market can enter into an option contract as either a buyer (long position) or 
seller (short position), four types of participants in the options market can be distinguished: 
(1) buyers of call options 
(2) sellers of call options 
(3) buyers of put options 
(4) sellers of put options 
 
a) Call options 
A call option provides the buyer (long position holder) with the right, but not an obligation, to 
buy an asset for a certain price by a specific date. The guaranteed price at which the asset 
can be bought is known as the strike price (Kohls & Uhl 2002:355). Since the buyer of the call 
option has the right to purchase an asset at a predetermined strike price, he or see foresees 
an increase in the price of the underlying asset and as such has a bullish outlook on the asset 
price.  
 
The maximum profit to be achieved upon entering a long call option position can be 
summarised as follows: 
 
max (St – X, 0) 
 
where X equals the strike price and St is the price of the underlying asset at option expiry. 
This indicates that the option will be exercised only if St>X, also known as an option that is “in 
the money”. In the instance where St=X (“at the money”) or St<X (“out of the money”), the 
option will not be exercised since the underlying asset can be bought at a price level lower 
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than the strike price (Hull 2002:164-165). When buying a call option, the maximum potential 
loss equals the amount of the call premium, while potential gains are unlimited. A short 
position in a call option gives the short position holder a maximum profit equal to the option 
premium with the risk of unlimited losses.   
 
The payoff from a short position in a call option can be summarised as follows: 
 
Min(X – St, 0) 
 
These payoffs are depicted graphically in figure 2.3, which shows a long position holder in a 
call option realising a profit when prices rise, while the short position holder simultaneously 
incurs a loss in the call option. 
 
Figure 2.3   Payoff from position in call options                   
                          
Source: Hull (2002:165) 
 
b) Put options 
A put option provides the buyer (long position holder) with the right but not an obligation to 
deliver an asset for a certain price by a specific date. The guaranteed price against which the 
asset can be delivered is known as the strike price (Kohls & Uhl 2002:355). The buyer of the 
put option has the right to sell an asset at a predetermined strike price and enters into a put 
option contract because he or she foresees a decrease in the price of the underlying asset 
and as such has a bearish outlook on the asset price.  
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The maximum profit to be achieved upon entering a long put option position can be 
summarised as follows: 
 
Max(X – St, 0) 
 
where X equals the strike price and St the price of the underlying asset at option expiry. This 
indicates that the option will be exercised only if X>St, also known as an option that is “in the 
money”. In the instance where X=St (“at the money”) or X<St (“out of the money”), the option 
will not be exercised since the underlying asset can be bought at a price level lower than the 
strike price (Hull 2002:164-165). When entering a long put position the maximum potential 
loss is equal to the amount of the put premium, while potential gains are unlimited. A short 
position in a put option provides the short position holder with a maximum profit equal to the 
option premium, while potential losses are unlimited. The payoff from a short position in a put 
option can be summarised as follows: Min (St – X, 0). These payoffs are represented 
graphically in figure 2.4, which shows that a profit is realised by a long position holder in a put 
option when prices drop, while the lower prices result in a loss for the short position holder in 
a put option. 
 
Figure 2.4   Payoff from position in put options 
                          
Source: Hull (2002:165) 
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c)      American options versus European options 
It is important to note that option contracts are classified as either American or European 
options. Bodie, Kane & Marcus (2002:978) define an American option as an option that can 
be exercised any time before and up to its expiration date. In contrast to American options, 
European options can only be exercised upon expiry of the option contract (Hull 2002:461). 
Since option contracts on SAFEX can be exercised on any given trading day up to option 
expiry, they form part of American option contracts. 
 
2.4.2.3     Pricing of options 
The price being paid to obtain a long position in an option contract is known as the option 
premium. Various mathematical models are used to determine this option premium, such as 
the binomial model and models by Cox, Ross and Ruberstein (Botha 2005:53-54). The 
principal option pricing model, which is even programmed into the permanent memories of 
some calculators, is the Black-Scholes model.  
 
During the early 1970s Fischer Black, Myron Scholes and Robert Merton developed a 
mathematical model upon which option pricing are still based today. This model, widely 
known as the Black-Scholes option pricing model, was pivotal in the rapid growth and 
success of financial engineering in the 1980s and 1990s. The importance of this model was 
highlighted when the Nobel Prize for economics was awarded to Scholes and Merton in 1997. 
The death of Black in 1995 prevented him from sharing this accolade. Some assumptions 
were made in the development of this model. These include the lack of arbitrage 
opportunities, returns on the underlying asset following a lognormal distribution and the 
continuous trading of the underlying asset (Brigham et al 1999:729; Hull 2002:232-239). 
 
The Black-Scholes option pricing model can be summarised in the following three equations   
(Bodie et al 2002:709-710): 
 
Co = SoN(d1) – Xe –rtN(d2) 
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where  d1 = [ln(So/X) + (r + σ²/2)T] / σ √T 
  d2 = d1 – σ√T 
 
and where Co = the current option value 
  So = the current asset value 
  N(d) = the probability that, from a standard normal distribution, a random  
      draw will be less than d 
  X = the strike price or Exercise price 
  e = the base of the natural log function, namely 2.71828 
  r = the risk-free interest rate 
  T = the time to option expiration, expressed in annual terms 
  ln = the natural logarithm function 
σ = the standard deviation of the annualized continuously compounded rate      
    of return of the underlying asset 
 
Six factors that influence the premium of an option can be identified. These are as follows: 
(1) the asset price 
(2) the strike price (exercise price) of the option 
(3) the volatility of the underlying asset 
(4) the time until option expiration 
(5) the interest rate 
(6) the dividend rate of the asset  
(Bodie et al  2002:698-699.) 
 
The first four of these variables have the greatest impact on the premium payable for a long 
position in an option. 
 
 
 
26  
a)     Asset price and strike price (exercise price) of option 
Everything else being equal, a higher asset price will result in a larger premium payable for a 
long position in an option. This statement can be derived from the Black-Scholes option 
pricing model where Co = SoN(d1) – Xe –rtN(d2), and So = the current asset price. Similarly, 
a lower asset price will result in a smaller premium payable for a long position in an option. 
 
Options are referred to as being “in the money, at the money or out of the money”. An at the 
money option is defined as “an option in which the strike price equals the price of the 
underlying asset” (Hull 2002:456). Hull (2002:462) defines an in the money option as “either a 
call option where the asset price is greater than the strike price or a put option where the 
asset price is less than the strike price”. This is the opposite of the definition of an out of the 
money option, which is a call option where the price on the underlying is less than the strike 
price or a put option with an underlying worth more in value than the strike price. This is 
summarised in table 2.3, with S being the asset value and X equal to the strike price of the 
option. 
 
Table 2.3   Relationship between the asset price and strike price of options 
 Call option Put option
At the money option S = X S = X 
In the money option S > X S < X 
Out of the money option S < X S > X 
Source: Hull (2002:168) 
 
As shown in table 2.3, the long position holder in a call option will benefit from an increase in 
the price of the asset, with the maximum risk being equal to the option premium initially paid 
for the call option. A long position holder in a put option will benefit from a decrease in price 
and face a maximum potential loss equal to the price of the put option. 
 
As such, in the money options are more expensive than at the money options which, in turn, 
trade for a larger premium than out of the money options. 
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b)     Volatility of the underlying asset 
Volatility is a major determinant of option prices because it measures the uncertainty of 
returns on an asset. It can be defined as the change in the price of a futures contract over a 
given time period. Higher levels of volatility lead to higher option prices and vice versa. 
 
c)     Time until maturity 
The longer the time until expiration of the option contract, the greater the influence will be on 
the eventual option price. Time value does not decrease in linear style, since the impact of 
time value on option prices falls sharply in the last few weeks until maturity. This is 
represented graphically in figure 2.5. An option with a longer period until expiration (A) is 
higher in price and decreases more slowly in value than an option with a shorter period until 
expiration (B). 
 
Figure 2.5   Effect of time value on option prices 
 
Source: Hull (2002:184) 
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2.5      SOUTH AFRICAN FUTURES EXCHANGE 
 
Even though futures trading in South Africa have been in existence for two decades, the trade 
of contracts for future delivery with soft commodities as the underlying asset was only added 
to the futures exchange in the mid-1990s. As such, it is still a developing market. 
 
2.5.1     Development of the South African Futures Exchange 
The possibilities and potential of futures trading were recognised in South Africa during the 
1980s, and in April 1987 Rand Merchant Bank established an informal futures market. In 
order to ensure widespread trust and to address the need for an independent exchange and 
clearing house, the South African Futures Exchange (hereafter known as SAFEX) came into 
existence. The SAFEX Clearing Company (Pty) Limited (SAFCOM) was formed, and on 10 
August 1990 SAFEX was granted an official licensed from the Financial Services Board in 
terms of the Financial Markets Control Act (Gravelet-Blondin 2001:1). 
 
Futures trading were initially confined to the financial markets with equity index products 
proving to be the most popular. Of these index products the All Share Index (ALSI) and 
Industrial Index (INDI) dominated trading volumes. Options contracts on financial futures were 
first introduced in October 1992, while the introduction of a fully automated trading system in 
1996 signaled a significant milestone in the development of the exchange. Options contracts 
exploded into popularity and currently account for 65% of volumes traded and 80% of open 
interest (Gravelet-Blondin 2001:1). 
 
2.5.2 Soft commodity futures contracts on SAFEX 
Soft commodities in South Africa have been subject to a highly regulated market, and as 
such, prices for agricultural products were fixed for over 40 years by government-enabled 
legislation and governing bodies. The best-known governing body in the agricultural market 
was the South African Maize Board. Local and international pressure to deregulate this 
market brought about extensive research into the feasibility of these products being traded on 
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a futures exchange. In 1995 a separate, independent division of SAFEX was formed for 
trading agricultural commodities and R4.2 million was raised as start-up capital through the 
issue of 84 trading seats (Gravelet-Blondin 2001:1). 
 
Contracts traded on the Agricultural Markets Division of SAFEX include white and yellow 
maize, bread-milling wheat, sunflower seeds and soybeans. March 1998 saw the successful 
introduction of options contracts on the underlying futures contract. As investor, speculator 
and hedger confidence in the futures market grew, so did the volumes traded.  From a 
mediocre 1 800 contracts traded monthly in 1996, market liquidity blossomed in the following 
years to reach 33 000 contracts traded on a monthly basis in 2000 (Gravelet-Blondin 2001:2). 
Currently the exchange averages an astonishing 200 000 metric tons of maize traded daily, 
while the volume of options traded on the underlying futures contracts is increasing. The 
number of broking members on SAFEX exploded from the initial five active members to 52 
members through which 12 000 clients manage their trading positions. South Africa remains 
the only country in the world with an exchange on which white maize futures contracts and 
white maize options contracts are traded (FMD 2005:1-3). 
 
In May 2001, members of SAFEX and the Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE) agreed 
to a buyout of SAFEX by the JSE, although the SAFEX branding is still used in order to 
promote futures trading in South Africa (SAFEX 2006). 
 
2.5.3 Clearinghouse and margins 
In order to guarantee the fulfillment of contractual obligations obtained by parties through the 
trading of futures and options contracts, an exchange clearinghouse acts as an intermediary 
in all futures exchange transactions. A broker who is not a member of the clearinghouse itself 
is obliged to facilitate all transactions through a clearinghouse member. The clearinghouse 
keeps track of the daily trades in order to calculate the net rand value of market movement on 
a specific day. The clearinghouse member is required to keep funds in a margin account at 
30  
the clearinghouse against which the net effect of the daily market movement is offset (Hull 
2002:23). 
 
Similarly, an investor is required to maintain a margin account with its broking member. These 
margins act as a safeguard against the possibility of default by a client. Two types of margins 
can be distinguished, namely initial and variation margins. The initial margin is set by the 
governing body of the exchange on which trading occurs, while the flow of variation margin is 
dependent upon the fluctuation in the price of the futures or options contract on which a 
position is taken (Hull 2002:20-23). 
 
2.5.3.1 The initial margin 
Hull (2002:463) defines the initial margin as “the cash required from a futures trader at the 
time of the trade”. In other words, the initial margin is funds payable by a participant in the 
futures market when entering into a transaction as a deposit of good faith. Internationally, the 
initial margin may be in the form of cash, shares and even government bonds, but the JSE 
only allows for cash as the means of initial margin (Skerrit 2002:19).The initial margin should 
remain in the margin account of the client as long as an open position is present. The amount 
per ton payable as initial margin may vary according to the strategy entered into. Whereas an 
open position in a single futures contract requires the maximum initial margin, the amount of 
the initial margin is less if the futures contract is part of a spread strategy among commodities 
highly correlated in price movements since the loss from one position in the spread will at 
least be partially offset by the gain from the other position.   
 
2.5.3.2 The variation margin 
Hull (2002:463) defines the variation margin as “an extra margin required to bring the balance 
in a margin account up to the initial margin when there is a margin call”. As stated in 2.5.3.1, 
the initial margin is the amount payable upon entering into a contract on the futures 
exchange. After completion of every trading day, an adjustment is made to the value of the 
funds in the investor’s margin account in order to reflect the market movement for the 
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particular day. This practice is commonly known as marking to market. The principle of 
marking to market the margin account of a client is not an arrangement between the broking 
member and client, but rather a mechanism whereby the investor’s losses are paid to the 
exchange in order to pass on the funds to the investor with a position similar in size but 
opposite in nature (Hull 2002:20-22). 
 
To ensure that the amount of funds in an investor’s margin account never becomes negative, 
a maintenance margin is set which is somewhat lower than the initial margin. In the event of a 
decline in the value of the margin account to a level lower than the maintenance margin, a 
margin call is placed upon the investor to deposit funds to the extent that the original initial 
margin level is restored. The funds payable to regain this initial margin level are known as the 
variation margin. Should the variation margin payment not be made, the broking member will 
liquidate the investor’s positions to ensure that further market movement will not result in the 
net total of the margin account becoming negative (Hull 2002:20-22). A number of variables 
have an ongoing impact on futures prices and determine the direction and extent of market 
movement. 
 
 
2.6      VARIABLES DETERMINING FUTURES PRICES 
 
Market variables determine the level at which futures prices trade. These include the supply 
of and demand for the commodity, market sentiment and technical indicators. Research has 
found the supply of and demands for the underlying product as one of the most important 
fundamental variables in the South African market (Krugel 2003:3). Factors influencing supply 
and demand can be summarised as follows:  
 
2.6.1 Import and export parity 
The soft commodity market in South Africa operates in a free-market environment. As such, 
changes in the world market of similar commodities have a direct impact on domestic prices. 
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Import and export parity prices act as ceiling and floor prices respectively for the underlying 
commodity. 
 
Import parity is a calculable price level at which a specific commodity can be imported from 
foreign countries. Once the SAFEX price moves beyond this level, demand for the local 
product tends to decline as imports of the product increase. The flagging demand for the local 
product generally forces prices back to levels lower than import parity.  
 
Export parity is a calculable price level at which a specific commodity can be exported to 
foreign countries. Once the SAFEX price moves lower than this level, demand for the local 
product tends to increase as exports of the product flourish. This higher demand for the local 
product generally forces prices back to levels higher than export parity (see figure 2.6). 
 
Figure 2.6   Import and export parity versus SAFEX white maize 
 
Source: GRAIN SA (2007) 
 
The impact of parity levels on SAFEX prices is clearly evident in figure 2.6, where the 
symbols A and C represent a period in which SAFEX prices are trading at levels similar to 
import parity. The lack of demand for local grain results in prices dropping after a brief period 
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at this level. Similarly, symbol B represents a brief period in which SAFEX prices traded 
around export parity levels. The resultant increase in demand for local grains leads to an 
immediate rise in SAFEX prices.   
 
2.6.2 Strength of the local currency 
The strength of the South African rand indirectly affects local supply and demand through its 
impact on import and export parity price levels. A stronger currency moves the parity price 
band lower, while a weaker currency drives the price band higher. The extent to which local 
SAFEX prices are influenced by a currency changing in value is illustrated in figure 2.7. 
 
Figure 2.7   Correlation between SAFEX white maize prices and the currency  
 
Source: Reuters (2007) 
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Figure 2.7 illustrates the impact of a volatile currency on the futures price of commodities. 
During period “A” the South African rand strengthened against the US dollar (R11/$ vs R7/$), 
resulting in SAFEX prices for white maize weakening by close to R1 000/mt. The weakening 
of the currency from the start of 2005 (R6/$ vs R7/$) resulted in SAFEX prices firming over 
the same period, indicated as “B”.  
 
2.6.3 Strength of international commodity prices 
The strength of international commodity prices indirectly affects local supply and demand 
through its impact on import and export parity price levels. Higher international commodity 
prices move the parity price band higher, while lower international commodity prices drive the 
price band lower. The effect of changing international commodity prices on local SAFEX 
prices is illustrated in figure 2.8. 
 
Figure 2.8   Correlation between SAFEX white maize and CBOT corn prices  
 
Source: Reuters (2007) 
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Figure 2.8 illustrates the impact of international commodity prices on the futures price of local 
commodities. From the start of 2007, US maize prices jumped dramatically, resulting in South 
African futures prices for maize following this price movement immediately, as shown in the 
rectangle marked “A”.  
 
2.6.4 Weather conditions 
Weather conditions affect supply and demand, and as such, the futures price level of 
commodities (Chabane 2003:7). Adverse weather conditions have a negative impact on the 
size and quality of the crop. This lower supply tends to move futures price levels higher. Ideal 
weather conditions, especially during planting and pollination, result in a larger crop and 
higher levels of supply which suppress futures prices.    
 
The participants in the trading of derivative instruments on the futures exchange differ with 
respect to their goals and risk appetite. In broad terms, participants are categorised as either 
hedgers or speculators. 
  
 
2.7      HEDGING VERSUS SPECULATION USING THE FUTURES EXCHANGE 
 
2.7.1  Hedging 
A great number of participants in the futures market are hedgers. The primary aim of hedging 
is to eliminate price risk through the use of derivative instruments provided by the futures 
market. Most companies are in the business of manufacturing, retailing or wholesaling. Since 
these companies do not possess superior expertise in predicting variables underlying 
commodity prices, it makes sense to hedge the risks associated with adverse price 
movements (Hull 2002:77). By hedging, participants avoid price surprises. 
 
The price of a manufactured product in a specific industry may fluctuate to reflect the cost of 
raw materials, and as such, the company exercising the most effective hedging strategy will 
36  
earn market share through a lower and more stable product price. Typically, a grain processor 
will make use of futures and options contracts in order to reduce the risk of rising commodity 
prices. In its simplest form, either a long position in a futures contract or call option will be 
obtained. 
 
2.7.2    Speculation 
Traders attempting to anticipate and profit from price movements in the futures market are 
known as speculators. In general, speculators do not intend to fulfil the futures contract by 
taking or making delivery at maturity of the contract (Kohls & Uhl 2002:357). Speculators 
exploit short-term arbitrage opportunities in the commodity markets, thus restoring price 
equilibrium.  
 
The characteristic distinguishing speculators from hedgers is risk. While speculators assume 
risk with the expectation of making a profit, hedgers are naturally risk averse. Speculators are 
a key component of the success of a futures exchange since their activity on the exchange 
provides the market with liquidity and ensures low transaction costs (Kurten 2002:5). Without 
speculators, short hedgers would only be able to trade with long hedgers. Finding a hedger 
with the exact opposite position is a frustrating and time-consuming exercise, and as such, 
speculators have a vital role to play in the futures market. 
 
 
2.8      VOLATILITY OF FUTURES PRICES 
 
As discussed in section 2.4.2.3, the change in the price of a futures contract over a given time 
period is known as the volatility of the contract. This measurement of price fluctuation is 
expressed as a percentage and computed as the annualised standard deviation of 
percentage changes in the daily price of a commodity. Volatility is one of the principal 
variables determining the price of an option. 
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SAFEX prices on white maize have been volatile since the inception of futures trading on soft 
commodities, with price fluctuations of up to 212% over a 16-month period (Chabane 2003:1). 
The average annual volatility of white maize contracts is in excess of 30%, although isolated 
cases of an annual volatility higher than 40% have been recorded (see tab 2.4). 
 
Table 2.4   Annual July white maize contract high, low and average volatility 2001-2006 
Season Season high Season low Average volatility
2001 R957 R599 Not available 
2002 R1893 R828 32.04% 
2003 R1989 R743 32.67% 
2004 R1578 R795 39.24% 
2005 R1200 R522 41.55% 
2006 R1419 R671 37.62% 
Source: (SAFEX) 
 
 
2.9      FINANCIAL REPORTING OF DERIVATIVE INSTRUMENTS: INTERNATIONAL       
           FINANCIAL REPORTING STANDARDS (IFRS) 
 
Historically, South African companies with an open position on SAFEX on financial year-end 
were subject to reporting of these positions through AC133 (Tiger Brands 2003; Tongaat 
Hulett 2003). In order to align South Africa to international standards of reporting in this field, 
AC133 was replaced by International Accounting Standard 39 (IAS39) as set by the 
International Accounting Standards Board. The aim of this section is to provide background 
on the working of the Board and the objectives of IAS39. 
 
2.9.1     IFRS 
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), which is based in London, started 
operations during 2001 and is committed to the development of a set of accounting standards 
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which is of the highest possible quality. In order to achieve the objective of convergence in 
accounting standards worldwide, the IASB cooperates with national accounting standard 
setters. The International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) Foundation is responsible 
for the selection and funding of the IASB. Funds are obtained through major accounting firms, 
industrial companies, central and development banks, private financial institutions and other 
professional and international organisations (IASB 2006:3).     
 
A formal process and broad international consultation are the foundation upon which 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are developed. The full responsibility of all 
technical matters related to IFRS lies with the IASB, which includes the preparation and 
issuing of IFRS and the development of its technical agenda. The following steps are 
performed in the formal process involving new projects: 
• IASB staff identifies and raises issues that warrant the attention of the Board, such as 
technical matters regarding the preparation and issuing of Reporting Standards. 
• The issue is placed on the active agenda and the IASB decides whether the project 
should be conducted alone or if support is needed from alternative standard setters. 
• After thorough consideration of the issue, the IASB may establish a working group. 
• Even though it is not required, the IASB usually publishes a discussion paper on any new 
topics. This involves a comprehensive discussion of the issue as well as possible 
approaches whereby the issue can be addressed, and an invitation to comment on the 
discussion paper. 
• A mandatory step in the process is the publication of an exposure draft, and this is carried 
out in public IASB meetings. 
• A review is conducted by the IASB on both the comments received and the results of 
alternative consultations. The IASB may decide to explore issues further through public 
hearings and field visits. 
• The final development of an IFRS is done during a public meeting by the IASB. Once all 
the issues arising from the exposure draft have been dealt with, the IASB decides 
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whether a revised proposal should be made available to the public for comment. In the 
instance where the IASB is satisfied that that a conclusion has been reached on all 
outstanding issues, an IFRS draft must be approved by no less than nine members of the 
IASB (IASB 2006:5-6).     
 
2.9.2  Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement (IAS 39) 
Futures and options contracts traded on SAFEX are recognised in the financial statements of 
relevant companies through International Accounting Standard 39 (IAS39) as the guideline. A 
detailed discussion of this is presented in section 3.5.1. 
 
Objective of IAS 39 and financial instruments categories  
“The objective of this Standard is to establish principles for recognizing and measuring 
financial assets, financial liabilities and some contracts to buy or sell non-financial items” 
(IASB 2006:1714). 
 
IASB (2006:1717) defines a derivative for the purposes of IAS39 as follows: 
“A derivative is a financial instrument or contract within the scope of this Standard with all 
three of the following characteristics: 
a) its value changes in response to the change in a specified interest rate, financial 
instrument price, commodity price, foreign exchange rate, index of prices or rates, 
credit rating or credit index, or other variable, provided in the case of a non-financial 
variable that the variable is not specific to a party to the contract (sometimes called the 
underlying); 
b) it requires no initial net investment or an initial net investment than is smaller than 
would be required for other types of contracts that would be expected to have a similar 
response to changes in market factors; and 
c) it is settled at a future date.” 
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IAS 39 specifies the following four categories of financial instruments: financial assets or 
liabilities at fair value through profit or loss; held to maturity investments; loans and 
receivables as well as available for sale financial assets. Since held to maturity investments, 
loans and receivables and available for sale financial assets are specified as non-derivative 
financial assets, futures and options contracts traded on SAFEX are categorised as financial 
assets or liabilities at fair value through profit or loss.  
 
While the aim of this section is to provide background on the manner in which derivative 
margins are recorded in the financial statements of companies subject to market movement at 
year-end, the specific measurement of cash flow gains and losses attributable to hedging 
transactions will only be discussed in section 3.5.1. 
 
 
2.10 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Formalised trading practices developed as early as the ancient Greek and Roman markets, 
but it was only during the 1800s that commodity trading in the USA came into existence. 
SAFEX was formed in 1990, with trading initially limited to the financial markets. Futures 
trading in soft commodities were introduced in 1995. 
 
Commodities are defined as portions of wealth that are demanded because they have the 
power to satisfy human needs and want, with soft commodities being agriculturally produced 
commodities. The development of highly scientific technology in the production of soft 
commodities lowers the risk of crop failures, but it remains an economic activity subject to 
high levels of uncertainty that shape the way in which commodity markets behave worldwide 
 
Derivative trading is based on underlying assets such as currencies, commodities, 
government or corporate debt, home mortgages, stocks and interest rates. These derivative 
instruments can be classified as forward-type contracts or option-type contracts and are 
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traded on a formal exchange or more privately on the over-the-counter (OTC) markets. 
Futures contracts are distinguished from forward contracts through a standardised quality, 
quantity, place and time of delivery for the commodity being traded. Participants in the futures 
market are either long (buy) or short (sell) the market, while options on the underlying 
commodity are classified as put or call options.    
 
Variables that influence the premium of an option include the asset price, the strike price 
(exercise price) of the option, the volatility of the underlying asset, the time until option 
expiration, the interest rate and the dividend rate of the asset. The Black-Scholes option 
pricing model is widely recognized as the most important development in the options market. 
 
Supply and demand, market sentiment and technical indicators are variables that determine 
the futures price of a commodity. Volatility measures the change in price of a futures contract 
over a given time period, and is a variable determining the price of options contracts. SAFEX 
prices on white maize are highly volatile, with extreme market movements since the inception 
of the contract. Hedgers participate in the futures market to eliminate the risk of adverse price 
movements, while speculators are risk-seekers whose goal is to realise profits from arbitrage 
opportunities. 
 
The IASB is responsible for the development of a set of reporting standards of the highest 
possible quality and which standardise accounting standards worldwide. IAS39 is applicable 
on the manner in which positions in derivative instruments are measured in financial 
statements.  
 
Chapter 3 identifies the groups susceptible to futures market volatility. The price risk 
management performance of these groups will be evaluated and the impact of volatile prices 
on their financial statements determined. 
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CHAPTER 3 
GROUPS SUSCEPTIBLE TO VOLATILITY IN THE FUTURES EXCHANGE  
 
 
3.1     INTRODUCTION 
 
A number of different groups have an ongoing interest in the futures market. The extent to 
which these groups actively manage their exposure to price volatility differs significantly. The 
price risk management performance of the groups managing a position on SAFEX and the 
impact of volatile prices on individuals with no position on the exchange will determine the 
need for risk management strategies.  
 
The objective of this chapter is to differentiate between groups with a concern in the futures 
exchange and evaluate the pricing performance of market advisory services and relevant 
participants in futures trading. The effect of price volatility on the financial statements of 
processors will be investigated and the need for indexing strategies explored.  
 
Although some individuals do not make use of futures trading in their daily activities, this 
study will determine whether volatile prices do influence passive groups with a concern in the 
underlying commodity traded. This will serve as justification for the development of risk 
management models in the ensuing chapters. 
 
 
3.2. CLASSIFICATION OF GROUPS INFLUENCED BY THE FUTURES MARKET 
 
Groups concerned in SAFEX can be classified according to their level of participation on the 
exchange itself. According to Hull (2002:29), some groups make use of complex 
mathematical models on an intraday, daily or long-term basis in order to evaluate trading 
strategies and risk exposure, while, according to Chabane (2003:1), others are subject to 
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price fluctuations despite having no open position. In broad terms, parties with a concern in 
SAFEX can be defined as groups directly or indirectly susceptible to price movements. 
 
3.2.1. Groups directly susceptible to price movements 
Speculators and hedgers who actively manage a position on SAFEX are directly susceptible 
to a changing market environment and as such to volatile commodity prices (Kohls & Uhl 
2002:350). Although similar price risk management tools are available to these market 
participants, their actual application and aim differ significantly. 
 
3.2.1.1. Speculators 
According to Kohls and Uhl (2002:357), speculators usually do not intend to participate in the 
delivery of physical grain but are directly susceptible to price movements since their financial 
success depends on the strategy used in the exploitation of arbitrage opportunities. The risk 
of being on the wrong side of the market is of such financial magnitude that risk managers of 
the future will need to deal with speculative risks, while activities such as market research and 
investments will resort within the scope of risk management departments (Valsamakis, Vivian 
& du Toit 2003:7).  
 
3.2.1.2. Hedgers 
Hedgers are naturally long stock (producers) or short stock (processors) and need to adopt 
an equal but offsetting position in the futures market in order to eliminate the risk of price 
fluctuations. Many underlying hedgers, attempting to achieve the optimum hedge, find it 
difficult to make effective decisions in volatile times (JSE 2006:1). 
 
Producers aim to hedge their stock by going short (i.e. sell) the market at the highest possible 
price level. In addition to the uncertainty of predicting when prices will reach their peak, 
producers need to manage emotion in hedging decisions (Decision Commodities 2006). 
Typically, prices will trade at high levels during periods of crop uncertainty, but this should not 
prevent producers from utilising the opportunity of hedging at high price levels. The 
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producer’s ultimate financial success depends on the efficiency of the applied hedging 
strategy. 
 
The South African milling industry exhibits typical characteristics of an oligopolistic structure 
(Bernstein 1996:120-145; SA Grain 2004) and the high level of competition makes it 
impossible to pass on the results of ineffective procurement strategies to the consumer 
(National Chamber of Milling 2006). As such, the milling industry will be forced to cut profit 
margins and even close down if higher raw material prices are not reflected in the final 
product (Doing little costs a lot 2002). Financial success will only be realised once an effective 
hedging strategy with a predictable outcome is applied to futures prices. 
 
3.2.2. Groups indirectly susceptible to price movement 
Groups, influenced by futures price movements without actively participating in trading on the 
futures exchange, can be classified as being indirectly susceptible to price movements. White 
maize is used for human consumption in South Africa (Traub & Jayne 2004:1), and since 
consumers of maize meal do not participate in the trading of futures and options contracts on 
SAFEX, but are still susceptible to adverse price movements (Chabane 2003:1), they qualify 
as being indirectly influenced by price movements. 
 
Huge numbers of poor people spend up to 50% of their income on food (Doing little costs a lot 
2002). It has been estimated that ultra poor South African households spend up to 20% of 
their monthly income on maize alone (NIEP 1995).  Because demand is price inelastic, that is, 
consumers have no choice but to absorb price increases or starve, rapid inflation in food 
prices has a devastating impact on the living standards of consumers (NALEDI 2002). This 
means that the food price index for low-income groups rises far more quickly than the overall 
consumer price index (CPI).  
 
The importance of maize, a staple food for the low-income South African citizen, means that 
volatile futures prices have a major impact on food security. Cycles of high prices will lead to 
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malnutrition and hunger. Since expenditure is diverted to the purchase of more expensive 
food, other areas of household activities will ultimately suffer and the disproportionate effect of 
higher SAFEX prices for maize will exacerbate inequality (Chabane 2003:4). 
 
 
3.3. PRICE-RISK MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE OF MARKET ADVISORY SERVICES 
 
The pioneering work in this field was done by Irwin, Good, Martines-Filho and Hagedorn 
(2005) for the AgMas project at the University of Illinois. Every price risk management 
recommendation from over 20 professional trading companies was recorded after 1994. A 
comparison was made between the net results of every recommendation from the individual 
companies and the benchmark average price constructed from the daily closing prices over 
the contract lifetime. The results indicate that only one professional trading company 
managed to outperform the simple average benchmark (by less than 7% on average). In 
other words, less than 5% of the professional trading companies managed to outperform the 
futures market.  
 
Another finding of the research indicated that the net advisory prices vary substantially 
between companies, with differences of up to 70% on the realised futures price. The 
conclusion drawn is that markets are efficient and no additional profits can be made through 
risk management strategies (Irwin et al 2003). 
 
 
3.4. PRICE RISK MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE OF SPECULATORS AND 
HEDGERS 
 
3.4.1. Speculators 
Thorough research has been done on the forecasting ability of speculators in the soft 
commodity futures market. The earliest findings on the performance of speculators in the 
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grain futures market were published in 1934. Stewart (1934:415-433) made a detailed 
analysis of 9 000 accounts of a nationwide brokers’ firm for the period 1925 to 1934. These 
accounts reflected exclusively speculative transactions in grain futures. The most striking 
finding of this research project was that nearly 75% of speculators lost money. Of greater 
concern, however, is the fact that the entire sample highlighted losses six times the value of 
total gains. 
 
In 2001, 67 years after Stewart (1934) published his findings, Wang (2001:929-952) released 
the results of his study on the predictability of returns in the futures market. The results 
showed that large speculators in the futures market are still unable to accurately predict price 
movements. 
 
Locally, the futures market was stunned when trustees of a pension fund stated their intention 
to sue WJ Morgan, a South African futures broker, for losses of R1.4 billion sustained as a 
result of overexposure on SAFEX. The decision to expose funds of R2.7 billion to the 
derivatives market was taken by WJ Morgan on the basis of expectations of a continued rise 
in maize prices (Pension funds plan to sue WJ Morgan 2003). 
 
3.4.2 Producers 
The inability of producers to effectively manage their exposure to adverse price movements is 
highlighted in the well-known fact that two-thirds of producers short the futures market in the 
bottom third of the price range (Decision Commodities 2006).  
 
3.4.3 Processors 
The inability of processors to effectively manage the risk of volatile prices has been well 
documented. The evaluation of the price risk management performance of processors will be 
done through an investigation into the procurement results of African Products and Tiger 
Brands. These two processing companies are used for the purposes of this study since they 
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are recognised as two of the main role players in the procurement market for the following 
reasons: 
 
• African Products consumes close to 7% of the average annual maize crop (Tongaat 
Hullett 2003:4). 
• Tiger Brands is recognised as one of the four biggest milling companies in South Africa 
(Chabane 2003:6-7). 
 
In order to determine the ability of African Products and Tiger Brands to successfully eliminate 
volatile futures prices, the year with the greatest maize price movement should be identified. 
By identifying this particular year, the impact of large price movements on hedging strategies 
can be explored. The difference between the contract high and low of the July white maize 
contract for the period 2001 to 2006 is represented graphically in figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1  Price difference between July white maize contract high and low 2001-2006 
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Figure 3.1 shows that 2003 experienced the greatest movement in white maize prices, and as 
such the annual results of Tongaat-Hulett and Tiger Brands for 2003 will be investigated in 
order to determine the effect of volatile prices. 
 
3.4.3.1     African Products 
Tongaat-Hulett is a group consisting of four closely linked and focused businesses.  One of 
these businesses is African Products, Africa’s largest manufacturer of starch and glucose. Its 
five mills consume in excess of 600 000 tons of maize annually, that is nearly 7% of the 
average South African maize crop.  
 
In the chairman’s statement for the 2003 financial year, Cedric Savage blamed expensive 
maize procurement costs as one of the main reasons contributing to a headline loss of R93 
million, down from a 2002 headline profit of R380 million. During 2003, African Products 
followed its long-established strategy with a focus on price stability. A characteristic of this 
procurement strategy was that the impact of price increases was nullified. The strategy simply 
consisted of going long the futures market. As the market came down from levels of 
R2000/ton late in 2002 to below R800/ton in 2003, African Products incurred huge valuation 
losses on the procurement contracts. This forced Peter Staude, Chief Executive Officer, to 
comment in Tongaat Huletts’ 2003 annual report that a new model of maize procurement was 
needed (Tongaat Hulett 2003). 
 
3.4.3.2      Tiger Brands 
In the group results for the year ended 30 September 2002, the following comment was made 
(Tiger Brands 2002): “The effects of sharply higher grain prices were mitigated by the benefits 
of an effective procurement programme, which resulted in the group being able to source its 
grain requirements at below market prices.”  
 
In subsequent months, the futures market was characterised by a sharp drop in white maize 
futures prices. This forced the Chief Executive Officer of Tiger Brands to make the following 
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contrasting comment in the 2003 annual report (Tiger Brands 2003): “High priced maize 
stocks carried over from last year, volatile maize prices and the stronger rand impacted on 
operating income which declined by 5% to R1.9 billion.”  
 
After much praise for the hedging strategy in the previous year, a comment was made in the 
2003 annual report that new hedging strategies would be introduced to provide for better 
hedging against volatile commodity prices. This clearly shows the absence of a hedging 
strategy with a predictable outcome that is able to beat the average market price.  
 
Consistent with this, Dhuyvetter and Kastens (2004:1-25) presented the findings of their 
research project at the Risk and Profitability Conference in Kansas. They concluded by 
stating that “… spending management time trying to beat the market is probably not a good 
use of time”. The National Chamber of Milling released a statement in early 2006, expressing 
concern over the continued existence of the milling industry. This followed a year in which the 
processing sector suffered cumulative losses of R149.3 million due to the high level of maize 
prices.  
 
As such, a price risk management strategy with effective results and a predictable outcome 
would be invaluable to all groups concerned in SAFEX. This is consistent with the findings of 
Erb and Harvey (2005:1-41) that tactical strategies provide higher average returns and lower 
risk than exclusively long-only commodity futures exposure. 
 
 
3.5 THE IMPACT OF A VOLATILE MARKET ON THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF   
PROCESSORS 
 
Since volatility in the futures price of maize has a definite impact on the earnings of 
processors (see secs 3.4.3.1 & 3.4.3.2) it is necessary to investigate the standard of 
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measurement used in the recognition of financial instruments in the financial statements of 
processors. 
 
3.5.1 IAS39 
International Accounting Standard 39 (IAS 39) covers the recognition and measurement of 
financial instruments and as such is applicable to open positions in futures and options 
contracts (IASB 2006:1709). It is a particularly complex and complicated accounting standard 
whereby a cash flow valuation methodology is prescribed in calculating position values going 
into a new financial year.  When a long futures position is held at a price level higher than the 
equivalent futures contract price level at financial year-end, a resultant charge against the 
income statement will be made to the extent that the long futures position is higher than the 
current futures price multiplied by the relevant tonnages. 
  
Any entity can apply IAS39 to all types of financial instruments except the following: 
• An interest in subsidiaries, associates or joint ventures that is accounted for under IAS27 
or IAS31. 
• A right or obligation under leases to which IAS17 is applicable. 
• The rights and obligations of employers under employee benefit plans which are subject to 
IAS19. 
• The issuance of financial instruments by an entity similar to the definition of equity 
instruments defined in IAS 32. 
• Contracts for contingent consideration in business combinations. 
• Contracts in a business combination between a vendor and acquirer to buy or sell at a 
future date. 
• Financial instruments, obligations and contracts resorting under share-based payment 
transactions discussed in IFRS2. (IASB 2006:1714.) 
 
The IASB (2006:1739-1742) identifies three types of hedging relationships, namely: 
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(1) Fair value hedge. “A hedge of the exposure to changes in fair value of a recognized asset 
or liability or an unrecognized firm commitment, or an identified portion of such an asset, 
liability or firm commitment, that is attributable to a particular risk and could affect profit or 
loss.” 
 
(2) Cash flow hedge. “A hedge of the exposure to variability in cash flows that (i) is 
attributable to a particular risk associated with a recognized asset or liability or a highly 
probable forecast transaction and (ii) could affect profit or loss.”  
 
(3) Hedge of net investment in foreign operations. When a long position in the futures market 
is entered into with the exclusive objective of nullifying the risk of a rise in futures prices, a 
cash flow hedge is incurred. A cash flow hedge is accounted for as follows: 
• “The portion of the gain or loss on the hedging instrument that is determined to be an 
effective hedge shall be recognized directly in equity through the statement of changes in 
equity; and 
• the ineffective portion of the gain or loss on the hedging instrument shall be recognized in 
profit or loss.” 
 
In order to evaluate the effect of IAS39 on the financial statements of processors, 2003 will be 
used to determine the impact of large price movements on hedged positions and as such on 
the financial statements of Tongaat-Hulett and Tiger Brands (see figure 3.1).  
 
3.5.2 Tongaat-Hulett 
The 2003 financial results for the group proved to be most disappointing, predominantly 
because of expensive maize procurement costs. A headline loss of R93 million was reported, 
comparing poorly with a 2002 headline profit of R380 million. The underlying operating profit 
of the Group dropped from R262 million in 2002 to a mediocre R114 million in 2003. The 
group incurred a total net loss of R41 million for the year, versus a 2002 net earnings of R388 
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million. The mark-to-market valuation adjustment required on the 2003 African Products 
procurement contracts resulted in a charge against the income statement of R255 million 
(Tongaat-Hulett 2003). 
 
The impact of high volatility in maize prices combined with customer expectations of a steady 
price has resulted in African Products changing its business model with respect to future 
procurement strategies (Tongaat-Hulett 2003). 
 
3.5.3 Tiger Brands 
Similar to the financial results of Tongaat-Hulett, the high levels of volatility in the futures 
market proved to be the main factor contributing to the poor results achieved by Tiger Brands 
in the financial year ending 30 September 2003 (Tiger Brands 2003). 
 
Even though revenue from continuing operations of R23 billion increased by a staggering 
15%, high-priced maize stocks carried over from the previous year are highlighted as the 
reason for a 5% drop in operating income to R1.9 billion. In addition, the operating margin 
declined from 10.1% in 2002 to 8.3% in 2003. A need was expressed in Tongaat Hulett’s 
interim results for the half year ended 30 June 2003 to change its procurement strategy in 
such a way that IAS39 would not enhance earnings volatility.  
 
 
3.6 THE IMPACT OF A VOLATILE MARKET ON GROUPS NOT ACTIVE ON SAFEX 
 
The impact of market volatility on consumers is a vital consideration in the development of 
price risk management strategies for processors, given the fact that nearly 16.3 million South 
Africans earn an income of less than the minimum subsistence level (CDFNSSA 1990). Since 
food makes up such a high percentage of spending by the poor, an increase in food prices 
has a devastating effect on living standards in addition to the economy as a whole. 
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Research conducted by BFAP (2003) cited market power as one of the most obvious reasons 
for asymmetric price transmission. The research found that a 10% increase in the SAFEX 
price of white maize resulted in a R2.42 increase per 10 kg bag of maize meal. Once the 
variables determining SAFEX prices had returned to its earlier levels, the meal price would 
only return to normal after eight months. In sharp contrast to this, a 10% decrease in the 
SAFEX price of white maize resulted in a drop of only R0.95 per 10 kg bag of maize meal, 
with the retail prices returning to normality in five 5 months. Thus, SAFEX price increases are 
passed on to consumers to a greater extent than price decreases. Since 75% of the cost of 
producing maize meal is maize itself, the conclusion that should be drawn is that processing 
companies do not possess the necessary capabilities to beat the market. 
 
An analysis of food price inflation for different income groups by SA Grain (2004) showed that 
poor households experienced higher inflation rates than wealthier households. At its peak in 
October 2002, poor households experienced a year-on-year food price inflation rate of 23.1%, 
while richer households were confronted with a 19% food price inflation rate.  
 
When food prices in South Africa soared towards the end of 2001 and at the start of 2002, the 
food price index for December 2001 rose by 11.4% compared to a 3% increase for nonfood 
prices (NALEDI 2002). This was mainly the result of a 212% increase in the SAFEX price of 
white maize over the period October 2000 to January 2002 (Chabane 2003). If the milling 
industry does not develop a hedging product that will eliminate price fluctuations, the 
consumer will continue to absorb the impact of volatile maize prices.  
 
 
3.7 THE NEED FOR INDEXING STRATEGIES  
 
Price risk management is not about controlling price uncertainty, but rather a focus on 
managing it (Decision Commodities 2006). In more specific terms, price risk management 
focuses on managing the emotions that influence and shape decisions. The price risk 
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management strategy applied should remove emotion and automate the hedging process. In 
other words, an indexing strategy should be considered. 
 
This need for indexing strategies was expressed by groups with a concern in SAFEX and 
resulted in the JSE publishing market notice A665 on 15 March 2006, entailing a proposal to 
trade a 30-day average pricing contract as an alternative hedging tool. This contract will be 
based on white maize contracts only and will represent a 30-day moving average for expiries 
based on the underlying futures contract. For example, should this alternative hedging tool 
trade on a willing buyer/willing seller principle at R1 000, but the 30-day moving average is 
R990 on a specific trading day, a R10 variation margin will be paid by the buyer to the seller 
(JSE 2006:1). 
 
Although the proposal has not yet been approved, it does confirm the need for strategies to 
reduce price volatility. 
 
 
3.8 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
Groups with a concern in SAFEX can broadly be defined as being directly or indirectly 
susceptible to price movements according to their level of active participation on the 
exchange itself. Speculators and hedgers (producers and processors) are directly influenced 
by market movement while consumers, exposed to fluctuations in retail prices of maize meal 
due to price volatility on SAFEX, are defined as being indirectly susceptible to volatile futures 
prices. 
 
There is sufficient empirical and literature evidence to suggest that either market advisory 
services, speculators, producers or processors possess sufficient knowledge of price risk 
management models to outperform the market. In addition, price volatility has an adverse 
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impact on the financial statements of processors, especially since IAS39 implies that a long-
term hedging position should be valued against short-term market levels. 
 
Extreme levels of price volatility cause poor households to experience higher levels of food 
inflation than richer households. Consumers mainly absorb the impact of price volatility, with 
asymmetric price transmission being evident. 
 
A need for indexing strategies led to the proposal of a 30-day moving average contract by 
SAFEX for expiries based on the underlying futures contract. These types of strategies will 
reduce price volatility and benefit participants in the futures market.  
 
Chapter 4 investigates and calculates the extent of market volatility present on SAFEX and 
determines a benchmark for performance measurement. A discussion on the working of the 
proposed risk management models will serve as an introduction to the ensuing chapters. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT THROUGH BENCHMARKING 
 
 
4.1     INTRODUCTION 
 
The ineffectiveness of speculators and hedgers in the forecasting of price movements and 
procurement of grains on the futures market was highlighted in chapter 3. Volatile prices on 
SAFEX and their adverse impact on low-income groups in South Africa were evident from the 
literature examined in that chapter. The conclusion was drawn that a definite need exists 
among active participants on SAFEX for price risk management models that will lower the 
effect of price volatility. This will ultimately also benefit consumers of the underlying 
commodity to which the models will be applied.   
 
The feasibility and success of price risk management models applied on futures prices can 
only be determined once their performance has been compared to the returns offered by the 
market or by alternative risk management models. The specific calculation of the market 
return or alternative risk management model against which the performance of the particular 
risk management model is measured is a significant consideration in the evaluation of a 
strategy. 
 
The aim of this chapter is to define and explain the concept of performance comparisons. A 
suitable standard of measurement will be determined against which the eventual results of the 
proposed strategies will be measured. The historical returns on the chosen standard of 
measurement will be calculated and an explanation of the proposed risk management models 
provided as an introduction to the ensuing chapters. As such, the success of the proposed 
models will depend on the average price of the long positions obtained versus the price level 
of the standard of measurement.  
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4.2      WHAT IS BENCHMARKING? 
 
In its simplest form, benchmarking involves comparisons (Brigham et al 1999:80). The 
concept underlying the evaluation of the performance of risk management strategies is the 
comparison of net prices achieved by these strategies versus the returns offered by similar 
active strategies or the passive market. These comparisons are widely known as 
benchmarking, because it serves as an objective standard of performance (similar to a scale 
providing an objective measurement of weight) (Irwin, Good, Martines-Filho & Batts 2006-
03:2). 
 
Benchmarking can be classified according to two broad groups of benchmarks: peer-group 
benchmarks and external benchmarks. Peer-group benchmarking is the comparison between 
the performances of a particular risk management strategy versus similar market-related 
strategies. External benchmarking focuses on the comparison between the performances of a 
particular risk management strategy and the return offered by the market, for example, a 
passive market index where the average price over a series of commodities or time periods is 
achieved without engaging in an actively managed strategy (Irwin et al 2006-02:29.) 
 
Peer-group benchmarking provides interesting information on the ranking of alternative 
strategies, but is unable to determine whether a specific risk management model is superior 
or inferior in an absolute economic sense. Benchmarking, according to external benchmarks, 
is based upon the efficient market theory. This entails that markets are rational and all 
knowing and that competition between participants in the marketplace will immediately 
eliminate all possible arbitrage opportunities available through the exploitation thereof (Irwin 
et al 2006-02:29-30).  
 
As such, the theory of efficient markets predicts that market prices will always reflect all the 
information available with reference to the variables determining the value of an underlying 
asset (Hull 2002:461; Madura 2000:263; Fama 1970:383-417). This implies that no trading 
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strategy can constantly outperform the return offered by the market and is the platform upon 
which the returns offered by the market are used as a benchmark. 
 
 
4.3      USING THE INDEX (AVERAGE PRICE) AS BENCHMARK 
 
For the purposes of this study, an index is defined as the average price of a single commodity 
or group of commodities, on a specific date or over a predetermined period. In this context the 
index used should measure the average SAFEX white maize price for July delivery over the 
contract lifetime for the processing company that follows no active hedging strategies. The 
average price is determined in order to reflect the returns of a naïve strategy, hedging equal 
amounts of the commodity every day over the duration of the contract. This is consistent with 
research already done on this subject (Irwin et al 2005:27-31).  
 
Outside of the grain markets, the performance of fund managers in stock markets is also 
compared to an index, of which the SATRIX 40 and ALSI are two of the best-known South 
African indexes; international indexes often referred to as benchmarks include the Dow Jones 
Industrials Index, S&P 500 Index and Nasdaq 100 Index (Irwin et al 2006-02:29-30; Hull 
2002:166). 
 
Good, Irwin and Jackson (1998:3) identify desirable properties, from a practical perspective, 
that a benchmark should adhere to, namely: 
• A benchmark should be easy to calculate and simple to understand. 
The index, for the purposes of this study, is a simple average price over the contract           
lifetime of the commodity and can easily be calculated. 
• It should represent the returns of a strategy that can be implemented by processors. 
By going long an equal amount of grain on a daily basis over the lifetime of the contract, 
the index price will be achieved by processors. 
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• The benchmark price should be directly comparable to the price achieved by the strategy. 
Since the benchmark index average price will be calculated on the same commodity and 
contract month as the strategy price, the benchmark price will be directly comparable to 
the price achieved by the risk management strategy. 
 
Since the simple average price index on grains has been used as a benchmark in previous 
research on this topic (Irwin et al 2005:27-31) and complies with the requirements of a 
benchmark (Good et al 1998:3), it will be used in the evaluation of the proposed price risk 
management models for the purposes of this study. 
 
 
4.4      BENCHMARK INDEX FROM 2001 TO 2006 
 
As discussed in section 4.3, the average price index can be calculated as follows: 
  
 API = (n1+n2+n3…………………)/TD 
 where  
API = average price index 
n = daily July closing price of white maize 
 TD = number of July white maize trading days 
(See appendix I for comprehensive details of the daily July white maize closing prices.)   
 
By applying this formula to the July white maize contract from 2001 to 2006, the average price 
index for the individual marketing years is calculated and summarised in figure 4.1. 
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Figure 4.I   Average Price Index 2001 – 2006 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 confirms the high levels of price volatility, with the highest Average Price Index 
(2003) nearly double the value of the lowest Average Price Index (2001). 
  
 
4.5      CONTRACT HIGHS, CONTRACT LOWS AND VOLATILITY OF PRICES 
(See appendix II for comprehensive details of the daily July white maize price volatility.) 
 
Price volatility is evident in figure 4.2. In five of the six years under review the high of the July 
white maize contract is close to, and in some instances even more than, double the contract 
low. The average volatility of the July white maize contract for the last five years is presented 
graphically in figure 4.3. (Published volatility is only available from the 2002 season.) 
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Figure 4.2   Contract highs and lows 2001–2006 
   
 
Figure 4.3   Average volatility 2002–2006 
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4.6      PROPOSED PRICE RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES 
 
The aim of the three price risk management strategies (to be presented in chapters 6, 7 & 8) 
is to beat the average July white maize price over the contract lifetime. This objective is in 
total contrast to the efficient market hypothesis which states that the market is a model of 
efficiency and cannot constantly be outguessed or outperformed (Hull 2002:461; Madura 
2000:263; Fama 1970). 
 
All three of the proposed strategies resort under core/satellite risk management models. This 
framework is used to develop a strategy with the potential to add additional value above a 
performance floor. In a typical core/satellite model, the main strategy is a risk-controlled core 
position, with an active satellite structure aiming to realise additional gains above the index 
price (Wicas 2005:27). 
 
A successful core/satellite strategy is based on the predictability of passive indexing. In the 
words of Charles D Ellis (1995:95-100) ”If you can’t beat the market, you should certainly 
consider joining it.” Hedging an open position according to this strategy will minimise the 
effect of volatility in the futures market. Much has been said about this type of risk 
management, with many diverse opinions. 
 
In his 2001 presentation at the Superbowl of Indexing, John Bogle argued that no strategy 
can claim performance superior to market averages. According to Bogle, the concept of an 
average indexed price is being modified and misused by some in order to realise better than 
average returns. He concludes by stating that market players who undertake the folly of 
speculation in addition to indexing implement a flawed strategy and are bound to be 
disappointed. 
 
In contrast to Bogle, Wicas (2005:27-30) claims that thoughtfully executed active 
management can potentially add value relative to a static average price index. He concedes 
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that active management should be incorporated in such a way that it does not sacrifice control 
of systematic risk factors, but states that active management and averaging of prices can 
complement each other. The core position should provide the strategy with a high degree of 
risk control, whereas active management provides the potential for enhanced performance.  
 
Wicas (2005:27) further claims that the incorporation of research and academic results, in 
addition to extensive practical experience, will provide the stakeholder in the market with the 
ability to construct a risk-controlled strategy likely to constantly outperform the market. 
 
   
4.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
  
The evaluation of the performance of risk management strategies by comparing their returns 
to those offered by similar active strategies or the passive market is known as benchmarking.  
Whilst peer-group benchmarking involves the comparison of returns between a particular 
strategy and those of alternative strategies available on the market, external benchmarking 
focuses on the comparison of the return of a particular strategy versus the return offered by 
the market. 
 
The average price of the July white maize contract will be used as a benchmark for the 
purposes of this study. This use of an average price index is consistent with previous 
research on this topic, and complies with the requirements as identified by research. 
 
A calculation of the average price index contract highs and contract lows for the July white 
maize contract over the last six years confirms the extraordinarily high levels of volatility 
present on SAFEX. This is confirmed by a five-year volatility average well in excess of 35%. 
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Chapter 5 provides background on alternative research methodologies and research designs 
and will determine the most appropriate sampling method and research design upon which 
the research will be conducted.  
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CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
 
5.1      INTRODUCTION 
 
The importance of agriculture in South Africa and the radical changes brought about by the 
Marketing of Agricultural Products Act 47 of 1996 were discussed in chapter 1, while a 
theoretical background on the working of derivative instruments was presented in chapter 2. 
Chapters 3 and 4 focused on the different groups susceptible to market fluctuations and a 
market benchmark for measuring performance. The aim of this chapter is to provide 
theoretical background on the alternative methods of sampling and research designs. The 
most appropriate method of sampling for this particular study will be chosen in addition to the 
research design to be implemented in the following chapters. Research will be conducted by 
means of a case study approach based on historical data in order to determine the success of 
the proposed risk management strategies. 
 
 
5.2     RESEARCH SAMPLE 
 
The research process entails a collection of information in order to solve the underlying 
problem, namely: What is the need and possibility for the development of futures market price 
risk management strategies that will constantly outperform the market? The results obtained 
from the data derived from the particular objects will ultimately determine whether the 
credibility of the price risk management strategies is accepted or rejected. Crucial to this is 
the research design, defined as the method whereby objects are obtained and information 
gathered from the chosen sample (Welman & Kruger 2001:46). 
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A specific population usually underlies a research problem. The study object may be any one 
of the following: individuals, groups, organisations or the conditions to which they are exposed 
(Welman & Kruger 2001:46). The sheer size of a particular population may be of such 
magnitude that it would be impractical and uneconomical to involve all of the individual 
components within the population (Botha 2005:68).  As such, the research will be based on 
data obtained from a sample of the population with characteristics similar to the population as 
a whole. According to Sekaran (2003:269), two broad types of samples can be distinguished, 
namely probability samples and non-probability samples. 
 
5.2.1 Probability samples 
In probability sampling, the probability of inclusion of an individual element from the larger 
population in the eventual research sample can be determined. Through probability samples, 
the probability with which the results from the sample differ from the corresponding population 
means can be indicated. Probability samples can be classified as follows: 
• simple random samples 
• stratified random samples 
• systematic samples 
• cluster samples  
(Welman & Kruger 2001:46-47.) 
 
5.2.1.1      Simple random samples 
Simple random sampling is also known as unrestricted sampling (Botha 2005:68-69). Every 
individual member of the population has an equal chance of being included in the sample in 
addition to every sample possessing a similar probability of being chosen (Welman & Kruger 
2001:53). 
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5.2.1.2      Stratified random samples 
This method of sampling is applied where the specific population is composed of more than 
one subpopulation which is recognisable and non-overlapping and which differs from one 
another in terms of the variable (Welman & Kruger 2001:55). The representation of every sub-
population in the sample is determined, and elements within the sub-population are randomly 
chosen for presentation in the sample (Botha 2005:69). 
 
5.2.1.3     Systematic samples 
In the instance where a sample of n members is required from a population of N elements 
numbered from 1 to N, every N/nth element is included in the sample (Welman & Kruger 
2001:58). 
 
5.2.1.4     Cluster samples 
Since it is impossible to obtain information on all members in large-scale surveys, a pre-
existing list of heterogeneous groups, also known as clusters, is drawn and every member of 
the particular cluster is the sample (Welman & Kruger 2001:60). 
 
5.2.2 Non-probability samples 
In non-probability sampling, the probability of an element chosen in the sample cannot be 
specified. Certain members may not even have a chance of being included in the eventual 
sample. Non-probability samples are classified as follows: 
• accidental sampling 
• purposive sampling 
• quota sampling 
• snowball sampling  
(Welman & Kruger 2001:61-63.) 
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5.2.2.1 Accidental sampling 
This method of sampling members for research purposes is the most convenient since 
members who are near and available are included in the sample. Accidental sampling is an 
easy way to obtain relevant information efficiently and without a time delay (Sekaran 
2003:276). 
 
5.2.2.2 Purposive sampling 
Purposive sampling is commonly regarded as the main type of non-probability sampling. This 
is because the user of this method relies purely on experience and ingenuity in order to obtain 
sample units in such a way that the units are recognised as being representative of the total 
population (Welman & Kruger 2001:63). 
 
5.2.2.3 Quota sampling 
Should the decision be made to follow the method of quota sampling, an effort is made to 
ensure that the sample consists of similar proportions of units in important areas. The units 
are obtained in the areas accidentally (Welman & Kruger 2001:63). 
 
5.2.2.4 Snowball sampling 
This entails individual members of the population being approached in order to identify 
additional members to be included in the sample (Welman & Kruger 2001:63). 
 
5.2.3 Application of sampling methodology 
For the purposes of this study, a non-probability purposive sample is used with reference to 
the procurement companies and the trading year on which the hedging results are evaluated. 
This sampling methodology is used for the following reasons: 
• The milling industry (procurement sector) includes a number of small millers but is mainly 
concentrated in a limited number of large milling companies (Chabane 2003:6-7). The 
price risk management performance of processors is evaluated by means of an 
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investigation into the procurement results of African Products and Tiger Brands. These 
two processing companies are used for the purposes of this study since they are 
recognised as two of the main role players in the procurement market (see sec 3.4.3). 
• In order to evaluate the price risk management success of procurement companies during 
periods of volatile market prices, the annual results of African Products and Tiger Brands 
are investigated for the year with the greatest maize price movement (see sec 3.4.3).  
 
It is evident that this method of sampling represents a non-probability purposive sample, since 
it relies on the experience and ingenuity of the researcher to select a sample representative of 
the total population.  
 
 
5.3      THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Mouton (2005:55) defines the research design as “… a plan or blueprint of how you intend 
conducting the research”. This is similar to the definition of a research design by Welman and 
Kruger (2001:46), which states that “a research design is the plan according to which we 
obtain research participants and collect information from them”. Botha (2005:73) distinguishes 
between the following four different research design techniques: 
(1) surveys 
(2) secondary data 
(3) experiments 
(4) observations  
 
5.3.1 Surveys 
Surveys are generally used in quantitative studies in order to provide an overview of a sample 
gathered from a large population (Mouton 2005:152). A survey is a research technique 
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whereby information is gathered from the chosen sample through verbal interviews or non-
verbal questionnaires (Botha 2005:73).  
 
5.3.2 Secondary data 
Welman and Kruger (2001:142) define secondary data as information that is gathered by 
individuals or groups other than the researcher. This definition is similar to that of Mouton 
(2005:164) who states that secondary data are usually quantitative and historical (existing) 
and used by the researcher in order to reanalyse such data so as to validate models.  
 
5.3.3 Experiments 
Experiments are quantitative (Mouton 2005:155). The aim of experimental research is to 
provide a causal study of a limited number of subjects in an environment in which a high 
degree of control is evident (usually in laboratory conditions).  
 
5.3.4 Observations 
Three types of observation types exist, namely systematic field observations, participant 
observations and controlled recordings (Mouton 2005:105). Welman and Kruger (2001:186-
187) note that the observer should refrain from summarising the findings of the observations 
since this can result in premature interpretations. To ensure that all relevant information is 
recorded, it is also of utmost importance that observations are recorded during the activity. 
 
5.3.5 Application of the research design 
The specific research design most suited to the purposes of this study is a secondary data 
analysis. This decision was made after considering the alternative research designs and the 
advantages and disadvantages offered by secondary data analysis, as stated by Mouton 
(2005:165).  
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Advantages 
• By using secondary data, the researcher can access relevant information more quickly 
than through the use of primary data. 
• Secondary data allow the researcher to obtain information at a lower cost than primary 
data. 
 
Disadvantages 
• Secondary data restrict the user in the original objective of the research. 
• The researcher cannot control errors in the data obtained. 
 
The main reasons why secondary data are most suitable for this study, can be summarised 
as follows: 
 
• Relevant historical information can be accessed immediately since the historical SAFEX 
prices and volatility percentages are readily available. 
• Secondary SAFEX data on grain prices and volatilities are available on the official SAFEX 
website (www.safex.co.za), and as such are made available to the general public at no 
cost.  
 
Welman and Kruger (2001:35) express their concern about the presence of biases and 
inaccuracies in the use of secondary data. This will not be a limitation in this study, since the 
primary source of data is quoted directly in the secondary data. SAFEX prices as traded on 
the electronic futures market are quoted on its closing prices and inaccurate data on the 
official SAFEX website are therefore limited.  
 
The historical SAFEX prices and volatilities are accessed by trading day per contract year and 
the application of the proposed price risk management strategies will be done on the 
information gathered.  
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5.4      SUMMARY 
 
Two broad types of samples can be distinguished, namely probability samples and non-
probability samples. Probability samples can be classified as simple random samples, 
stratified random samples, systematic samples and cluster samples. Non-probability samples 
are limited to accidental sampling, purposive sampling, quota sampling and snowball 
sampling. A research design is the method whereby objects are obtained and information 
gathered from the chosen sample. Four different research design techniques can be 
distinguished, namely surveys, secondary data, experiments and observations. 
 
After due consideration and based upon a review of sampling techniques and research 
designs the researcher concluded that a non-probability purposive sample would be used with 
reference to the procurement companies and the trading year on which the hedging results 
would be evaluated. The accurate and available historical price and volatility information are 
the main reasons why a secondary data analysis was chosen as the most appropriate data 
collection method. This historical information includes the daily trading range and closing 
prices, as well as the volatility for every commodity and contract month. 
 
In the next chapter the first of three core/satellite price risk management strategies will be 
presented. A successful core/satellite strategy captures the predictability of passive indexing 
with the possibilities of active management. The aim of these strategies is to beat the average 
price index. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE MOMENTUM STRATEGY 
 
 
6.1      INTRODUCTION 
 
It was concluded in previous chapters that neither hedgers nor speculators are able to 
outperform the returns offered by the market, in accordance with the efficient market 
hypothesis. The average price index was consequently chosen as benchmark against which 
the results from the proposed risk management strategies would be compared. 
 
The proposed price risk management strategies are based on a core/satellite model. This 
framework is used to develop a strategy with the potential to add additional value above an 
average price, where the main strategy is a risk-controlled position, with an active structure 
aiming to add additional value.  
 
This chapter will discuss and evaluate the momentum strategy. The success of the strategy 
depends on its performance relative to the benchmark, and the consistency with which the 
benchmark is outperformed. 
 
 
6.2      DEFINITION 
 
Erb and Harvey (2005:3) define the momentum strategy as a method of pursuing above- 
average returns by investing in commodity futures with positive past price movements. This is 
consistent with Spurgin’s (1999:1) description, which states that the momentum strategy 
involves buying the underlying asset that rises in price and selling the asset when prices fall. 
For the purposes of this study, a drop in prices will not result in a short position being taken, 
since the underlying hedge position should result in delivery of the commodity being taken. 
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Hence the proposed momentum strategy will hold exclusively long positions, similar to the 
Goldman Sachs commodity index (Spurgin 1999:1). 
 
The long-only momentum strategy for the purposes of this study is ultimately defined as 
buying the underlying commodity in the event of an increase in prices (or no change in 
prices), while a drop in the commodity price results in no action being taken. 
 
 
6.3      DESCRIPTION OF THE MOMENTUM STRATEGY 
 
The characteristic that defines a momentum strategy is its design whereby short-term price 
trends are captured with the added advantage of a minimisation of risk through indexing of 
prices over a period.  Because this is a fixed strategy, it can easily be replicated by hedgers in 
the futures market. 
 
While there is sufficient literature on momentum in equity markets (Carhart 1997:57-82; 
Johnson 2004:585-608) there does not seem to be general consensus on the reasons why 
this strategy is successful in its application. In terms of the proposed momentum strategy, 
Johnson’s (2004:585-608) view seems to be the most likely reason for potential hedging 
success on SAFEX. He argues that the returns achieved by such a strategy are a payoff for 
taking more risk than merely buying the average price index. 
 
The momentum strategy, to be applied on historical data, possesses the following distinctive 
features: 
• Every trading day that July white maize prices increase (or remain unchanged), a long 
position will be taken. 
• Every trading day that July white maize prices drop, no position will be taken on SAFEX. 
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• The first trading day on which July white maize prices increase after a drop in prices, long 
positions will be taken. The number of long positions entered into should equal the sum of 
the number of trading days since the last trading day on which prices closed higher. 
 
The July contract is used in the evaluation of the proposed strategy, because it is the most 
liquid futures contract available on SAFEX. Although grain processors do not wish to take 
delivery of a year’s stock all at once, the resultant long position can be rolled forward to the 
delivery month in which the grain is required. Rolling a position forward consists of going short 
the July contract against the long position obtained from the Momentum strategy, and 
immediately going long the desired contract month (Hull 2002:458).  
 
For the purposes of the evaluation of the strategy, the assumption will be made that a single 
daily position taken on SAFEX entails one futures contract (100 metric tons) traded at its 
closing price. Since processors are naturally much shorter the market, the number of futures 
contracts taken as position on SAFEX can be adjusted according to individual needs.  
 
 
6.4      APPLICATION OF THE MOMENTUM STRATEGY 
  
A detailed analysis of the momentum strategy applied to the 2001 July white maize contract 
data (as given in Appendix I) is presented below in table 6.1, while an individual calculation 
for the years up to 2006 is presented in appendix III. 
 
Table 6.I   The momentum strategy applied to 2001 July white maize daily closing prices 
DATE JULY WHITE MAIZE 
PRICE 
CONTRACTS 
TRADED 
TONNAGES 
TRADED 
PRICE x 
TONNAGES 
05 May 2000 R 670    
08 May 2000 R 670 1 100 R 67,000 
09 May 2000 R 665 0 0 R 0 
10 May 2000 R 665 2 200 R 133,000 
11 May 2000 R 665 1 100 R 66,500 
12 May 2000 R 670 1 100 R 67,000 
15 May 2000 R 690 1 100 R 69,000 
16 May 2000 R 690 1 100 R 69,000 
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17 May 2000 R 690 1 100 R 69,000 
18 May 2000 R 690 1 100 R 69,000 
19 May 2000 R 690 1 100 R 69,000 
22 May 2000 R 690 1 100 R 69,000 
23 May 2000 R 690 1 100 R 69,000 
24 May 2000 R 690 1 100 R 69,000 
25 May 2000 R 690 1 100 R 69,000 
26 May 2000 R 690 1 100 R 69,000 
29 May 2000 R 690 1 100 R 69,000 
30 May 2000 R 685 0 0 R 0 
31 May 2000 R 685 2 200 R 137,000 
01 June 2000 R 686 1 100 R 68,600 
02 June 2000 R 686 1 100 R 68,600 
05 June 2000 R 686 1 100 R 68,600 
06 June 2000 R 690 1 100 R 69,000 
07 June 2000 R 690 1 100 R 69,000 
08 June 2000 R 690 1 100 R 69,000 
09 June 2000 R 700 1 100 R 70,000 
12 June 2000 R 700 1 100 R 70,000 
13 June 2000 R 685 0 0 R 0 
14 June 2000 R 685 2 200 R 137,000 
15 June 2000 R 682 0 0 R 0 
19 June 2000 R 682 2 200 R 136,400 
20 June 2000 R 682 1 100 R 68,200 
21 June 2000 R 675 0 0 R 0 
22 June 2000 R 675 2 200 R 135,000 
23 June 2000 R 672 0 0 R 0 
26 June 2000 R 655 0 0 R 0 
27 June 2000 R 660 3 300 R 198,000 
28 June 2000 R 657 0 0 R 0 
29 June 2000 R 650 0 0 R 0 
30 June 2000 R 648 0 0 R 0 
03 July 2000 R 638 0 0 R 0 
04 July 2000 R 636 0 0 R 0 
05 July 2000 R 633 0 0 R 0 
06 July 2000 R 630 0 0 R 0 
07 July 2000 R 630 8 800 R 504,000 
10 July 2000 R 624 0 0 R 0 
11 July 2000 R 625 2 200 R 125,000 
12 July 2000 R 617 0 0 R 0 
13 July 2000 R 620 2 200 R 124,000 
14 July 2000 R 624 1 100 R 62,400 
17 July 2000 R 625 1 100 R 62,500 
18 July 2000 R 630 1 100 R 63,000 
19 July 2000 R 622 0 0 R 0 
20 July 2000 R 619 0 0 R 0 
21 July 2000 R 625 3 300 R 187,500 
24 July 2000 R 625 1 100 R 62,500 
25 July 2000 R 625 1 100 R 62,500 
26 July 2000 R 625 1 100 R 62,500 
27 July 2000 R 628 1 100 R 62,800 
28 July 2000 R 630 1 100 R 63,000 
31 July 2000 R 626 0 0 R 0 
01 August 2000 R 627 2 200 R 125,400 
02 August 2000 R 632 1 100 R 63,200 
03 August 2000 R 629 0 0 R 0 
04 August 2000 R 629 2 200 R 125,800 
07 August 2000 R 624 0 0 R 0 
08 August 2000 R 624 2 200 R 124,800 
10 August 2000 R 612 0 0 R 0 
11 August 2000 R 599 0 0 R 0 
14 August 2000 R 599 3 300 R 179,700 
15 August 2000 R 602 1 100 R 60,200 
16 August 2000 R 608 1 100 R 60,800 
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17 August 2000 R 600 0 0 R 0 
18 August 2000 R 604 2 200 R 120,800 
21 August 2000 R 599 0 0 R 0 
22 August 2000 R 604 2 200 R 120,800 
23 August 2000 R 603 0 0 R 0 
24 August 2000 R 603 2 200 R 120,600 
25 August 2000 R 603 1 100 R 60,300 
28 August 2000 R 601 0 0 R 0 
29 August 2000 R 605 2 200 R 121,000 
30 August 2000 R 618 1 100 R 61,800 
31 August 2000 R 620 1 100 R 62,000 
01 September 2000 R 619 0 0 R 0 
04 September 2000 R 612 0 0 R 0 
05 September 2000 R 617 3 300 R 185,100 
06 September 2000 R 625 1 100 R 62,500 
07 September 2000 R 626 1 100 R 62,600 
08 September 2000 R 620 0 0 R 0 
11 September 2000 R 625 2 200 R 125,000 
12 September 2000 R 629 1 100 R 62,900 
13 September 2000 R 626 0 0 R 0 
14 September 2000 R 624 0 0 R 0 
15 September 2000 R 622 0 0 R 0 
18 September 2000 R 627 4 400 R 250,800 
19 September 2000 R 632 1 100 R 63,200 
20 September 2000 R 625 0 0 R 0 
21 September 2000 R 629 2 200 R 125,800 
22 September 2000 R 627 0 0 R 0 
26 September 2000 R 626 0 0 R 0 
27 September 2000 R 626 3 300 R 187,800 
28 September 2000 R 628 1 100 R 62,800 
29 September 2000 R 632 1 100 R 63,200 
02 October 2000 R 635 1 100 R 63,500 
03 October 2000 R 643 1 100 R 64,300 
04 October 2000 R 665 1 100 R 66,500 
05 October 2000 R 668 1 100 R 66,800 
06 October 2000 R 659 0 0 R 0 
09 October 2000 R 657 0 0 R 0 
10 October 2000 R 655 0 0 R 0 
11 October 2000 R 655 4 400 R 262,000 
12 October 2000 R 662 1 100 R 66,200 
13 October 2000 R 682 1 100 R 68,200 
16 October 2000 R 679 0 0 R 0 
17 October 2000 R 686 2 200 R 137,200 
18 October 2000 R 694 1 100 R 69,400 
19 October 2000 R 697 1 100 R 69,700 
20 October 2000 R 688 0 0 R 0 
23 October 2000 R 676 0 0 R 0 
24 October 2000 R 672 0 0 R 0 
25 October 2000 R 682 4 400 R 272,800 
26 October 2000 R 690 1 100 R 69,000 
27 October 2000 R 682 0 0 R 0 
30 October 2000 R 693 2 200 R 138,600 
31 October 2000 R 695 1 100 R 69,500 
01 November 2000 R 694 0 0 R 0 
02 November 2000 R 703 2 200 R 140,600 
03 November 2000 R 712 1 100 R 71,200 
06 November 2000 R 706 0 0 R 0 
07 November 2000 R 710 2 200 R 142,000 
08 November 2000 R 725 1 100 R 72,500 
09 November 2000 R 732 1 100 R 73,200 
10 November 2000 R 714 0 0 R 0 
13 November 2000 R 695 0 0 R 0 
14 November 2000 R 693 0 0 R 0 
15 November 2000 R 705 4 400 R 282,000 
78  
16 November 2000 R 720 1 100 R 72,000 
17 November 2000 R 722 1 100 R 72,200 
20 November 2000 R 729 1 100 R 72,900 
21 November 2000 R 738 1 100 R 73,800 
22 November 2000 R 741 1 100 R 74,100 
23 November 2000 R 739 0 0 R 0 
24 November 2000 R 744 2 200 R 148,800 
27 November 2000 R 744 1 100 R 74,400 
28 November 2000 R 740 0 0 R 0 
29 November 2000 R 736 0 0 R 0 
30 November 2000 R 706 0 0 R 0 
01 December 2000 R 709 4 400 R 283,600 
04 December 2000 R 704 0 0 R 0 
06 December 2000 R 699 0 0 R 0 
07 December 2000 R 685 0 0 R 0 
08 December 2000 R 699 4 400 R 279,600 
11 December 2000 R 716 1 100 R 71,600 
12 December 2000 R 712 0 0 R 0 
13 December 2000 R 715 2 200 R 143,000 
14 December 2000 R 705 0 0 R 0 
15 December 2000 R 715 2 200 R 143,000 
18 December 2000 R 720 1 100 R 72,000 
19 December 2000 R 733 1 100 R 73,300 
20 December 2000 R 732 0 0 R 0 
21 December 2000 R 726 0 0 R 0 
22 December 2000 R 732 3 300 R 219,600 
27 December 2000 R 729 0 0 R 0 
28 December 2000 R 736 2 200 R 147,240 
29 December 2000 R 739 1 100 R 73,900 
02 January 2001 R 757 1 100 R 75,680 
03 January 2001 R 756 0 0 R 0 
04 January 2001 R 779 2 200 R 155,800 
05 January 2001 R 800 1 100 R 80,000 
08 January 2001 R 830 1 100 R 83,000 
09 January 2001 R 831 1 100 R 83,100 
10 January 2001 R 851 1 100 R 85,100 
11 January 2001 R 853 1 100 R 85,300 
12 January 2001 R 839 0 0 R 0 
15 January 2001 R 847 2 200 R 169,400 
16 January 2001 R 862 1 100 R 86,200 
17 January 2001 R 872 1 100 R 87,200 
18 January 2001 R 861 0 0 R 0 
19 January 2001 R 875 2 200 R 175,000 
22 January 2001 R 879 1 100 R 87,900 
23 January 2001 R 864 0 0 R 0 
24 January 2001 R 877 2 200 R 175,400 
25 January 2001 R 871 0 0 R 0 
26 January 2001 R 841 0 0 R 0 
29 January 2001 R 840 0 0 R 0 
30 January 2001 R 810 0 0 R 0 
31 January 2001 R 805 0 0 R 0 
01 February 2001 R 835 6 600 R 501,000 
02 February 2001 R 865 1 100 R 86,500 
05 February 2001 R 910 1 100 R 91,000 
06 February 2001 R 934 1 100 R 93,400 
07 February 2001 R 904 0 0 R 0 
08 February 2001 R 892 0 0 R 0 
12 February 2001 R 855 0 0 R 0 
13 February 2001 R 870 4 400 R 348,000 
14 February 2001 R 900 1 100 R 90,000 
15 February 2001 R 930 1 100 R 93,000 
16 February 2001 R 923 0 0 R 0 
19 February 2001 R 893 0 0 R 0 
20 February 2001 R 894 3 300 R 268,200 
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21 February 2001 R 906 1 100 R 90,600 
22 February 2001 R 887 0 0 R 0 
23 February 2001 R 859 0 0 R 0 
26 February 2001 R 834 0 0 R 0 
27 February 2001 R 833 0 0 R 0 
28 February 2001 R 829 0 0 R 0 
01 March 2001 R 840 6 600 R 504,000 
02 March 2001 R 864 1 100 R 86,400 
05 March 2001 R 874 1 100 R 87,400 
07 March 2001 R 873 0 0 R 0 
08 March 2001 R 878 2 200 R 175,600 
09 March 2001 R 883 1 100 R 88,300 
12 March 2001 R 862 0 0 R 0 
13 March 2001 R 848 0 0 R 0 
14 March 2001 R 843 0 0 R 0 
15 March 2001 R 840 0 0 R 0 
16 March 2001 R 830 0 0 R 0 
19 March 2001 R 846 6 600 R 507,600 
20 March 2001 R 854 1 100 R 85,400 
22 March 2001 R 850 0 0 R 0 
23 March 2001 R 820 0 0 R 0 
26 March 2001 R 820 3 300 R 246,000 
27 March 2001 R 832 1 100 R 83,200 
28 March 2001 R 813 0 0 R 0 
29 March 2001 R 802 0 0 R 0 
30 March 2001 R 797 0 0 R 0 
02 April 2001 R 815 4 400 R 326,000 
03 April 2001 R 817 1 100 R 81,700 
04 April 2001 R 818 1 100 R 81,800 
05 April 2001 R 827 1 100 R 82,700 
06 April 2001 R 845 1 100 R 84,500 
09 April 2001 R 846 1 100 R 84,600 
10 April 2001 R 835 0 0 R 0 
11 April 2001 R 830 0 0 R 0 
12 April 2001 R 832 3 300 R 249,600 
17 April 2001 R 840 1 100 R 84,000 
18 April 2001 R 831 0 0 R 0 
19 April 2001 R 826 0 0 R 0 
20 April 2001 R 822 0 0 R 0 
23 April 2001 R 823 4 400 R 329,200 
24 April 2001 R 813 0 0 R 0 
25 April 2001 R 804 0 0 R 0 
26 April 2001 R 809 3 300 R 242,700 
30 April 2001 R 807 0 0 R 0 
02 May 2001 R 816 2 200 R 163,200 
03 May 2001 R 812 0 0 R 0 
04 May 2001 R 808 0 0 R 0 
07 May 2001 R 788 0 0 R 0 
08 May 2001 R 781 0 0 R 0 
09 May 2001 R 771 0 0 R 0 
10 May 2001 R 767 0 0 R 0 
11 May 2001 R 754 0 0 R 0 
14 May 2001 R 760 8 800 R 608,000 
15 May 2001 R 764 1 100 R 76,400 
16 May 2001 R 757 0 0 R 0 
17 May 2001 R 750 0 0 R 0 
18 May 2001 R 751 3 300 R 225,300 
21 May 2001 R 737 0 0 R 0 
22 May 2001 R 744 2 200 R 148,800 
23 May 2001 R 758 1 100 R 75,800 
24 May 2001 R 758 1 100 R 75,800 
25 May 2001 R 756 0 0 R 0 
28 May 2001 R 744 0 0 R 0 
29 May 2001 R 743 0 0 R 0 
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30 May 2001 R 750 4 400 R 300,000 
31 May 2001 R 756 1 100 R 75,600 
01 June 2001 R 766 1 100 R 76,600 
04 June 2001 R 766 1 100 R 76,600 
05 June 2001 R 768 1 100 R 76,800 
06 June 2001 R 761 0 0 R 0 
07 June 2001 R 777 2 200 R 155,400 
08 June 2001 R 782 1 100 R 78,200 
11 June 2001 R 796 1 100 R 79,600 
12 June 2001 R 794 0 0 R 0 
13 June 2001 R 784 0 0 R 0 
14 June 2001 R 794 3 300 R 238,200 
15 June 2001 R 784 0 0 R 0 
18 June 2001 R 777 0 0 R 0 
19 June 2001 R 779 3 300 R 233,700 
20 June 2001 R 775 0 0 R 0 
21 June 2001 R 795 2 200 R 159,000 
22 June 2001 R 796 1 100 R 79,600 
25 June 2001 R 787 0 0 R 0 
26 June 2001 R 807 2 200 R 161,400 
27 June 2001 R 826 1 100 R 82,600 
28 June 2001 R 830 1 100 R 83,000 
29 June 2001 R 828 0 0 R 0 
02 July 2001 R 828 2 200 R 165,600 
03 July 2001 R 823 0 0 R 0 
04 July 2001 R 837 2 200 R 167,400 
05 July 2001 R 858 1 100 R 85,800 
06 July 2001 R 859 1 100 R 85,900 
09 July 2001 R 855 0 0 R 0 
10 July 2001 R 867 2 200 R 173,400 
11 July 2001 R 892 1 100 R 89,200 
12 July 2001 R 900 1 100 R 90,000 
13 July 2001 R 925 1 100 R 92,500 
17 July 2001 R 943 1 100 R 94,300 
18 July 2001 R 930 0 0 R 0 
19 July 2001 R 957 2 200 R 191,400 
20 July 2001 R 956 0 0 R 0 
     
AVERAGE PRICE 
INDEX 
R 739.40    
MOMENTUM 
STRATEGY 
R 738.61    
TONNAGES 
HEDGED 
29,900    
 
 
6.5      EVALUATION OF THE MOMENTUM STRATEGY VERSUS BENCHMARK:  
     2001-2006 
  
The results of the momentum strategy applied to July white maize contract data over the 
period 2001-2006 is summarised in table 6.2 and graphically represented in figure 6.1. 
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Table 6.2   Summary of the momentum strategy applied to July white maize data from 2001 to 2006 
 
* Based upon a processor procuring 600 000 metric tons of maize annually 
 
The results indicate that the benchmark index is outperformed by the momentum strategy in 
five of the six years under review, because the realised procurement price is lower than the 
average price index. The extent to which the momentum strategy beats the market varies 
substantially, from R0.79/metric ton in 2001 up to R11.86/metric ton in 2003. Based upon a 
processor purchasing 600 000 metric tons of maize annually, a R0.79/metric ton hedging gain 
in 2001 represented an overall gain of R473 597.26. The benefit of the strategy is clear once 
the R11.86/metric ton gain of 2003 is extrapolated over 600 000 metric tons, which leads to 
an overall hedging gain of R7 113 240.42.  
 
Figure 6.1   R/metric ton by which the momentum strategy outperforms/underperforms the average price index 
R -2.00
R -
R 2.00
R 4.00
R 6.00
R 8.00
R 10.00
R 12.00
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
 
Year Average price index Momentum strategy Value gained (R/ton) Total value gained*
2001 739.40R  738.61R  0.79R  473,597.26R  
2002 1,254.24R  1,252.48R  1.76R  1,057,304.03R 
2003 1,400.50R  1,388.64R  11.86R  7,113,240.42R 
2004 1,086.16R  1,084.39R  1.77R  1,060,166.59R 
2005 810.74R  807.77R  2.97R  1,779,472.85R 
2006 958.11R  959.72R  -1.60R  -962,400.85R  
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6.6      SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The common momentum strategy is a core/satellite price risk management strategy whereby 
the underlying asset is bought in the event of an increase in price and sold when its price 
moves lower. In the application of the proposed strategy, the definition is altered in order to 
make provision for an exclusively long position. This is achieved by staying neutral the market 
when prices drop, and going long the market on the first positive price movement (or 
sideways price movement) to the extent of the number of trading days since the previous 
upward movement in prices. 
 
There is no mutual agreement as to why the momentum strategy works. The most obvious 
explanation is that the returns achieved by such a strategy are a payoff for taking more risk 
than merely trading the average price index. The July white maize contract is used in the 
analysis of the strategy, since it is the most liquid contract available on SAFEX, and as such, 
a single daily position entered into entails one futures contract (100 metric tons) on the July 
white maize contract. The realised long position can be rolled to the desired contract month 
by engaging into a calendar spread. 
 
The momentum strategy applied to historical data shows that the average price index is 
outperformed in five of the six years under review. The extent to which the strategy 
outperforms the market varies considerably from year to year. 
 
In the next two chapters an additional two core/satellite price risk management strategies will 
be evaluated. The ability of these strategies to outperform the market in all of the years under 
review will be explored, because the momentum strategy was only able to beat the average 
price in five out of the six years in which the strategy was tested. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE MAXIMUM PRICE STRATEGY 
 
 
7.1      INTRODUCTION 
 
The previous chapter discussed the momentum strategy and evaluated its returns against a 
passive buy and hold average price benchmark. Although the momentum strategy was able 
to outperform the simple average price benchmark during most years, it was not able to do so 
consistently. Another shortcoming of the momentum strategy is its inability to determine a 
maximum procurement price upon commencement of the strategy.  
 
This chapter will discuss and evaluate the maximum price strategy which is also based upon 
a core/satellite method of risk management. Similar to the previous chapter, the success of 
the strategy depends on its performance relative to the benchmark as well as the consistency 
with which the benchmark is outperformed. The maximum price strategy will make use of both 
options and futures contracts, in contrast to the momentum strategy which applied exclusively 
futures contracts. 
 
 
7.2      DEFINITION 
 
Hull (2002:461) defines an exotic option simply as “a nonstandard option”. He states that the 
price and volatility of plain vanilla options are determined by an exchange, whereas financial 
engineers develop exotic options to be sold at a price not necessarily related to prices quoted 
by the market. He further argues that an exotic product comes about because of a number of 
factors. These include a specific need for a hedging product in the market and to reflect the 
user’s view on potential future price movements (Hull 2002:394). He identifies an Asian option 
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as “an option with a payoff dependent on the average price of the underlying asset during a 
specified period” (Hull 2002:456). 
 
In their research on options available in the futures market for hedging purposes, Hagedorn, 
Irwin, Good, Martines-Filho, Sherrick and Schnitkey (2003:3-5) describe new generation 
contracts as products that use automated pricing rules, discretionary marketing, options 
strategies, or a combination of all three in order to achieve an average hedge price. They 
classify new generation contracts into three basic categories, namely automated pricing 
contracts, managed hedging contracts and combination contracts.  
 
The maximum price strategy, to be presented in this chapter, is an exotic option strategy 
since it possesses no standard features and occurs as a result of a specific need expressed 
by risk-averse hedgers in the futures market. The strategy may be mistaken for an Asian 
option, but since its payoff does not depend on an average price, it should rather be classified 
as a managed hedging contract. It complies with the definition of a managed hedging contract 
(Hagedorn et al 2003:4) since a specific volume of the underlying commodity is hedged over 
a predetermined period with a fixed maximum price. 
 
Taking all of the above into account, the maximum price strategy can be defined as an exotic 
and managed hedging strategy that guarantees a maximum procurement price. The benefit of 
daily price movements lower than the maximum price will lead to a reduction in the final 
procurement price of the commodity, while daily price movements higher than the maximum 
price will have no adverse impact on the price at which the underlying commodity is bought.  
 
 
7.3      DESCRIPTION AND FEASIBILITY 
 
The characteristics that distinguish the maximum price strategy from alternative exotic options 
can be summarised as follows: 
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• On the trading day on which the strategy is initiated, the buyer of the underlying 
commodity is guaranteed a maximum procurement price. 
• The total volume of maize to be hedged is divided into the number of trading days over 
which the strategy will be applied to futures prices (i.e. the daily volume). 
• Every trading day, on which the price of maize is higher than the maximum price, the daily 
volume of maize will be purchased at the maximum price. Should the price of maize be 
lower than the maximum price on option expiration, the long position holder will receive 
the benefit of the lower price, as on option expiration, for the total number of trading days 
on which the maize price traded higher than the maximum price. 
• Every trading day, on which the price of maize is lower than the maximum price, the daily 
volume of maize will be purchased at the lower price. 
• The average of the daily volume of long positions taken over a predetermined strategy 
period will result in the final procurement price. The working of the strategy is summarized 
in figure 7.1. 
 
Figure 7.I   Graphical representation of maximum price contract 
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As is evident from figure 7.1, the long position holder will benefit from daily price movements 
lower than the guaranteed maximum price (as indicated in fig 7.1 by the daily pricing below 
the maximum price when SAFEX trades lower than the maximum price), while price 
movements higher than the maximum price will result in a daily long position being taken at 
the maximum price. The practical implementation of this strategy is structured as follows: 
 
• On the date of commencement, at-the-money call options are bought for the total volume 
to be hedged. This results in a guaranteed maximum procurement price. 
• The volume of grain to be hedged is divided into the number of trading days from the date 
of commencement to option expiration. This is known as the daily volume. 
• Every trading day between the date of commencement and option expiry on which the 
daily price is lower than the maximum price, the daily volume of call options is sold and 
replaced by a daily volume long futures position. By going short the option (which is now 
an out-of-the money call option), the net cost of the strategy is reduced. 
• Every trading day between the date of commencement and option expiry on which the 
daily price is higher than the maximum price, no action is taken. The daily volume of grain 
is hedged by the call option at the maximum price, which is the strike level of the call 
option. This call option is in the money.  
• Should the daily price of the underlying commodity be higher than the maximum price 
(strike level of option) on date of option expiry, the call options will automatically become 
long futures positions. In the event of a daily price lower than the maximum price on the 
date of option expiry, long futures positions will be taken to the extent of the daily volume 
multiplied by the total number of trading days on which the daily price traded higher than 
the maximum price. 
• The average price of the daily volume of grain hedged over the strategy period will result 
in the procurement price for the underlying commodity. By adding the premiums and 
broking fees of the call options to the realised procurement price, the net hedged price can 
be compared to the market benchmark. 
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• Since historical data on maize prices and volatility are available (appendixes I & II), the 
Black-Scholes model will be used to calculate the historical prices of options (see sec 
2.4.2.3). The maximum price strategy will be initiated on the day on which volatility is first 
published, since this represents the first trading day on which options can be traded. 
 
The July contract is used in the evaluation of the proposed strategy, because it is the most 
liquid futures contract available on SAFEX. Although grain processors do not wish to take 
delivery of a year’s stock all at once, the resultant long position can be rolled forward to the 
delivery month in which the grain is required. Rolling a position forward consists of going short 
the July contract against the long position obtained from the maximum price strategy, and 
immediately going long the desired contract month (Hull 2002:458).  
 
For the purposes of the evaluation of the strategy, the assumption will be made that the daily 
volume on SAFEX entails one futures contract (100 metric tons) traded at its closing price. 
Since processors are naturally much shorter the market, the volume of grain to be hedged 
can be adjusted according to individual needs. Once the value of the long call option is below 
R1/ton, no effort will be made to go short the option on days when the daily price is lower than 
the maximum price, since the broking cost will exceed the premium benefit of the option. 
 
 
7.4      APPLICATION OF MAXIMUM PRICE STRATEGY 
  
A detailed analysis of the maximum price strategy applied to the 2006 contract data (as given 
in appendixes I & II) is presented in table 7.1 below.  
 
A at the money call constitutes a maximum price of R680/ton for 30 900 metric tons of maize, 
that is, one contract per day since inception of the strategy up to option expiration. An 
individual calculation for the years after 2001 is presented in appendix IV. 
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Table 7.I   Maximum price strategy applied on 2006 July white maize daily closing prices 
 
VOLUME BELOW VOLUME @ ADDITIONAL BROKING DAILY
DATE  PRICE VOLATILITY CALL-STRIKE DAILY HEDGEMAXIMUM PRICE MAXIMUM PRICE OPTION PREMIUM NET OPTION COST FEES @ R1/TON PROCUREMENT PRICE
2005/03/29 R 671 35.0% R 680 -R 99.75 -R 3,082,275.00 -R 30,900.00 R 0.00
2005/03/30 R 671 35.0% R 680 R 671 100 0 R 99.63 R 9,963.00 -R 100.00 -R 67,100.00
2005/03/31 R 674 35.0% R 680 R 674 100 0 R 101.22 R 10,122.00 -R 100.00 -R 67,400.00
2005/04/01 R 674 35.0% R 680 R 674 100 0 R 101.10 R 10,110.00 -R 100.00 -R 67,400.00
2005/04/04 R 674 35.0% R 680 R 674 100 0 R 100.76 R 10,076.00 -R 100.00 -R 67,400.00
2005/04/05 R 674 35.0% R 680 R 674 100 0 R 100.64 R 10,064.00 -R 100.00 -R 67,400.00
2005/04/06 R 698 35.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/04/07 R 698 35.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/04/08 R 698 35.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/04/11 R 692 35.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/04/12 R 693 35.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/04/13 R 689 35.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/04/14 R 685 35.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/04/15 R 695 35.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/04/18 R 687 35.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/04/19 R 683 35.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/04/20 R 675 38.0% R 680 R 675 100 0 R 108.08 R 10,808.00 -R 100.00 -R 67,500.00
2005/04/21 R 675 38.0% R 680 R 675 100 0 R 107.96 R 10,796.00 -R 100.00 -R 67,500.00
2005/04/22 R 678 38.0% R 680 R 678 100 0 R 109.56 R 10,956.00 -R 100.00 -R 67,800.00
2005/04/25 R 677 38.0% R 680 R 677 100 0 R 108.60 R 10,860.00 -R 100.00 -R 67,700.00
2005/04/26 R 683 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/04/28 R 683 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/04/29 R 683 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/03 R 683 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/04 R 683 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/05 R 682 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/06 R 682 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/09 R 683 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/10 R 690 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/11 R 690 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/12 R 675 38.0% R 680 R 675 100 0 R 105.25 R 10,525.00 -R 100.00 -R 67,500.00
2005/05/13 R 690 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/16 R 695 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/17 R 695 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/18 R 695 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/19 R 695 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/20 R 680 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/23 R 695 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/24 R 695 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/25 R 694 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/26 R 694 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/27 R 705 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/30 R 705 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/31 R 719 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/01 R 719 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/02 R 717 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/03 R 704 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/06 R 704 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/07 R 700 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/08 R 700 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/09 R 715 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/10 R 715 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/13 R 715 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/14 R 715 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/15 R 707 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/17 R 707 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/20 R 707 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/21 R 715 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/22 R 714 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/23 R 705 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/24 R 705 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/27 R 710 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/28 R 699 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/29 R 700 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/30 R 703 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/01 R 703 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/04 R 707 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/05 R 720 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/06 R 728 35.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/07 R 718 35.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/08 R 718 35.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/11 R 718 35.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/12 R 717 35.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/13 R 716 35.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/14 R 732 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/15 R 725 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/18 R 733 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/19 R 750 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
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2005/07/20 R 733 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/21 R 733 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/22 R 733 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/25 R 733 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/26 R 741 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/27 R 745 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/28 R 745 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/29 R 759 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/01 R 759 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/02 R 759 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/03 R 757 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/04 R 752 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/05 R 749 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/08 R 749 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/10 R 749 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/11 R 749 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/12 R 750 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/15 R 750 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/16 R 752 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/17 R 764 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/18 R 762 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/19 R 762 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/22 R 775 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/23 R 780 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/24 R 796 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/25 R 790 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/26 R 797 36.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/29 R 792 36.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/30 R 797 36.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/31 R 803 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/01 R 815 40.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/02 R 805 41.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/05 R 797 43.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/06 R 822 44.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/07 R 825 47.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/08 R 839 48.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/09 R 860 48.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/12 R 882 49.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/13 R 839 47.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/14 R 860 49.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/15 R 842 49.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/16 R 849 49.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/19 R 877 49.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/20 R 875 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/21 R 864 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/22 R 852 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/23 R 866 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/26 R 858 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/27 R 866 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/28 R 869 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/29 R 867 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/30 R 877 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/03 R 904 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/04 R 893 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/05 R 893 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/06 R 896 49.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/07 R 897 49.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/10 R 870 49.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/11 R 851 48.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/12 R 856 47.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/13 R 875 47.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/14 R 839 47.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/17 R 846 47.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/18 R 868 47.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/19 R 874 47.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/20 R 880 48.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/21 R 890 48.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/24 R 900 48.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/25 R 880 48.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/26 R 880 48.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/27 R 875 48.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/28 R 860 48.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/31 R 880 48.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/01 R 862 48.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/02 R 862 48.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/03 R 856 48.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/04 R 867 48.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/07 R 886 48.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/08 R 890 47.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00  
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2005/11/09 R 894 47.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/10 R 898 44.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/11 R 905 44.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/14 R 950 44.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/15 R 983 44.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/16 R 971 46.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/17 R 979 46.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/18 R 969 46.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/21 R 960 46.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/22 R 1,005 52.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/23 R 997 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/24 R 956 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/25 R 959 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/28 R 988 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/29 R 970 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/30 R 980 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/01 R 990 49.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/02 R 998 49.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/05 R 1,023 49.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/06 R 1,022 49.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/07 R 1,052 49.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/08 R 1,067 48.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/09 R 1,070 45.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/12 R 1,115 47.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/13 R 1,135 45.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/14 R 1,127 45.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/15 R 1,128 45.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/19 R 1,173 47.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/20 R 1,128 47.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/21 R 1,120 47.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/22 R 1,120 47.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/23 R 1,150 48.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/27 R 1,195 49.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/28 R 1,154 51.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/29 R 1,140 53.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/30 R 1,095 53.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/03 R 1,050 56.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/04 R 1,079 56.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/05 R 1,065 55.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/06 R 1,110 54.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/09 R 1,144 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/10 R 1,151 47.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/11 R 1,141 44.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/12 R 1,096 44.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/13 R 1,078 45.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/16 R 1,081 45.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/17 R 1,123 45.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/18 R 1,116 43.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/19 R 1,119 42.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/20 R 1,141 40.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/23 R 1,096 39.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/24 R 1,088 37.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/25 R 1,110 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/26 R 1,091 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/27 R 1,076 36.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/30 R 1,036 37.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/31 R 994 38.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/01 R 962 39.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/02 R 1,006 40.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/03 R 1,007 40.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/06 R 962 40.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/07 R 933 41.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/08 R 977 41.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/09 R 984 41.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/10 R 985 40.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/13 R 988 38.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/14 R 1,006 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/15 R 1,006 35.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/16 R 976 35.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/17 R 992 36.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/20 R 987 35.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/21 R 978 35.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/22 R 1,022 36.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/23 R 1,019 35.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/24 R 1,045 35.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/27 R 1,090 37.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/28 R 1,090 37.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/02 R 1,092 37.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00  
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2006/03/03 R 1,109 36.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/06 R 1,132 36.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/07 R 1,124 35.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/08 R 1,096 35.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/09 R 1,117 34.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/10 R 1,127 33.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/13 R 1,132 33.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/14 R 1,126 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/15 R 1,141 32.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/16 R 1,132 30.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/17 R 1,114 30.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/20 R 1,129 29.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/22 R 1,166 30.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/23 R 1,159 31.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/24 R 1,161 30.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/27 R 1,163 28.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/28 R 1,171 27.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/29 R 1,164 28.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/30 R 1,147 29.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/31 R 1,146 29.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/04/03 R 1,134 29.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/04/04 R 1,113 28.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/04/05 R 1,120 26.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/04/06 R 1,105 26.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/04/07 R 1,117 24.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/04/10 R 1,122 24.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/04/11 R 1,120 24.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/04/12 R 1,119 24.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/04/13 R 1,106 24.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/04/18 R 1,077 25.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/04/19 R 1,068 25.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/04/20 R 1,080 26.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/04/21 R 1,098 26.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/04/24 R 1,093 26.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/04/25 R 1,087 26.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/04/26 R 1,099 25.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/04/28 R 1,090 25.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/02 R 1,094 24.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/03 R 1,088 24.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/04 R 1,089 24.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/05 R 1,089 24.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/08 R 1,088 24.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/09 R 1,100 23.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/10 R 1,140 23.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/11 R 1,143 23.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/12 R 1,169 24.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/15 R 1,197 27.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/16 R 1,187 25.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/17 R 1,189 24.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/18 R 1,206 24.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/19 R 1,218 25.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/22 R 1,216 25.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/23 R 1,226 25.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/24 R 1,216 24.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/25 R 1,201 25.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/26 R 1,209 25.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/29 R 1,207 23.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/30 R 1,221 22.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/31 R 1,233 22.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/06/01 R 1,244 21.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/06/02 R 1,244 21.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/06/05 R 1,266 22.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/06/06 R 1,272 24.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/06/07 R 1,270 23.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/06/08 R 1,290 22.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/06/09 R 1,285 20.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/06/12 R 1,302 24.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/06/13 R 1,335 25.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/06/14 R 1,314 26.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/06/15 R 1,295 23.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/06/19 R 1,287 25.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/06/20 R 1,270 27.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/06/21 R 1,288 28.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/06/22 R 1,320 28.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/06/23 R 1,340 29.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
-R 2,977,995.00 -R 31,900.00 -R 21,006,700.00
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The maximum price strategy applied to the 2006 contract data results in a net procurement 
cost of R24 016 595.00 for 30 900 metric tons of maize, with an average long position of 
R777.24 per metric ton. This is R180.87 lower than the average price index over the same 
period. 
 
7.5      EVALUATION OF THE MAXIMUM PRICE STRATEGY VERSUS BENCHMARK:  
          2001-2006 
  
The results of the maximum price strategy applied to July white maize contract data over the 
period 2001-2006 is summarised in table 7.2 and graphically represented in figure 7.2. 
 
Table 7.2   Summary of the maximum price strategy applied to July white maize data from 2001 to 2006 
Year Average price index Maximum price strategy Value gained (R/ton) Total value gained* 
2001  R                    739.40   R                          713.29  R                       26.11   R    15,663,209.30 
2002  R                 1,254.24   R                       1,102.03  R                     152.21   R    91,325,589.74 
2003  R                 1,400.50   R                       1,291.70  R                     108.80   R    65,280,000.00 
2004  R                 1,086.16   R                       1,021.03  R                       65.13   R    39,076,852.94 
2005 R                    810.74   R                          787.55  R                       23.19   R    13,913,010.75 
2006  R                    958.11   R                          777.24  R                     180.87   R  108,523,477.20 
* Based upon a processor procuring 600 000 metric tons of maize annually. 
 
The results indicate that the benchmark index is outperformed by the maximum price strategy 
in all the years under review, because the realised procurement price is lower than the 
average price index.  
 
Total procurement price -R 21,006,700.00 
Total option cost -R 2,977,995.00 
Additional broking fees -R 31,900.00 
Net procurement cost -R 24,016,595.00 
Average price index R 958.11 
Maximum price strategy R 777.24 
Tonnages hedged 30,900 
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The extent to which the maximum price strategy beats the market varies substantially, from 
R23.19/metric ton in 2005 up to R180.87/metric ton in 2006. There are two reasons for the 
inconsistency in the rand value by which the average price index is outperformed, namely: 
 
(1) A larger price movement over the duration of the contract results in a higher rand value by 
which the average price index is outperformed. 
(2) The second reason is the level at which a long position in call options is entered into. 
 
Based upon a processor purchasing 600 000 metric tons of maize annually, a R180.87/metric 
ton hedging gain in 2006 represents an overall gain of R108 523 477.20.  
 
Figure 7.2   R/metric ton by which the maximum price strategy outperforms the average price index 
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94  
7.6     SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The maximum price strategy is an exotic and managed hedging strategy that guarantees the 
user a maximum procurement price on the date on which the strategy is initiated. The benefit 
of daily price movements lower than the maximum price will lead to a reduction in the final 
procurement price of the commodity, while daily price movements higher than the maximum 
price will have no adverse impact on the price at which the underlying commodity is bought.  
 
In an economic sense, the maximum price strategy offers returns in excess of the average 
price offered by the futures market because of the additional risk taken in the management of 
the strategy. Since volatility tends to increase in the period immediately following the 
introduction of the underlying futures contract, the at-the-money call option is bought at a low 
premium. The July white maize contract is used in the analysis of the strategy, because it is 
the most liquid contract available on SAFEX, and as such, a position entered into entails one 
futures contract (100 metric tons) on the July white maize contract. The eventual long position 
can be rolled forward to the desired contract month. 
 
The maximum price strategy applied to historical data shows that the average price index is 
outperformed in every year under review. The extent to which the strategy outperforms the 
market varies from 3 to 19%. 
 
In the following chapter, the last of the proposed price risk management strategies will be 
evaluated. The ability of this strategy to outperform the market will be explored, and the 
results compared to those of the momentum and maximum price strategies.  
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CHAPTER 8 
THE INDEXED STRANGLE 
 
 
8.1      INTRODUCTION 
 
In previous chapters, the adverse impact of a volatile market on groups with a concern in 
SAFEX was discussed and highlighted. It was concluded that there is a need for indexing 
strategies among stakeholders in order to reduce the extreme levels of price volatility evident 
in the futures market.  
 
Chapters 6 and 7 discussed and evaluated two risk management strategies based on a 
core/satellite method of price risk management. Both the momentum strategy and the 
maximum price strategy were able to outperform the chosen benchmark, even though the 
consistency of and extent to which the benchmark was outperformed varied substantially. 
Although high levels of volatility negatively impact on procurement results, the possibility of 
exploiting volatile markets to the ultimate benefit of all groups concerned should be evaluated. 
 
This chapter discusses and evaluates the indexed strangle strategy. The success of the 
strategy depends on its performance relative to the average price index and the consistency 
with which this benchmark is outperformed. 
 
 
8.2     DESCRIPTION OF THE INDEXED STRANGLE STRATEGY 
 
In their study on information flows in financial markets, Berchtold and Norden (2005:1147-
1172) analysed two types of information flows, namely return information and volatility 
information. Whereas return information embodies the knowledge of informed investors on 
whether prices will increase or decrease, volatility information entails the lack of knowledge 
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on the direction of market movements. The indexed strangle strategy is consistent with 
volatility information flows, since the future direction of market movements cannot be 
predicted. As such, the indexed strangle will aim to provide additional value to an average 
price index on both upward and downward price movements.   
 
Even though the future direction and extent of price movements cannot be accurately 
predicted, volatility movements are predictable in both its direction and extent, as is evident 
from figure 8.1.  
 
Figure 8.1 Ten-day volatility average 2002-2007 
           
 
 
Figure 8.1 confirms a trend among historical volatility movements for the July white maize 
contract. The following important conclusions can be drawn from the graphical representation: 
• Volatility is low at the commencement of the contract. 
• Volatility increases over time from commencement and reaches a peak over 
December/January (see tab 8.1). This is because of the high levels of uncertainty in the 
maize market during planting time.  
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• From January until option expiration, volatility decreases. The lower volatility is brought 
about by higher levels of supply and demand certainty. 
 
Table 8.1 Ten-day volatility 2002-2007 
Period from: Period to: 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Average 
01-May 10-May     38.0 38.0 
11-May 20-May     38.0 38.0 
21-May 30-May  24.0   38.0 31.0 
31-May 09-Jun  24.0   38.0 31.0 
10-Jun 19-Jun  24.0   37.0 30.5 
20-Jun 29-Jun  25.1 30.8  37.0 31.0 
30-Jun 09-Jul  26.4 31.0 26.0 36.1 29.9 
10-Jul 19-Jul  25.3 31.0 26.4 33.9 29.1 
20-Jul 29-Jul  27.0 34.6 30.8 33.0 31.3 
30-Jul 08-Aug  27.5 36.5 36.0 33.0 33.3 
09-Aug 18-Aug  25.8 36.7 37.7 33.0 33.3 
19-Aug 28-Aug  24.7 36.3 38.9 33.5 33.3 
29-Aug 07-Sep  25.4 37.2 41.0 40.6 36.1 
08-Sep 17-Sep  26.6 38.0 40.3 48.5 38.3 
18-Sep 27-Sep  28.0 37.5 41.4 49.9 39.2 
28-Sep 07-Oct  28.4 36.7 41.5 49.8 39.1 
08-Oct 17-Oct  27.5 37.9 42.2 47.5 38.8 
18-Oct 27-Oct  29.0 38.7 41.8 47.8 39.3 
28-Oct 06-Nov  32.2 40.4 44.7 48.3 41.4 
07-Nov 16-Nov  31.9 41.8 47.0 45.6 41.6 
17-Nov 26-Nov  31.1 40.5 48.4 48.7 42.2 
27-Nov 06-Dec  30.3 37.6 51.2 49.7 42.2 
07-Dec 16-Dec  33.2 42.8 51.9 46.5 43.6 
17-Dec 26-Dec  30.8 49.8 50.1 47.2 44.5 
27-Dec 05-Jan 39.3 29.1 52.1 52.3 53.3 45.2 
06-Jan 15-Jan 39.1 27.4 52.0 52.3 47.5 43.7 
16-Jan 25-Jan 38.8 29.0 51.0 46.7 41.1 41.3 
26-Jan 04-Feb 35.6 36.7 45.5 47.6 38.4 40.8 
05-Feb 14-Feb 37.2 42.6 46.8 48.4 40.0 43.0 
15-Feb 24-Feb 33.2 39.7 45.1 42.1 35.7 39.2 
25-Feb 05-Mar 32.8 37.7 41.6 35.6 37.3 37.0 
06-Mar 15-Mar 36.2 42.1 44.5 39.6 34.1 39.3 
16-Mar 25-Mar 37.1 43.8 44.9 40.9 30.2 39.4 
26-Mar 04-Apr 38.8 37.5 41.5 38.7 28.4 37.0 
05-Apr 14-Apr 35.4 37.5 41.4 38.4 24.7 35.5 
15-Apr 24-Apr 29.9 34.0 39.0 38.8 25.8 33.5 
25-Apr 04-May 26.5 31.5 35.3 35.6 24.7 30.7 
05-May 14-May 26.8 37.0 32.9 34.0 23.6 30.9 
15-May 24-May 23.5 48.0 32.0 35.6 25.3 32.9 
25-May 03-Jun 23.1 46.6 28.6 38.5 22.7 31.9 
04-Jun 13-Jun 24.1 46.1 37.8 41.5 23.1 34.5 
14-Jun 23-Jun 24.2 47.0 38.6 39.1 26.9 35.2 
 
 
As discussed in chapter 2, one of the main variables determining the price of an option is 
volatility. Lower volatility leads to a lower premium being paid for an option, while high 
volatility levels will result in a higher premium being paid for an option on an underlying 
futures contract. The opportunity therefore is to go short volatility (sell options) over the 10-
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day period in which volatility historically peaks. Since the direction of market movement 
cannot be accurately predicted, a short position in both put and call options should be taken. 
Although market movements tend to be less aggressive after the historical volatility peak, the 
strike level of the options, in which a short position is taken, should be out of the money. This 
is commonly known as a short option strangle.  
 
Hull (2002:13) defines a strangle strategy as a position being taken in a put and call option 
with the same expiration date and different strike prices. He states that a short strangle 
position will be entered into if large price movements are possible. Maximum profit occurs 
when the underlying futures price on expiration date is trading between the strike prices of the 
options sold (indicated as the area between A and B in fig 8.2). At this price, both options 
expire worthless and the options trader profits the premiums of the options sold.  
 
Figure 8.2  Short strangle payoff 
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The proposed indexed strangle strategy will therefore aim to profit from volatility trends, in 
addition to an average price. This will be implemented in the following way: 
• An average long futures price will be realised by buying equal volumes of futures contracts 
on a daily basis over the whole of the contract lifetime. 
• Since volatility tends to peak annually over the period 27 December to 5 January, short 
strangles will be implemented during this period for the total number of tonnages to be 
hedged via the average price strategy. This volume of grain divided by the number of 
trading days between 27 December and 5 January will determine the daily number of 
short strangles to be entered into. Should the mentioned formula not result in a round 
hundred number, it will be rounded off, and on the last trading day the resultant strangles 
will be entered into. The rule to be used is that an option will not be sold if the premium of 
the option is lower than R1/ton, since this is the breakeven value to offset broking fees. 
• The strike of the call options to be sold will equal the SAFEX futures price for the July 
white maize contract as on 27 December (or the first trading day thereafter) plus 40%. The 
strike of the put options to be sold will equal the SAFEX futures price for the July white 
maize contract as on 27 December (or the first trading day thereafter) minus 40%. The 
resultant strike level will be rounded off to the nearest R20 interval. 
 
It is necessary to consider the effect of the short options.  
• If, on option expiry, the July white maize futures contract closes higher than the put option 
strike and lower than the call option strike the total amount of the option premiums will be 
realised as profit and deducted from the average long futures price. This is indicated as A 
in figure 8.3. 
• If, on option expiry, the July white maize futures contract closes higher than the call option 
strike, short futures contracts will be assigned against the short call options. These short 
futures contracts will offset the long futures contracts entered into through the realisation 
of an average price. As such, no futures position will exist and the difference between the 
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long and short futures levels plus the option premiums will be the resultant cash flow per 
ton. This is indicated by B in figure 8.3. 
• If, on option expiry, the July white maize futures contract closes lower than the put option 
strike, long futures contracts will be assigned against the short put options. As such a 
double-up of tonnages will arise as indicated by C in figure 8.3. 
 
 In this instance, the average long position price level can be calculated as follows:  
 
 AP = (LF + PS - OP)/2 
 where AP = average price of long futures position (per ton) 
            LF = average of daily long futures position (per ton) 
           PS = strike level of short put options  
          OP = sum of option premiums (per ton) 
 
Example: 
Average daily long futures position = R1 235/mt 
Strike level of short put options = R1 000/mt 
Call option premium = R50/mt 
Put option premium = R40/mt 
AP = (R1 235 + R1 000 – R90)/2 
           = R1 072.50/mt 
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Figure 8.3  Tonnages hedged on option expiry 
 
 
 
8.3      APPLICATION OF INDEXED STRANGLE STRATEGY 
 
Detailed analyses of the indexed strangle strategy applied to the 2006 contract data (as given 
in appendixes I & II) is presented in table 8.2 below. An individual calculation for the years 
since 2001 is presented in appendix V. 
 
Table 8.2   The indexed strangle strategy applied to 2006 July white maize contract data 
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Since the July closing price on option expiration is between the short strangle strikes, the 
options expire worthless and the total option premium is gained. 
 
 
8.4      EVALUATION OF INDEXED STRANGLE VS BENCHMARK 2001-2006 
 
The results of the indexed strangle strategy applied to July white maize contract data over the 
period 2001-2006 is summarised in table 8.3 and graphically represented in figure 8.4. 
 
Table 8.3   Summary of the indexed strangle strategy applied on July white maize data from 2001 to 2006 
Year Average price index Indexed strangle strategy Value gained (R/ton) Total value gained* 
2001  R                739.40   R                         713.94   R                    25.46   R     15,273,209.30  
2002  R              1,254.24   R                      1,200.85   R                    53.39   R     32,033,589.74  
2003  R              1,400.50   R                      1,393.89   R                     6.61   R       3,966,000.00  
2004  R              1,086.16   R                      1,028.64   R                    57.52   R     34,510,852.94  
2005  R                810.74   R                         764.25   R                    46.49   R     27,893,010.75  
2006  R                958.11   R                         907.68   R                    50.43   R     30,259,477.20  
• Based upon a processor procuring 600 000 metric tons of maize annually. 
 
The results indicate that the benchmark index is outperformed in all the years under review 
because the realised procurement price is lower than the average price index.  
 
The extent to which the indexed strangle strategy beats the market varies substantially, from 
R6.61/metric ton in 2003 up to R57.52/metric ton in 2004. Based upon a processor 
purchasing 600 000 metric tons of maize annually, a R57.52/metric ton hedging gain in 2004 
represents an overall gain of R34 510 852.94. 
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Figure 8.4   R/metric ton by which the indexed strangle strategy outperforms the average price index 
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8.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The indexed strangle strategy is a combination strategy that combines an average price with 
a short option structure. Whereas high volatility is traditionally experienced negatively by 
processors in the futures market, the short strangle actually exploits volatility to the benefit of 
the grain buyer. By selling options over the period on which volatility tends to reach its peak, 
high option premiums are secured.  
 
In an economic sense, the indexed strangle strategy offers returns in excess of the average 
price offered by the futures market because of the additional risk taken by implementing a 
short strangle. Since volatility tends to decrease in the period following the introduction of the 
short strangle, the options are sold at high price levels. The July white maize contract is used 
in the analysis of the strategy, because it is the most liquid contract available on SAFEX, and 
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as such, a position entered into entails one futures contract (100 metric tons) on the July 
white maize contract. The eventual long position can be rolled forward to the desired contract 
month. 
 
The indexed strangle strategy applied to historical data shows that the average price index is 
outperformed in every year under review. The extent to which the strategy outperforms the 
market varies from 0.47 to 5.73%. 
 
In the following chapter, the results of the three proposed price risk management strategies 
will be compared, and a recommendation made about the optimal strategy or combination of 
strategies. 
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CHAPTER 9 
EVALUATION AND COMPARISON OF PRICE RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES 
 
 
9.1      INTRODUCTION 
 
In chapters 6, 7 and 8 three price risk management strategies were discussed and applied to 
historical market data. The resultant performance of each strategy was compared to the 
benchmark average July white maize SAFEX price. Even though all three strategies 
compared favorably with historical average SAFEX prices, the consistency and extent to 
which the benchmark average price was outperformed differed significantly.  
 
By comparing the results of the three strategies, the optimum single or combination 
procurement strategy could be identified. This is achieved by comparing the consistency of 
performance and the extent to which the benchmark is outperformed. 
   
This chapter will also focus on the benefits and disadvantages of each strategy. The objective 
will be to highlight the strategy that will provide the user with the most value and will 
successfully eliminate the high volatility levels inherent in the futures market. Results 
achieved by the price risk management strategies relative to the benchmark will be compared 
to those achieved by fund managers in alternative markets. 
 
 
9.2      ANNUAL PERFORMANCE OF PRICE RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES  
 
Figure 9.1 graphically represents the six-year results of the proposed strategies against one 
another and the benchmark average price from 2001 to 2006. This is summarised in table 9.1 
and then discussed on an annual basis. 
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Figure 9.1 Comparison of price risk management strategies versus benchmark average price 
 
 
Table 9.1 Comparison between performances of price risk management strategies versus benchmark 
 
 
  
• 2001. The average price of the July 2001 white maize contract is R739.40, the lowest 
average of all the years under review. All the price risk management strategies outperform 
the average price. The maximum price strategy achieves the best procurement price of 
R713.29, followed closely by the indexed strangle strategy with a procurement price of 
R713.94. The momentum strategy outperforms the average price by a mere 0.11% or 
R0.79/metric ton. 
 
• 2002. The average price of the July 2002 white maize contract is R1 254.24. 
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Once again all the price risk management strategies outperform this average price. The 
strategy rating is similar to 2001, with the maximum price strategy achieving the best 
procurement price of R1 102.03, followed by the indexed strangle strategy with a price of 
R1200.85. The momentum strategy outperforms the average price by realizing a long position 
of R1 252.48. 
 
• 2003. The R1 400.50 average price of the July 2003 white maize contract is the highest of 
all the years under review. Consistent with previous years, all the price risk management 
strategies outperform the average price. The maximum price strategy once again leads 
the way, achieving a procurement price of R1 291.70. The indexed strangle strategy 
realises a price of R1 393.89, while the momentum strategy outperforms the average price 
by R11.86/metric ton. 
 
• 2004. The R1 086.16 average price of the July 2004 white maize contract is outperformed 
by all the strategies evaluated. The performance ratings are consistent with previous years 
and the maximum price strategy achieves a procurement price of R1 021.03. This price is 
R7.61 better than the indexed strangle strategy and R63.36 superior to the momentum 
strategy. 
 
 
•  2005. The average price of the July 2005 white maize contract is R810.74. All the price 
risk management strategies outperform this average price. The maximum price strategy is 
outperformed for the first time because the indexed strangle realises a procurement price 
of R764.25, which is R23.30/metric ton lower than the maximum price strategy. The 
momentum strategy outperforms the average price by R2.97/metric ton, which equates to 
a 0.37% better performance than the average price. 
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• 2006. The average price of the July 2006 white maize contract is R958.11. For the first 
time the average price is lower than one of the strategies, because the application of the 
momentum strategy on historical data results in a long position R1.61/metric ton higher 
than the average price. The maximum price strategy achieves a long position of R777.24 
which is 18.88% lower than the average price and R130.44/metric ton lower than the 
indexed strangle procurement price. 
 
The amount per metric ton by which the average price of the July contract is 
outperformed/underperformed from 2001 to 2006, is indicated in figure 9.2.  
 
Figure 9.2 Price risk management strategies performance versus benchmark (R/metric ton) 
   
 
From figure 9.2 it can be concluded that all three strategies are successful in reaching their 
objective. This is because 17 out of the 18 strategy applications were able to outperform the 
average price over the last six years on which the data were tested. It is especially true of the 
maximum price and indexed strangle strategies, because both these strategies constantly 
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achieved long futures positions at a price lower than the average price used as benchmark. 
These results are the direct opposite of the efficient market hypothesis and previous research 
done on this subject (Irwin et al 2005; Stewart 1934:415-433; Wang 2001:929-952). 
 
 
9.3      DISCUSSION OF PRICE RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES 
 
The benefits and disadvantages of each individual risk management strategy are summarised 
in table 9.2. 
 
Table 9.2 Benefits and disadvantages of individual price risk management strategies 
Strategy Benefits Disadvantages 
Momentum 
strategy 
No cost (premium) payable 
Easy to implement 
Inconsistency of results (versus benchmark) 
Small rand-value benefit versus benchmark 
average price 
No guaranteed maximum price 
Maximum price 
strategy 
Maximum price is known at 
inception of the strategy 
Consistency in performance 
versus benchmark 
High rand-value benefit versus 
benchmark average price 
Relatively easy to implement 
 
Premium payable 
 
Indexed strangle 
strategy 
No cost (premium) payable 
Easy to implement 
High rand-value benefit versus 
benchmark average price 
 
Price movement outside of short option strike 
levels results in double hedging/no hedging 
No guaranteed maximum price 
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Since the results achieved by these strategies are not consistent with the efficient market 
hypothesis, the question remains as to why these strategies are able to consistently 
outperform the market. The most obvious reasons for the superior performance of the 
individual strategies are as follows: 
 
• Momentum strategy. No long positions are taken during bearish market movements, 
while futures are bought once prices move upwards. As such, short-term price trends are 
captured which results in a favorable net long position price. 
 
• Maximum price strategy. Call options are bought on the day on which the strategy is 
implemented, resulting in a maximum price equal to the sum of the call-option strike and 
the option premium. Price movements lower than the call-option strike is exploited, while 
prices higher than the discussed strike level are nullified by the call option itself. Since 
volatility tends to start at low levels and increase over time, the call options are initially 
bought at a low premium and the subsequent rise in volatility will be exploited once long 
call options are liquidated in favor of long futures contracts. 
 
• Indexed strangle strategy. Options are sold during the period over which volatility tends 
to peak, resulting in a high option premium to be subtracted from the average price 
realised by going long equal volumes of futures contracts every trading day over the 
contract lifetime. Since market movement is limited from the days on which the options are 
sold to option expiration, the net amount of the premiums will be realised. 
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9.4      THE IMPACT OF PRICE RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES  
 
The application of the proposed price risk management strategies results in a lower exposure 
to volatility and the realisation of a better than average futures contract price level. This will 
benefit groups directly and indirectly susceptible to volatile prices. 
 
9.4.1 Speculators. Speculators’ financial success depends on the strategy used in the 
exploitation of arbitrage opportunities. The principle of speculation in the futures market 
is to buy at low price levels and sell at high price levels, or vice versa (Kohls & Uhl 
2002:350). By engaging in a risk management strategy, the speculator is not 
guaranteed a profit, since the lower than average long futures position in the market 
may still be higher than the futures price at the last trading day of the futures contract.  
 
By applying components of these strategies for shorter periods of time, the speculator 
may still realise a profit. Since the momentum strategy exploits short-term price trends, 
a profit can be realised by going long the market on its first upward price movement 
and by going short the market on the first trading day thereafter on which prices move 
lower. The speculator can use the principle of buying options at low volatility levels 
(maximum price strategy), since a limited amount of funds are placed on risk with 
unlimited profit gains. Similarly, the indexed strangle can be used by ignoring the 
indexing strategy and simply engaging in a short strangle strategy over the designated 
time period. This would have resulted in speculative profits for the period 2001 to 2006. 
 
9.4.2 Hedgers and consumers. Food price inflation has a major impact on a country’s 
overall inflation rate. During the 2007 season white maize, a major part of the 
population’s staple diet, soared by 75% in price. This caused economists to argue that 
higher grain prices in South Africa would result in food price inflation of close to 20%, 
which in turn would lift the overall inflation rate higher than the 6% upper target 
(Thomas 2007:34-35). 
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According to Thomas (2007:36-37), the complacent approach of industry players to market 
movement will ultimately be borne by consumers. This is illustrated in the price comparison of 
a 5 kg bag of maize meal over a one-year period. Although the price of the bag of meal 
increased from R14.87 to R21.84 because of higher grain prices, the component cost 
attributable to millers and retailers remained unchanged. The major price increase is the 
result of a higher cost of maize and as such a higher long position level obtained in the 
futures market. Since no effort is made to beat the market, the profit of processors thus 
remains unchanged. 
 
Thomas (2007:36-37) make the following recommendations in order to eliminate the 
concerned state of food price inflation: 
 
• Tackle import parity pricing. Import parity pricing only applies when South Africa is a net 
importer of grain. During this period, the landed cost of the imports sets the floor price. 
When there is a surplus production, prices will fall dramatically. Since import parity pricing 
is determined by the market, there is no obvious way to address this issue, except through 
government intervention to control prices.  
 
• Smooth the supply of grain. Before the introduction of the futures market, the marketing 
boards would smooth the supply of grain by accumulating grain during good harvesting 
years and selling it in bad harvesting years. This is not the best solution because 
taxpayers end up paying storage costs as well as the cost of writing off accumulated stock 
after a succession of successful crops.  
 
• Fight retail prices. South African retailers are competitive and their net margin of 2.8% to 
3% compares favorably with the 6% net margin achieved by the UK’s largest food retailer. 
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• Allow the market to take care of itself. When SAFEX prices for soft commodities trade 
at high levels, producers tend to expand production. The problem remains that the 
shortage of supply, and as such, prices of close to import parity, is usually only temporary.  
 
• Raise interest rates. Interest rates remain the South African Reserve Bank’s most 
popular inflation weapon. Higher interest rates could dampen food demand but how 
effective this would be in curbing rising prices is debatable. In fact, this could prove to be 
counterproductive since lower volumes would increase cost pressure on manufacturers.  
 
Amazingly, no mention is made of better procurement strategies in order to eliminate price 
volatility and to obtain lower levels of procurement prices (long positions in the futures 
market). In fact, mention is made of the opportunity that existed in the 2007 season to go long 
the futures market at modest price levels. By entering into risk management strategies, long 
futures positions at levels lower than the discussed modest price levels could have been 
obtained. 
 
For the purposes of this study, consumers will obtain the following benefits from a stable, 
below-average procurement price: 
• Since demand is price inelastic, that is, consumers have no choice but to absorb price 
increases or starve, rapid inflation in food prices has a devastating impact on living 
standards of the consumer (NALEDI 2002). This means that the food price index for low-
income groups rises far more quickly than the overall consumer price index (CPI). By 
applying the proposed price risk management strategies to grain procurement, food price 
inflation can be minimised and therefore have a smaller impact on consumer income. 
 
• Since food price inflation has a definite impact on a country’s overall inflation rate, the 
minimisation of food price inflation will lessen the upward pressure on overall inflation. In 
turn, this will ease the possibility of interest rate hikes due to high inflation levels. 
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The obvious benefits to hedgers of the price risk management strategies proposed in this 
study are as follows: 
 
• Increased profits. By going long the market at below average prices, larger profit margins 
could be achieved while still remaining competitive with reference to other milling 
companies. 
• Increased market share. Should a portion of the price benefits resulting from the 
successful procurement strategies be passed on to the consumer through lower retail 
prices, market share can be increased. 
• IAS39. Accounting statement IAS39 relates to the recognition and valuation of the price 
levels of positions in futures contracts versus the price level of the relevant futures 
contract as on the end of the financial year. In the instance where the net long futures 
position price level is higher than the futures contract price at year-end, a charge will be 
made against the income statement (see sec 3.5). In turn, this will increase earnings 
volatility. By adopting the proposed price risk management strategies, the effect of IAS39 
on the financial statements of the hedger can be minimised. This is because of a below-
average long position price level which will be discounted against the price level at 
financial year-end.  
 
 
9.5      COMPARISON OF PERFORMANCE TO FUND MANAGERS IN ALTERNATIVE    
          MARKETS 
 
The price risk management strategies discussed in this chapter was able to beat the average 
price (benchmark) fairly consistently. In turn, the same cannot be said about the performance 
of funds in alternative markets. 
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Thomas P McGuigan (2006) examined the performance of actively managed stock funds 
versus the returns offered by the market via a passive strategy over a 20-year period. His 
conclusion for the period 1983 to 2003 supports the theory that the market cannot be 
consistently outperformed by an actively managed strategy. The study found it nearly 
impossible for investors to predict winning strategies/funds. Even though some funds were 
able to generate returns superior to those offered by the market, they lacked consistency in 
doing so. Another significant finding of the study was the high cost of picking the wrong 
actively managed fund. Out of 170 funds, only six managed to outperform the market return 
by 1% or greater, whilst a staggering 113 funds underperformed the returns offered by the 
market by 1% or worse. 
 
Wicas (2005:27-30) evaluated the results of 214 mutual funds from 1966 to 2003 and 
concluded that the market return outperformed actively managed funds on average by five 
basis points per month before costs. After subtracting the cost, the actively managed funds 
realised an average return of 22 cents per month lower than the market return (passive 
strategy). He states that these results are because of the fact that the market is a zero-sum 
playing field. Before costs, half of the funds invested in stocks and bonds will outperform the 
market and half will underperform. Once transaction costs and management fees have been 
subtracted, markets become a negative-sum playing field. The percentage of net winnings 
shrinks, the percentage of losses grows and the average return of all the funds trails the 
market by transaction costs. 
 
The inability of investors to outperform the market is also evident in South Africa, where it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to beat the returns offered by a passive market index like the 
SATRIX 40 (De Klerk 2006).The practical implication is that no trading strategy can beat the 
return offered by the market on a constant basis (Brorsen & Anderson 1994:85-94; Zulauf & 
Irwin 1998:308-331). 
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9.6      SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The application and evaluation of the three proposed price risk management strategies on 
historical data contradicts the efficient market hypothesis, since the average return offered by 
the market is outperformed in 17 out of the 18 applications on historical data. The consistency 
and extent to which the market return is outperformed varies according to strategy and the 
year in which the strategy is applied. 
 
The maximum price strategy proves to be the most successful risk management strategy 
because it provides the best returns in five of the six years under review. It constantly 
outperforms the benchmark average and provides the fundamentally short position holder 
with a maximum long position price on the day on which the strategy is applied. A cost, the 
premium of an at-the-money call option, is payable in the use of the strategy. 
 
The indexed strangle strategy achieves the second best returns, because it constantly 
outperforms the benchmark average price and realises the best return in one of the six years 
under review. Although no cost is payable in the application of the strategy, it does possess 
the feature that a price above the short call option strike level on option expiration will result in 
a hedging profit but zero hedged tonnages. A price below the short put option strike level on 
option expiration will result in double the volume tonnages hedged at an average of the 
market index (average price) and the short put option strike level minus the net option 
premium. 
 
In terms of the average return offered by a particular price risk management strategy, the 
momentum strategy proves to be the least successful. It does outperform the benchmark in 
five of the six years investigated, but the amount by which the average price is beaten is 
minor in terms of the returns achieved by the maximum price and indexed strangle strategies. 
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Groups with either a direct or indirect concern in SAFEX will benefit from the application of the 
price risk management strategies. These groups include speculators, hedgers and 
consumers. The returns offered by these strategies compare favorably with those achieved by 
fund managers in alternative markets. This is evident in both local and international markets. 
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CHAPTER 10 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The aim of the preceding chapters was to discuss a specific component of the study, which 
can be summarised as follows:  
• Chapter 1 
Background and problem statement  
• Chapter 2 
The futures market, derivative instruments and literature review 
• Chapter 3 
Groups vulnerable to volatile futures prices and their performance on the futures market 
• Chapter 4 
The measurement of performance through benchmarking 
• Chapter 5 
Research sample and research design 
• Chapters 6 to 9 
Proposed risk management strategies and evaluation versus benchmark 
 
This chapter summarises the relevant literature, empirical research and the results of the risk 
management strategies applied to historical data. A conclusion is drawn in order to answer 
the problem statement and recommendations put forward for further research on risk 
management strategies in the futures market. 
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10.2 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH 
 
The futures market evolved from practices that are centuries old. These trading practices 
developed in the ancient Greek and Roman markets with the introduction of fixed trading 
locations and trading hours. During the 1800s, chaos in supply and demand in the USA was 
fairly common. This, together with the difficulty of transporting grains via dirt roads and the 
lack of sufficient storage space, resulted in producers and merchants contracting grains for 
future delivery. The first recorded trade of a contract for future delivery was on 13 March 1851 
in the USA.  
 
More than a century later, in April 1987, an informal futures market was formed in South 
Africa. This market was formalised in 1990 with the establishment of the South African 
Futures Exchange (SAFEX). Futures trading were initially confined to the financial markets. 
The prices of soft commodities, and grains in particular, were subject to a highly regulated 
market in which legislation and governing bodies had the authority to determine price levels. 
Local and international pressure to deregulate this market resulted in governing bodies being 
abolished through the Marketing of Agricultural Products Act 47 of 1996. As such, futures and 
options contracts are available with grain as the underlying asset.  
 
A futures contract is a commitment to purchase or sell a given quantity of a specific 
instrument on a specified future date. Variables affecting the price of a futures contract 
include supply and demand, import and export parity price levels, the strength of the local 
currency, international grain prices and weather conditions. The following characteristics are 
standard features of futures contracts: 
• the underlying asset 
• the quantity of the asset 
• the quality of the asset 
• the future delivery date 
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The difference between an option contract and a futures contract is the higher level of 
flexibility inherent in options contracts since the holder of an option contract has the right, but 
not the obligation, to enter into the underlying futures contract. Two types of option contracts 
can be distinguished, namely call options and put options. A call option (put option) provides 
the holder thereof with the right, but not the obligation, to buy (sell) an asset for a certain price 
by a specific date. The variables with the greatest impact on the price of an option are 
volatility, time to maturity and intrinsic value. Black, Merton and Scholes were responsible for 
the development of the Black-Scholes option pricing model in the 1970s upon which option 
valuation is still done today. 
 
Volatility is known as the change in the price of a futures contract over a given time period 
and is expressed as a percentage. This is computed as the annualised standard deviation of 
percentage changes in the daily price of a commodity. SAFEX white maize prices are known 
to be extraordinarily volatile with annual volatility levels as high as 40%. This can have a 
negative impact on financial statements of role players in the market, since IAS39 determines 
that the valuation of futures contracts at year-end should be reflected in financial statements.  
 
A distinction is made between groups who are susceptible to volatility in the futures market, 
namely: 
• groups directly susceptible to market movement 
• groups indirectly susceptible to market movement 
This distinction is based on the groups’ level of activity on SAFEX. Hedgers and speculators 
are defined as being directly susceptible to market movements, while consumers of the 
commodity are indirectly influenced by changing market prices. Various sources of literature 
confirm the negative impact of fluctuating prices on consumers. South Africans spend up to 
50% of their income on food, while the poor spend 20% on maize alone. Ineffective 
procurement strategies therefore lead to malnutrition and hunger, since the food price index 
for low-income groups rises far more quickly than the overall consumer price index. 
121  
Ineffective procurement strategies and higher grain prices also contribute to the overall 
inflation rate.  
 
A non-probability purposive sample was used in this study with reference to the procurement 
companies and the trading year on which the hedging results of these companies were 
evaluated. The procurement sector includes a number of small millers but is mainly 
concentrated in a limited number of large milling companies. The evaluation of the price risk 
management performance of processors was done by means of an investigation into the 
procurement results of African Products and Tiger Brands. These two processing companies 
were used for the purposes of this study since they are recognised as two of the main role 
players in the procurement market. 
• African Products consume close to 7% of the average annual maize crop.  
• Tiger Brands is recognised as being among the four largest milling companies in South 
Africa. 
The year with the greatest price fluctuation (2003) was used to determine the effectiveness of 
existing price risk management strategies. A secondary data analysis was used to evaluate 
the proposed risk management strategies and to determine the benchmark, namely the 
average price index. 
 
From the analysis on the chosen sample, it was concluded that procurement companies do 
not possess the necessary knowledge and capabilities to beat the market. This finding is 
similar to previous research on this subject which found that less than 5% of grain trading 
companies were able to beat the simple average price over a predetermined period, while 
75% of speculators were not able to outperform the grain market. In addition, hedgers are 
known to enter futures contracts in the wrong third of the price range. This correlates with 
research on the performance of actively managed stock funds which found it near impossible 
to accurately predict winning stocks. 
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Three price risk management strategies, based on a core/satellite strategy, were developed 
and applied to historical SAFEX white maize prices. 
 
(1) The momentum strategy. The momentum strategy outperformed the market in five of the 
six years under review. The extent to which the average price was outperformed varied from 
R-1.60/ton to R11.86/ton. 
 
(2) The maximum price strategy. By applying the Maximum price strategy to historical data, 
the average white maize price was outperformed in all of the years under review. The 
maximum price strategy results varied from R23.19/ton to R180.87/ton better than the 
benchmark. 
 
(3) The indexed strangle strategy. The indexed strangle strategy, like the maximum price 
strategy, outperformed the market in all of the years under review, from R6.61/ton to 
R57.62/ton. 
 
 
10.3 CONCLUSIONS 
 
Speculators, and for the purposes of this study, more specifically hedgers, are currently 
unable to enter into contracts on the futures exchange in a manner that will minimise the 
impact of price volatility on their earnings. Indirectly, this has a negative impact on consumers 
of the commodity underlying the futures/options contract. 
 
Even though derivative instruments are available to use as a counter against market 
fluctuations, the price risk management success of groups with a concern on SAFEX 
suggests that this has not yet been achieved, ultimately to the detriment of consumers. The 
view exists that markets are efficient and the return offered by the futures exchange cannot 
consistently be outperformed. 
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This study shows the exact opposite, since the use of futures/options strategies results in 
returns superior to those of the market. Two of the proposed price risk management 
strategies outperform the market in every year under review, which is exactly the opposite of 
the popular belief of efficient markets. This is achieved by minimising price volatility and 
gaining from short-term market trends. By applying these strategies to their procurement 
models, processors will benefit from below-average prices. In turn, this could have a favorable 
impact on food inflation. 
 
After considering the results of this study, the following recommendations are made to assist 
users of the futures market, particularly processors, in lowering the impact of market 
movement: 
(1) Personnel concerned with SAFEX should be educated in the use of derivative instruments 
in order to increase their knowledge. 
(2) Greater emphasis should be placed on the development of core/satellite risk management 
strategies, which will ultimately result in procurement models based on an indexing 
strategy. 
(3) The procurement function should in part be outsourced to companies specialising in exotic 
options based on the expectation of achieving average prices. 
 
 
10.4 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
This study provides statistically sound information on the use of derivative instruments in 
order to outperform market returns. Further components of this topic that should be 
investigated in order to elaborate on the findings of this study include the following: 
• the development of index derivatives to be introduced on SAFEX to minimise the risk of 
price fluctuations 
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• development of a model whereby the price of consumable goods obtained from the 
commodity underlying the derivative instrument is adjusted in order to reflect price 
fluctuations in both bullish and bearish markets 
• research into the possibility of developing strategies whereby producers can obtain above 
average short positions on the futures market 
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APPENDIX I 
JULY WHITE MAIZE CLOSING PRICES 2001 – 2006 
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APPENDIX II 
JULY WHITE MAIZE VOLATILITY 2001 – 2006 
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APPENDIX III 
MOMENTUM STRATEGY 2001 – 2006 
2001 
 
147  
 
148  
 
149  
 
 
150  
 
 
151  
 
 
152  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
153  
2002 
 
 
154  
 
 
155  
 
156  
 
157  
 
158  
 
 
159  
 
160  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
161  
2003 
 
 
162  
 
163  
 
164  
 
165  
 
166  
 
 
 
 
167  
2004 
 
 
168  
 
 
169  
 
170  
 
171  
 
172  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
173  
2005 
 
 
174  
 
175  
 
176  
 
177  
 
178  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
179  
2006 
 
 
180  
 
181  
 
182  
 
183  
 
184  
 
185  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
186  
APPENDIX IV 
MAXIMUM PRICE STRATEGY 2001 – 2006 
2001  
 
(*A fixed level of volatility is used since no 2001 volatility data exists) 
VOLUME BELOW VOLUME @ ADDITIONAL BROKING DAILY
DATE  PRICE VOLATILITY* CALL-STRIKE DAILY HEDGE MAXIMUM PRICE MAXIMUM PRICE OPTION PREMIUM NET OPTION COST FEES @ R1/TON PROCUREMENT PRICE
2000/05/05 R 670 30.0% R 660 -R 71.50 -R 2,016,300.00 -R 28,200.00
2000/05/08 R 670 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/05/09 R 665 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/05/10 R 665 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/05/11 R 665 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/05/12 R 670 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/05/15 R 690 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/05/16 R 690 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/05/17 R 690 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/05/18 R 690 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/05/19 R 690 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/05/22 R 690 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/05/23 R 690 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/05/24 R 690 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/05/25 R 690 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/05/26 R 690 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/05/29 R 690 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/05/30 R 685 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/05/31 R 685 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/06/01 R 686 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/06/02 R 686 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/06/05 R 686 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/06/06 R 690 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/06/07 R 690 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/06/08 R 690 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/06/09 R 700 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/06/12 R 700 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/06/13 R 685 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/06/14 R 685 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/06/15 R 682 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/06/19 R 682 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/06/20 R 682 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/06/21 R 675 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/06/22 R 675 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/06/23 R 672 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/06/26 R 655 30.0% R 660 R 655 100 0 R 58.60 R 5,860.00 -R 100.00 -R 65,500.00
2000/06/27 R 660 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/06/28 R 657 30.0% R 660 R 657 100 0 R 59.32 R 5,932.00 -R 100.00 -R 65,700.00
2000/06/29 R 650 30.0% R 660 R 650 100 0 R 55.95 R 5,595.00 -R 100.00 -R 65,000.00
2000/06/30 R 648 30.0% R 660 R 648 100 0 R 54.93 R 5,493.00 -R 100.00 -R 64,800.00
2000/07/03 R 638 30.0% R 660 R 638 100 0 R 50.18 R 5,018.00 -R 100.00 -R 63,800.00
2000/07/04 R 636 30.0% R 660 R 636 100 0 R 49.21 R 4,921.00 -R 100.00 -R 63,600.00
2000/07/05 R 633 30.0% R 660 R 633 100 0 R 47.83 R 4,783.00 -R 100.00 -R 63,300.00
2000/07/06 R 630 30.0% R 660 R 630 100 0 R 46.47 R 4,647.00 -R 100.00 -R 63,000.00
2000/07/07 R 630 30.0% R 660 R 630 100 0 R 46.37 R 4,637.00 -R 100.00 -R 63,000.00
2000/07/10 R 624 30.0% R 660 R 624 100 0 R 43.61 R 4,361.00 -R 100.00 -R 62,400.00
2000/07/11 R 625 30.0% R 660 R 625 100 0 R 43.91 R 4,391.00 -R 100.00 -R 62,500.00
2000/07/12 R 617 30.0% R 660 R 617 100 0 R 40.66 R 4,066.00 -R 100.00 -R 61,700.00
2000/07/13 R 620 30.0% R 660 R 620 100 0 R 41.72 R 4,172.00 -R 100.00 -R 62,000.00
2000/07/14 R 624 30.0% R 660 R 624 100 0 R 43.20 R 4,320.00 -R 100.00 -R 62,400.00
2000/07/17 R 625 30.0% R 660 R 625 100 0 R 43.29 R 4,329.00 -R 100.00 -R 62,500.00
2000/07/18 R 630 30.0% R 660 R 630 100 0 R 45.21 R 4,521.00 -R 100.00 -R 63,000.00
2000/07/19 R 622 30.0% R 660 R 622 100 0 R 41.89 R 4,189.00 -R 100.00 -R 62,200.00
2000/07/20 R 619 30.0% R 660 R 619 100 0 R 40.61 R 4,061.00 -R 100.00 -R 61,900.00
2000/07/21 R 625 30.0% R 660 R 625 100 0 R 42.87 R 4,287.00 -R 100.00 -R 62,500.00
2000/07/24 R 625 30.0% R 660 R 625 100 0 R 42.55 R 4,255.00 -R 100.00 -R 62,500.00
2000/07/25 R 625 30.0% R 660 R 625 100 0 R 42.44 R 4,244.00 -R 100.00 -R 62,500.00
2000/07/26 R 625 30.0% R 660 R 625 100 0 R 42.34 R 4,234.00 -R 100.00 -R 62,500.00
2000/07/27 R 628 30.0% R 660 R 628 100 0 R 43.43 R 4,343.00 -R 100.00 -R 62,800.00
2000/07/28 R 630 30.0% R 660 R 630 100 0 R 44.14 R 4,414.00 -R 100.00 -R 63,000.00
2000/07/31 R 626 30.0% R 660 R 626 100 0 R 42.20 R 4,220.00 -R 100.00 -R 62,600.00
2000/08/01 R 627 30.0% R 660 R 627 100 0 R 42.49 R 4,249.00 -R 100.00 -R 62,700.00
2000/08/02 R 632 30.0% R 660 R 632 100 0 R 44.41 R 4,441.00 -R 100.00 -R 63,200.00
2000/08/03 R 629 30.0% R 660 R 629 100 0 R 43.08 R 4,308.00 -R 100.00 -R 62,900.00
2000/08/04 R 629 30.0% R 660 R 629 100 0 R 42.97 R 4,297.00 -R 100.00 -R 62,900.00
2000/08/07 R 624 30.0% R 660 R 624 100 0 R 40.66 R 4,066.00 -R 100.00 -R 62,400.00
2000/08/08 R 624 30.0% R 660 R 624 100 0 R 40.56 R 4,056.00 -R 100.00 -R 62,400.00
2000/08/10 R 612 30.0% R 660 R 612 100 0 R 35.82 R 3,582.00 -R 100.00 -R 61,200.00  
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2000/08/11 R 599 30.0% R 660 R 599 100 0 R 31.19 R 3,119.00 -R 100.00 -R 59,900.00
2000/08/14 R 599 30.0% R 660 R 599 100 0 R 30.89 R 3,089.00 -R 100.00 -R 59,900.00
2000/08/15 R 602 30.0% R 660 R 602 100 0 R 31.80 R 3,180.00 -R 100.00 -R 60,200.00
2000/08/16 R 608 30.0% R 660 R 608 100 0 R 33.77 R 3,377.00 -R 100.00 -R 60,800.00
2000/08/17 R 600 30.0% R 660 R 600 100 0 R 30.93 R 3,093.00 -R 100.00 -R 60,000.00
2000/08/18 R 604 30.0% R 660 R 604 100 0 R 32.18 R 3,218.00 -R 100.00 -R 60,400.00
2000/08/21 R 599 30.0% R 660 R 599 100 0 R 30.20 R 3,020.00 -R 100.00 -R 59,900.00
2000/08/22 R 604 30.0% R 660 R 604 100 0 R 31.77 R 3,177.00 -R 100.00 -R 60,400.00
2000/08/23 R 603 30.0% R 660 R 603 100 0 R 31.33 R 3,133.00 -R 100.00 -R 60,300.00
2000/08/24 R 603 30.0% R 660 R 603 100 0 R 31.23 R 3,123.00 -R 100.00 -R 60,300.00
2000/08/25 R 603 30.0% R 660 R 603 100 0 R 31.13 R 3,113.00 -R 100.00 -R 60,300.00
2000/08/28 R 601 30.0% R 660 R 601 100 0 R 30.16 R 3,016.00 -R 100.00 -R 60,100.00
2000/08/29 R 605 30.0% R 660 R 605 100 0 R 31.40 R 3,140.00 -R 100.00 -R 60,500.00
2000/08/30 R 618 30.0% R 660 R 618 100 0 R 35.90 R 3,590.00 -R 100.00 -R 61,800.00
2000/08/31 R 620 30.0% R 660 R 620 100 0 R 36.53 R 3,653.00 -R 100.00 -R 62,000.00
2000/09/01 R 619 30.0% R 660 R 619 100 0 R 36.05 R 3,605.00 -R 100.00 -R 61,900.00
2000/09/04 R 612 30.0% R 660 R 612 100 0 R 33.19 R 3,319.00 -R 100.00 -R 61,200.00
2000/09/05 R 617 30.0% R 660 R 617 100 0 R 34.88 R 3,488.00 -R 100.00 -R 61,700.00
2000/09/06 R 625 30.0% R 660 R 625 100 0 R 37.75 R 3,775.00 -R 100.00 -R 62,500.00
2000/09/07 R 626 30.0% R 660 R 626 100 0 R 38.02 R 3,802.00 -R 100.00 -R 62,600.00
2000/09/08 R 620 30.0% R 660 R 620 100 0 R 35.65 R 3,565.00 -R 100.00 -R 62,000.00
2000/09/11 R 625 30.0% R 660 R 625 100 0 R 37.19 R 3,719.00 -R 100.00 -R 62,500.00
2000/09/12 R 629 30.0% R 660 R 629 100 0 R 38.62 R 3,862.00 -R 100.00 -R 62,900.00
2000/09/13 R 626 30.0% R 660 R 626 100 0 R 37.34 R 3,734.00 -R 100.00 -R 62,600.00
2000/09/14 R 624 30.0% R 660 R 624 100 0 R 36.47 R 3,647.00 -R 100.00 -R 62,400.00
2000/09/15 R 622 30.0% R 660 R 622 100 0 R 35.61 R 3,561.00 -R 100.00 -R 62,200.00
2000/09/18 R 627 30.0% R 660 R 627 100 0 R 37.15 R 3,715.00 -R 100.00 -R 62,700.00
2000/09/19 R 632 30.0% R 660 R 632 100 0 R 38.98 R 3,898.00 -R 100.00 -R 63,200.00
2000/09/20 R 625 30.0% R 660 R 625 100 0 R 36.16 R 3,616.00 -R 100.00 -R 62,500.00
2000/09/21 R 629 30.0% R 660 R 629 100 0 R 37.57 R 3,757.00 -R 100.00 -R 62,900.00
2000/09/22 R 627 30.0% R 660 R 627 100 0 R 36.69 R 3,669.00 -R 100.00 -R 62,700.00
2000/09/26 R 626 30.0% R 660 R 626 100 0 R 35.84 R 3,584.00 -R 100.00 -R 62,600.00
2000/09/27 R 626 30.0% R 660 R 626 100 0 R 35.73 R 3,573.00 -R 100.00 -R 62,600.00
2000/09/28 R 628 30.0% R 660 R 628 100 0 R 36.37 R 3,637.00 -R 100.00 -R 62,800.00
2000/09/29 R 632 30.0% R 660 R 632 100 0 R 37.79 R 3,779.00 -R 100.00 -R 63,200.00
2000/10/02 R 635 30.0% R 660 R 635 100 0 R 38.61 R 3,861.00 -R 100.00 -R 63,500.00
2000/10/03 R 643 30.0% R 660 R 643 100 0 R 41.74 R 4,174.00 -R 100.00 -R 64,300.00
2000/10/04 R 665 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/10/05 R 668 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/10/06 R 659 30.0% R 660 R 659 100 0 R 48.31 R 4,831.00 -R 100.00 -R 65,900.00
2000/10/09 R 657 30.0% R 660 R 657 100 0 R 47.02 R 4,702.00 -R 100.00 -R 65,700.00
2000/10/10 R 655 30.0% R 660 R 655 100 0 R 46.00 R 4,600.00 -R 100.00 -R 65,500.00
2000/10/11 R 655 30.0% R 660 R 655 100 0 R 45.87 R 4,587.00 -R 100.00 -R 65,500.00
2000/10/12 R 662 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/10/13 R 682 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/10/16 R 679 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/10/17 R 686 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/10/18 R 694 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/10/19 R 697 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/10/20 R 688 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/10/23 R 676 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/10/24 R 672 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/10/25 R 682 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/10/26 R 690 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/10/27 R 682 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/10/30 R 693 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/10/31 R 695 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/11/01 R 694 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/11/02 R 703 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/11/03 R 712 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/11/06 R 706 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/11/07 R 710 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/11/08 R 725 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/11/09 R 732 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/11/10 R 714 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/11/13 R 695 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/11/14 R 693 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/11/15 R 705 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/11/16 R 720 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/11/17 R 722 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/11/20 R 729 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/11/21 R 738 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/11/22 R 741 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/11/23 R 739 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/11/24 R 744 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/11/27 R 744 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/11/28 R 740 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/11/29 R 736 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/11/30 R 706 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00  
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2000/12/01 R 709 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/12/04 R 704 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/12/06 R 699 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/12/07 R 685 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/12/08 R 699 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/12/11 R 716 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/12/12 R 712 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/12/13 R 715 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/12/14 R 705 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/12/15 R 715 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/12/18 R 720 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/12/19 R 733 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/12/20 R 732 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/12/21 R 726 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/12/22 R 732 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/12/27 R 729 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/12/28 R 736 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2000/12/29 R 739 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/01/02 R 757 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/01/03 R 756 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/01/04 R 779 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/01/05 R 800 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/01/08 R 830 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/01/09 R 831 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/01/10 R 851 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/01/11 R 853 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/01/12 R 839 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/01/15 R 847 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/01/16 R 862 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/01/17 R 872 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/01/18 R 861 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/01/19 R 875 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/01/22 R 879 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/01/23 R 864 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/01/24 R 877 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/01/25 R 871 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/01/26 R 841 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/01/29 R 840 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/01/30 R 810 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/01/31 R 805 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/02/01 R 835 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/02/02 R 865 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/02/05 R 910 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/02/06 R 934 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/02/07 R 904 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/02/08 R 892 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/02/12 R 855 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/02/13 R 870 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/02/14 R 900 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/02/15 R 930 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/02/16 R 923 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/02/19 R 893 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/02/20 R 894 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/02/21 R 906 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/02/22 R 887 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/02/23 R 859 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/02/26 R 834 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/02/27 R 833 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/02/28 R 829 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/03/01 R 840 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/03/02 R 864 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/03/05 R 874 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/03/07 R 873 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/03/08 R 878 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/03/09 R 883 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/03/12 R 862 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/03/13 R 848 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/03/14 R 843 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/03/15 R 840 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/03/16 R 830 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/03/19 R 846 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/03/20 R 854 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/03/22 R 850 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/03/23 R 820 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/03/26 R 820 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/03/27 R 832 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/03/28 R 813 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/03/29 R 802 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/03/30 R 797 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00  
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2001/04/02 R 815 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/04/03 R 817 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/04/04 R 818 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/04/05 R 827 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/04/06 R 845 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/04/09 R 846 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/04/10 R 835 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/04/11 R 830 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/04/12 R 832 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/04/17 R 840 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/04/18 R 831 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/04/19 R 826 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/04/20 R 822 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/04/23 R 823 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/04/24 R 813 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/04/25 R 804 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/04/26 R 809 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/04/30 R 807 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/05/02 R 816 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/05/03 R 812 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/05/04 R 808 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/05/07 R 788 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/05/08 R 781 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/05/09 R 771 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/05/10 R 767 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/05/11 R 754 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/05/14 R 760 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/05/15 R 764 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/05/16 R 757 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/05/17 R 750 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/05/18 R 751 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/05/21 R 737 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/05/22 R 744 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/05/23 R 758 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/05/24 R 758 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/05/25 R 756 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/05/28 R 744 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/05/29 R 743 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/05/30 R 750 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/05/31 R 756 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/06/01 R 766 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/06/04 R 766 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/06/05 R 768 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/06/06 R 761 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/06/07 R 777 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/06/08 R 782 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/06/11 R 796 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/06/12 R 794 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/06/13 R 784 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/06/14 R 794 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/06/15 R 784 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/06/18 R 777 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/06/19 R 779 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/06/20 R 775 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/06/21 R 795 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/06/22 R 796 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
2001/06/25 R 787 30.0% R 660 R 660 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 66,000.00
-R 1,723,907.00 -R 35,500.00 -R 18,355,300.00
Total procurement price -R 18,355,300.00
Total option cost -R 1,723,907.00
Additional broking fees -R 35,500.00
Net procurement cost -R 20,114,707.00
Average Price Index R 739.40
Maximum price strategy R 713.29
Tonnages hedged 28,200
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(*A fixed level of volatility is used up until 2 January 2002 due to non-existence of data)  
VOLUME BELOW VOLUME @ ADDITIONAL BROKING DAILY
DATE  PRICE VOLATILITY* CALL-STRIKE DAILY HEDGE MAXIMUM PRICE MAXIMUM PRICE OPTION PREMIUM NET OPTION COST FEES @ R1/TON PROCUREMENT PRICE
2001/02/21 R 1,030 39.0% R 1,020 -R 187.89 -R 6,200,370.00 -R 33,000.00 R 0.00
2001/02/22 R 1,015 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,015 100 0 R 178.84 R 17,884.00 -R 100.00 -R 101,500.00
2001/02/23 R 950 39.0% R 1,020 R 950 100 0 R 142.51 R 14,251.00 -R 100.00 -R 95,000.00
2001/02/26 R 880 39.0% R 1,020 R 880 100 0 R 107.49 R 10,749.00 -R 100.00 -R 88,000.00
2001/02/27 R 870 39.0% R 1,020 R 870 100 0 R 102.80 R 10,280.00 -R 100.00 -R 87,000.00
2001/02/28 R 870 39.0% R 1,020 R 870 100 0 R 102.64 R 10,264.00 -R 100.00 -R 87,000.00
2001/03/01 R 870 39.0% R 1,020 R 870 100 0 R 102.48 R 10,248.00 -R 100.00 -R 87,000.00
2001/03/02 R 870 39.0% R 1,020 R 870 100 0 R 102.32 R 10,232.00 -R 100.00 -R 87,000.00
2001/03/05 R 870 39.0% R 1,020 R 870 100 0 R 101.84 R 10,184.00 -R 100.00 -R 87,000.00
2001/03/07 R 880 39.0% R 1,020 R 880 100 0 R 106.03 R 10,603.00 -R 100.00 -R 88,000.00
2001/03/08 R 880 39.0% R 1,020 R 880 100 0 R 105.86 R 10,586.00 -R 100.00 -R 88,000.00
2001/03/09 R 880 39.0% R 1,020 R 880 100 0 R 105.70 R 10,570.00 -R 100.00 -R 88,000.00
2001/03/12 R 880 39.0% R 1,020 R 880 100 0 R 105.21 R 10,521.00 -R 100.00 -R 88,000.00
2001/03/13 R 865 39.0% R 1,020 R 865 100 0 R 98.33 R 9,833.00 -R 100.00 -R 86,500.00
2001/03/14 R 865 39.0% R 1,020 R 865 100 0 R 98.17 R 9,817.00 -R 100.00 -R 86,500.00
2001/03/15 R 865 39.0% R 1,020 R 865 100 0 R 98.01 R 9,801.00 -R 100.00 -R 86,500.00
2001/03/16 R 858 39.0% R 1,020 R 858 100 0 R 94.81 R 9,481.00 -R 100.00 -R 85,800.00
2001/03/19 R 858 39.0% R 1,020 R 858 100 0 R 94.33 R 9,433.00 -R 100.00 -R 85,800.00
2001/03/20 R 860 39.0% R 1,020 R 860 100 0 R 95.03 R 9,503.00 -R 100.00 -R 86,000.00
2001/03/22 R 840 39.0% R 1,020 R 840 100 0 R 86.28 R 8,628.00 -R 100.00 -R 84,000.00
2001/03/23 R 835 39.0% R 1,020 R 835 100 0 R 84.08 R 8,408.00 -R 100.00 -R 83,500.00
2001/03/26 R 830 39.0% R 1,020 R 830 100 0 R 81.61 R 8,161.00 -R 100.00 -R 83,000.00
2001/03/27 R 840 39.0% R 1,020 R 840 100 0 R 85.50 R 8,550.00 -R 100.00 -R 84,000.00
2001/03/28 R 840 39.0% R 1,020 R 840 100 0 R 85.34 R 8,534.00 -R 100.00 -R 84,000.00
2001/03/29 R 840 39.0% R 1,020 R 840 100 0 R 85.19 R 8,519.00 -R 100.00 -R 84,000.00
2001/03/30 R 835 39.0% R 1,020 R 835 100 0 R 83.00 R 8,300.00 -R 100.00 -R 83,500.00
2001/04/02 R 841 39.0% R 1,020 R 841 100 0 R 84.97 R 8,497.00 -R 100.00 -R 84,100.00
2001/04/03 R 841 39.0% R 1,020 R 841 100 0 R 84.81 R 8,481.00 -R 100.00 -R 84,100.00
2001/04/04 R 841 39.0% R 1,020 R 841 100 0 R 84.65 R 8,465.00 -R 100.00 -R 84,100.00
2001/04/05 R 841 39.0% R 1,020 R 841 100 0 R 84.49 R 8,449.00 -R 100.00 -R 84,100.00
2001/04/06 R 845 39.0% R 1,020 R 845 100 0 R 85.97 R 8,597.00 -R 100.00 -R 84,500.00
2001/04/09 R 840 39.0% R 1,020 R 840 100 0 R 83.45 R 8,345.00 -R 100.00 -R 84,000.00
2001/04/10 R 840 39.0% R 1,020 R 840 100 0 R 83.30 R 8,330.00 -R 100.00 -R 84,000.00
2001/04/11 R 840 39.0% R 1,020 R 840 100 0 R 83.14 R 8,314.00 -R 100.00 -R 84,000.00
2001/04/12 R 840 39.0% R 1,020 R 840 100 0 R 82.98 R 8,298.00 -R 100.00 -R 84,000.00
2001/04/17 R 847 39.0% R 1,020 R 847 100 0 R 85.03 R 8,503.00 -R 100.00 -R 84,700.00
2001/04/18 R 841 39.0% R 1,020 R 841 100 0 R 82.43 R 8,243.00 -R 100.00 -R 84,100.00
2001/04/19 R 842 39.0% R 1,020 R 842 100 0 R 82.67 R 8,267.00 -R 100.00 -R 84,200.00
2001/04/20 R 842 39.0% R 1,020 R 842 100 0 R 82.51 R 8,251.00 -R 100.00 -R 84,200.00
2001/04/23 R 845 39.0% R 1,020 R 845 100 0 R 83.24 R 8,324.00 -R 100.00 -R 84,500.00
2001/04/24 R 845 39.0% R 1,020 R 845 100 0 R 83.08 R 8,308.00 -R 100.00 -R 84,500.00
2001/04/25 R 845 39.0% R 1,020 R 845 100 0 R 82.92 R 8,292.00 -R 100.00 -R 84,500.00
2001/04/26 R 845 39.0% R 1,020 R 845 100 0 R 82.76 R 8,276.00 -R 100.00 -R 84,500.00
2001/04/30 R 845 39.0% R 1,020 R 845 100 0 R 82.11 R 8,211.00 -R 100.00 -R 84,500.00
2001/05/02 R 845 39.0% R 1,020 R 845 100 0 R 81.78 R 8,178.00 -R 100.00 -R 84,500.00
2001/05/03 R 847 39.0% R 1,020 R 847 100 0 R 82.43 R 8,243.00 -R 100.00 -R 84,700.00
2001/05/04 R 847 39.0% R 1,020 R 847 100 0 R 82.26 R 8,226.00 -R 100.00 -R 84,700.00
2001/05/07 R 850 39.0% R 1,020 R 850 100 0 R 82.99 R 8,299.00 -R 100.00 -R 85,000.00
2001/05/08 R 850 39.0% R 1,020 R 850 100 0 R 82.82 R 8,282.00 -R 100.00 -R 85,000.00
2001/05/09 R 830 39.0% R 1,020 R 830 100 0 R 74.72 R 7,472.00 -R 100.00 -R 83,000.00
2001/05/10 R 830 39.0% R 1,020 R 830 100 0 R 74.56 R 7,456.00 -R 100.00 -R 83,000.00
2001/05/11 R 830 39.0% R 1,020 R 830 100 0 R 74.40 R 7,440.00 -R 100.00 -R 83,000.00
2001/05/14 R 830 39.0% R 1,020 R 830 100 0 R 73.92 R 7,392.00 -R 100.00 -R 83,000.00
2001/05/15 R 830 39.0% R 1,020 R 830 100 0 R 73.76 R 7,376.00 -R 100.00 -R 83,000.00
2001/05/16 R 830 39.0% R 1,020 R 830 100 0 R 73.60 R 7,360.00 -R 100.00 -R 83,000.00
2001/05/17 R 830 39.0% R 1,020 R 830 100 0 R 73.44 R 7,344.00 -R 100.00 -R 83,000.00
2001/05/18 R 830 39.0% R 1,020 R 830 100 0 R 73.28 R 7,328.00 -R 100.00 -R 83,000.00
2001/05/21 R 830 39.0% R 1,020 R 830 100 0 R 72.80 R 7,280.00 -R 100.00 -R 83,000.00
2001/05/22 R 830 39.0% R 1,020 R 830 100 0 R 72.63 R 7,263.00 -R 100.00 -R 83,000.00
2001/05/23 R 828 39.0% R 1,020 R 828 100 0 R 71.71 R 7,171.00 -R 100.00 -R 82,800.00
2001/05/24 R 828 39.0% R 1,020 R 828 100 0 R 71.55 R 7,155.00 -R 100.00 -R 82,800.00
2001/05/25 R 830 39.0% R 1,020 R 830 100 0 R 72.15 R 7,215.00 -R 100.00 -R 83,000.00
2001/05/28 R 830 39.0% R 1,020 R 830 100 0 R 71.66 R 7,166.00 -R 100.00 -R 83,000.00
2001/05/29 R 835 39.0% R 1,020 R 835 100 0 R 73.41 R 7,341.00 -R 100.00 -R 83,500.00
2001/05/30 R 835 39.0% R 1,020 R 835 100 0 R 73.24 R 7,324.00 -R 100.00 -R 83,500.00
2001/05/31 R 835 39.0% R 1,020 R 835 100 0 R 73.08 R 7,308.00 -R 100.00 -R 83,500.00
2001/06/01 R 835 39.0% R 1,020 R 835 100 0 R 72.91 R 7,291.00 -R 100.00 -R 83,500.00
2001/06/04 R 835 39.0% R 1,020 R 835 100 0 R 72.41 R 7,241.00 -R 100.00 -R 83,500.00
2001/06/05 R 835 39.0% R 1,020 R 835 100 0 R 72.25 R 7,225.00 -R 100.00 -R 83,500.00
2001/06/06 R 830 39.0% R 1,020 R 830 100 0 R 70.19 R 7,019.00 -R 100.00 -R 83,000.00
2001/06/07 R 840 39.0% R 1,020 R 840 100 0 R 73.84 R 7,384.00 -R 100.00 -R 84,000.00
2001/06/08 R 850 39.0% R 1,020 R 850 100 0 R 77.59 R 7,759.00 -R 100.00 -R 85,000.00
2001/06/11 R 850 39.0% R 1,020 R 850 100 0 R 77.08 R 7,708.00 -R 100.00 -R 85,000.00  
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2001/06/12 R 850 39.0% R 1,020 R 850 100 0 R 76.91 R 7,691.00 -R 100.00 -R 85,000.00
2001/06/13 R 850 39.0% R 1,020 R 850 100 0 R 76.73 R 7,673.00 -R 100.00 -R 85,000.00
2001/06/14 R 850 39.0% R 1,020 R 850 100 0 R 76.56 R 7,656.00 -R 100.00 -R 85,000.00
2001/06/15 R 845 39.0% R 1,020 R 845 100 0 R 74.42 R 7,442.00 -R 100.00 -R 84,500.00
2001/06/18 R 845 39.0% R 1,020 R 845 100 0 R 73.91 R 7,391.00 -R 100.00 -R 84,500.00
2001/06/19 R 835 39.0% R 1,020 R 835 100 0 R 69.91 R 6,991.00 -R 100.00 -R 83,500.00
2001/06/20 R 835 39.0% R 1,020 R 835 100 0 R 69.74 R 6,974.00 -R 100.00 -R 83,500.00
2001/06/21 R 840 39.0% R 1,020 R 840 100 0 R 71.47 R 7,147.00 -R 100.00 -R 84,000.00
2001/06/22 R 845 39.0% R 1,020 R 845 100 0 R 73.22 R 7,322.00 -R 100.00 -R 84,500.00
2001/06/25 R 845 39.0% R 1,020 R 845 100 0 R 72.70 R 7,270.00 -R 100.00 -R 84,500.00
2001/06/26 R 855 39.0% R 1,020 R 855 100 0 R 76.45 R 7,645.00 -R 100.00 -R 85,500.00
2001/06/27 R 860 39.0% R 1,020 R 860 100 0 R 78.27 R 7,827.00 -R 100.00 -R 86,000.00
2001/06/28 R 845 39.0% R 1,020 R 845 100 0 R 72.18 R 7,218.00 -R 100.00 -R 84,500.00
2001/06/29 R 843 39.0% R 1,020 R 843 100 0 R 71.24 R 7,124.00 -R 100.00 -R 84,300.00
2001/07/02 R 843 39.0% R 1,020 R 843 100 0 R 70.72 R 7,072.00 -R 100.00 -R 84,300.00
2001/07/03 R 837 39.0% R 1,020 R 837 100 0 R 68.28 R 6,828.00 -R 100.00 -R 83,700.00
2001/07/04 R 842 39.0% R 1,020 R 842 100 0 R 69.99 R 6,999.00 -R 100.00 -R 84,200.00
2001/07/05 R 845 39.0% R 1,020 R 845 100 0 R 70.96 R 7,096.00 -R 100.00 -R 84,500.00
2001/07/06 R 850 39.0% R 1,020 R 850 100 0 R 72.72 R 7,272.00 -R 100.00 -R 85,000.00
2001/07/09 R 850 39.0% R 1,020 R 850 100 0 R 72.18 R 7,218.00 -R 100.00 -R 85,000.00
2001/07/10 R 865 39.0% R 1,020 R 865 100 0 R 77.94 R 7,794.00 -R 100.00 -R 86,500.00
2001/07/11 R 877 39.0% R 1,020 R 877 100 0 R 82.69 R 8,269.00 -R 100.00 -R 87,700.00
2001/07/12 R 880 39.0% R 1,020 R 880 100 0 R 83.77 R 8,377.00 -R 100.00 -R 88,000.00
2001/07/13 R 893 39.0% R 1,020 R 893 100 0 R 89.15 R 8,915.00 -R 100.00 -R 89,300.00
2001/07/17 R 900 39.0% R 1,020 R 900 100 0 R 91.45 R 9,145.00 -R 100.00 -R 90,000.00
2001/07/18 R 876 39.0% R 1,020 R 876 100 0 R 80.96 R 8,096.00 -R 100.00 -R 87,600.00
2001/07/19 R 870 39.0% R 1,020 R 870 100 0 R 78.31 R 7,831.00 -R 100.00 -R 87,000.00
2001/07/20 R 860 39.0% R 1,020 R 860 100 0 R 74.11 R 7,411.00 -R 100.00 -R 86,000.00
2001/07/23 R 850 39.0% R 1,020 R 850 100 0 R 69.68 R 6,968.00 -R 100.00 -R 85,000.00
2001/07/24 R 859 39.0% R 1,020 R 859 100 0 R 72.98 R 7,298.00 -R 100.00 -R 85,900.00
2001/07/25 R 867 39.0% R 1,020 R 867 100 0 R 75.97 R 7,597.00 -R 100.00 -R 86,700.00
2001/07/26 R 881 39.0% R 1,020 R 881 100 0 R 81.52 R 8,152.00 -R 100.00 -R 88,100.00
2001/07/27 R 888 39.0% R 1,020 R 888 100 0 R 84.28 R 8,428.00 -R 100.00 -R 88,800.00
2001/07/30 R 884 39.0% R 1,020 R 884 100 0 R 82.00 R 8,200.00 -R 100.00 -R 88,400.00
2001/07/31 R 880 39.0% R 1,020 R 880 100 0 R 80.14 R 8,014.00 -R 100.00 -R 88,000.00
2001/08/01 R 880 39.0% R 1,020 R 880 100 0 R 79.94 R 7,994.00 -R 100.00 -R 88,000.00
2001/08/02 R 877 39.0% R 1,020 R 877 100 0 R 78.51 R 7,851.00 -R 100.00 -R 87,700.00
2001/08/03 R 885 39.0% R 1,020 R 885 100 0 R 81.64 R 8,164.00 -R 100.00 -R 88,500.00
2001/08/06 R 880 39.0% R 1,020 R 880 100 0 R 78.97 R 7,897.00 -R 100.00 -R 88,000.00
2001/08/07 R 884 39.0% R 1,020 R 884 100 0 R 80.44 R 8,044.00 -R 100.00 -R 88,400.00
2001/08/08 R 879 39.0% R 1,020 R 879 100 0 R 78.17 R 7,817.00 -R 100.00 -R 87,900.00
2001/08/10 R 892 39.0% R 1,020 R 892 100 0 R 83.22 R 8,322.00 -R 100.00 -R 89,200.00
2001/08/13 R 895 39.0% R 1,020 R 895 100 0 R 83.90 R 8,390.00 -R 100.00 -R 89,500.00
2001/08/14 R 903 39.0% R 1,020 R 903 100 0 R 87.16 R 8,716.00 -R 100.00 -R 90,300.00
2001/08/15 R 899 39.0% R 1,020 R 899 100 0 R 85.21 R 8,521.00 -R 100.00 -R 89,900.00
2001/08/16 R 895 39.0% R 1,020 R 895 100 0 R 83.29 R 8,329.00 -R 100.00 -R 89,500.00
2001/08/17 R 885 39.0% R 1,020 R 885 100 0 R 78.87 R 7,887.00 -R 100.00 -R 88,500.00
2001/08/20 R 873 39.0% R 1,020 R 873 100 0 R 73.39 R 7,339.00 -R 100.00 -R 87,300.00
2001/08/21 R 882 39.0% R 1,020 R 882 100 0 R 76.84 R 7,684.00 -R 100.00 -R 88,200.00
2001/08/22 R 903 39.0% R 1,020 R 903 100 0 R 85.51 R 8,551.00 -R 100.00 -R 90,300.00
2001/08/23 R 900 39.0% R 1,020 R 900 100 0 R 84.00 R 8,400.00 -R 100.00 -R 90,000.00
2001/08/24 R 905 39.0% R 1,020 R 905 100 0 R 85.97 R 8,597.00 -R 100.00 -R 90,500.00
2001/08/27 R 908 39.0% R 1,020 R 908 100 0 R 86.65 R 8,665.00 -R 100.00 -R 90,800.00
2001/08/28 R 920 39.0% R 1,020 R 920 100 0 R 91.80 R 9,180.00 -R 100.00 -R 92,000.00
2001/08/29 R 920 39.0% R 1,020 R 920 100 0 R 91.59 R 9,159.00 -R 100.00 -R 92,000.00
2001/08/30 R 935 39.0% R 1,020 R 935 100 0 R 98.31 R 9,831.00 -R 100.00 -R 93,500.00
2001/08/31 R 939 39.0% R 1,020 R 939 100 0 R 99.99 R 9,999.00 -R 100.00 -R 93,900.00
2001/09/03 R 940 39.0% R 1,020 R 940 100 0 R 99.80 R 9,980.00 -R 100.00 -R 94,000.00
2001/09/04 R 935 39.0% R 1,020 R 935 100 0 R 97.21 R 9,721.00 -R 100.00 -R 93,500.00
2001/09/05 R 930 39.0% R 1,020 R 930 100 0 R 94.65 R 9,465.00 -R 100.00 -R 93,000.00
2001/09/06 R 912 39.0% R 1,020 R 912 100 0 R 86.28 R 8,628.00 -R 100.00 -R 91,200.00
2001/09/07 R 925 39.0% R 1,020 R 925 100 0 R 91.91 R 9,191.00 -R 100.00 -R 92,500.00
2001/09/10 R 918 39.0% R 1,020 R 918 100 0 R 88.08 R 8,808.00 -R 100.00 -R 91,800.00
2001/09/11 R 909 39.0% R 1,020 R 909 100 0 R 83.89 R 8,389.00 -R 100.00 -R 90,900.00
2001/09/12 R 923 39.0% R 1,020 R 923 100 0 R 89.90 R 8,990.00 -R 100.00 -R 92,300.00
2001/09/13 R 917 39.0% R 1,020 R 917 100 0 R 86.98 R 8,698.00 -R 100.00 -R 91,700.00
2001/09/14 R 920 39.0% R 1,020 R 920 100 0 R 88.10 R 8,810.00 -R 100.00 -R 92,000.00
2001/09/17 R 920 39.0% R 1,020 R 920 100 0 R 87.44 R 8,744.00 -R 100.00 -R 92,000.00
2001/09/18 R 927 39.0% R 1,020 R 927 100 0 R 90.38 R 9,038.00 -R 100.00 -R 92,700.00
2001/09/19 R 925 39.0% R 1,020 R 925 100 0 R 89.24 R 8,924.00 -R 100.00 -R 92,500.00
2001/09/20 R 934 39.0% R 1,020 R 934 100 0 R 93.15 R 9,315.00 -R 100.00 -R 93,400.00
2001/09/21 R 950 39.0% R 1,020 R 950 100 0 R 100.50 R 10,050.00 -R 100.00 -R 95,000.00
2001/09/25 R 969 39.0% R 1,020 R 969 100 0 R 108.97 R 10,897.00 -R 100.00 -R 96,900.00
2001/09/26 R 998 39.0% R 1,020 R 998 100 0 R 123.92 R 12,392.00 -R 100.00 -R 99,800.00
2001/09/27 R 1,009 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,009 100 0 R 129.69 R 12,969.00 -R 100.00 -R 100,900.00
2001/09/28 R 1,000 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,000 100 0 R 124.51 R 12,451.00 -R 100.00 -R 100,000.00
2001/10/01 R 1,028 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/10/02 R 1,058 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/10/03 R 1,068 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00  
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2001/10/04 R 1,054 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/10/05 R 1,044 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/10/08 R 1,027 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/10/09 R 1,024 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/10/10 R 1,022 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/10/11 R 1,019 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,019 100 0 R 131.75 R 13,175.00 -R 100.00 -R 101,900.00
2001/10/12 R 1,043 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/10/15 R 1,025 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/10/16 R 1,021 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/10/17 R 1,018 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,018 100 0 R 129.65 R 12,965.00 -R 100.00 -R 101,800.00
2001/10/18 R 1,018 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,018 100 0 R 129.39 R 12,939.00 -R 100.00 -R 101,800.00
2001/10/19 R 1,012 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,012 100 0 R 125.78 R 12,578.00 -R 100.00 -R 101,200.00
2001/10/22 R 1,013 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,013 100 0 R 125.55 R 12,555.00 -R 100.00 -R 101,300.00
2001/10/23 R 1,037 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/10/24 R 1,035 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/10/25 R 1,041 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/10/26 R 1,067 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/10/29 R 1,055 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/10/30 R 1,036 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/10/31 R 1,043 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/11/01 R 1,034 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/11/02 R 1,042 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/11/05 R 1,057 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/11/06 R 1,077 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/11/07 R 1,088 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/11/08 R 1,098 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/11/09 R 1,080 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/11/12 R 1,110 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/11/13 R 1,140 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/11/14 R 1,185 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/11/15 R 1,185 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/11/16 R 1,163 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/11/19 R 1,178 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/11/20 R 1,208 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/11/21 R 1,238 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/11/22 R 1,283 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/11/23 R 1,328 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/11/26 R 1,336 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/11/27 R 1,291 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/11/28 R 1,246 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/11/29 R 1,255 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/11/30 R 1,285 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/12/03 R 1,315 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/12/04 R 1,340 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/12/05 R 1,385 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/12/06 R 1,419 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/12/07 R 1,383 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/12/10 R 1,428 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/12/11 R 1,454 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/12/12 R 1,499 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/12/13 R 1,544 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/12/14 R 1,589 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/12/18 R 1,634 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/12/19 R 1,679 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/12/20 R 1,724 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/12/21 R 1,689 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/12/24 R 1,644 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/12/27 R 1,599 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/12/28 R 1,554 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2001/12/31 R 1,599 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/01/02 R 1,644 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/01/03 R 1,689 40.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/01/04 R 1,680 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/01/07 R 1,635 38.5% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/01/08 R 1,590 38.5% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/01/09 R 1,525 40.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/01/10 R 1,495 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/01/11 R 1,518 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/01/14 R 1,550 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/01/15 R 1,570 40.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/01/16 R 1,615 41.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/01/17 R 1,628 40.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/01/18 R 1,652 40.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/01/21 R 1,661 40.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/01/22 R 1,630 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/01/23 R 1,665 38.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/01/24 R 1,657 36.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/01/25 R 1,639 36.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/01/28 R 1,594 34.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00  
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2002/01/29 R 1,558 33.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/01/30 R 1,595 35.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/01/31 R 1,640 36.5% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/02/01 R 1,605 37.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/02/04 R 1,646 38.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/02/05 R 1,636 37.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/02/06 R 1,591 36.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/02/07 R 1,626 37.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/02/08 R 1,614 38.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/02/11 R 1,628 38.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/02/12 R 1,631 37.5% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/02/13 R 1,586 37.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/02/14 R 1,565 37.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/02/15 R 1,571 35.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/02/18 R 1,526 34.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/02/19 R 1,481 33.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/02/20 R 1,416 32.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/02/21 R 1,430 32.5% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/02/22 R 1,472 32.5% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/02/25 R 1,492 32.8% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/02/26 R 1,473 32.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/02/27 R 1,481 31.5% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/02/28 R 1,514 33.5% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/03/01 R 1,489 32.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/03/04 R 1,457 33.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/03/05 R 1,412 34.5% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/03/06 R 1,445 35.5% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/03/07 R 1,490 36.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/03/08 R 1,522 36.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/03/11 R 1,477 36.5% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/03/12 R 1,451 35.5% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/03/13 R 1,450 36.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/03/14 R 1,490 37.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/03/15 R 1,492 37.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/03/18 R 1,517 37.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/03/19 R 1,555 37.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/03/20 R 1,600 37.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/03/22 R 1,645 37.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/03/25 R 1,639 37.5% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/03/26 R 1,672 38.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/03/27 R 1,668 38.5% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/03/28 R 1,713 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/04/02 R 1,758 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/04/03 R 1,803 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/04/04 R 1,756 39.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/04/05 R 1,775 38.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/04/08 R 1,799 37.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/04/09 R 1,785 36.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/04/10 R 1,775 35.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/04/11 R 1,820 33.5% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/04/12 R 1,850 33.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/04/15 R 1,870 33.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/04/16 R 1,873 31.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/04/17 R 1,878 29.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/04/18 R 1,893 29.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/04/19 R 1,885 30.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/04/22 R 1,853 30.5% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/04/23 R 1,808 29.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/04/24 R 1,786 28.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/04/25 R 1,770 27.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/04/26 R 1,751 26.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/04/29 R 1,706 26.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/04/30 R 1,725 27.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/05/02 R 1,752 27.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/05/03 R 1,763 26.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/05/06 R 1,774 26.5% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/05/07 R 1,737 26.5% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/05/08 R 1,692 28.5% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/05/09 R 1,727 27.5% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/05/10 R 1,718 27.5% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/05/13 R 1,722 26.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/05/14 R 1,745 25.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/05/15 R 1,765 23.5% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/05/16 R 1,764 23.5% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/05/17 R 1,772 24.5% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/05/20 R 1,773 24.5% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/05/21 R 1,771 25.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/05/22 R 1,766 22.5% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/05/23 R 1,766 22.5% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00  
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2002/05/24 R 1,781 22.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/05/27 R 1,777 23.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/05/28 R 1,791 23.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/05/29 R 1,799 22.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/05/30 R 1,793 23.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/05/31 R 1,802 23.5% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/06/03 R 1,787 24.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/06/04 R 1,742 28.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/06/05 R 1,738 27.5% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/06/06 R 1,734 26.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/06/07 R 1,719 23.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/06/10 R 1,737 23.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/06/11 R 1,743 22.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/06/12 R 1,734 22.5% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/06/13 R 1,754 20.5% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/06/14 R 1,786 19.5% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/06/18 R 1,831 24.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/06/19 R 1,794 25.5% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/06/20 R 1,778 26.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/06/21 R 1,786 26.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
2002/06/24 R 1,802 26.0% R 1,020 R 1,020 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 102,000.00
-R 4,877,973.00 -R 48,300.00 -R 31,440,700.00
Total procurement price -R 31,440,700.00
Total option cost -R 4,877,973.00
Additional broking fees -R 48,300.00
Net procurement cost -R 36,366,973.00
Average Price Index R 1,254.24
Maximum price strategy R 1,102.03
Tonnages hedged 33,000
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2002/05/27 R 1,730 24.0% R 1,720 -R 175.98 -R 4,698,666.00 -R 26,700.00 R 0.00
2002/05/28 R 1,715 24.0% R 1,720 R 1,715 100 0 R 167.49 R 16,749.00 -R 100.00 -R 171,500.00
2002/05/29 R 1,710 24.0% R 1,720 R 1,710 100 0 R 164.56 R 16,456.00 -R 100.00 -R 171,000.00
2002/05/30 R 1,710 24.0% R 1,720 R 1,710 100 0 R 164.35 R 16,435.00 -R 100.00 -R 171,000.00
2002/05/31 R 1,710 24.0% R 1,720 R 1,710 100 0 R 164.13 R 16,413.00 -R 100.00 -R 171,000.00
2002/06/03 R 1,700 24.0% R 1,720 R 1,700 100 0 R 158.13 R 15,813.00 -R 100.00 -R 170,000.00
2002/06/04 R 1,698 24.0% R 1,720 R 1,698 100 0 R 156.86 R 15,686.00 -R 100.00 -R 169,800.00
2002/06/05 R 1,680 24.0% R 1,720 R 1,680 100 0 R 147.29 R 14,729.00 -R 100.00 -R 168,000.00
2002/06/06 R 1,690 24.0% R 1,720 R 1,690 100 0 R 152.23 R 15,223.00 -R 100.00 -R 169,000.00
2002/06/07 R 1,690 24.0% R 1,720 R 1,690 100 0 R 152.01 R 15,201.00 -R 100.00 -R 169,000.00
2002/06/10 R 1,690 24.0% R 1,720 R 1,690 100 0 R 151.36 R 15,136.00 -R 100.00 -R 169,000.00
2002/06/11 R 1,705 24.0% R 1,720 R 1,705 100 0 R 159.05 R 15,905.00 -R 100.00 -R 170,500.00
2002/06/12 R 1,680 24.0% R 1,720 R 1,680 100 0 R 145.78 R 14,578.00 -R 100.00 -R 168,000.00
2002/06/13 R 1,680 24.0% R 1,720 R 1,680 100 0 R 145.56 R 14,556.00 -R 100.00 -R 168,000.00
2002/06/14 R 1,690 24.0% R 1,720 R 1,690 100 0 R 150.49 R 15,049.00 -R 100.00 -R 169,000.00
2002/06/18 R 1,725 24.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/06/19 R 1,690 24.0% R 1,720 R 1,690 100 0 R 149.39 R 14,939.00 -R 100.00 -R 169,000.00
2002/06/20 R 1,685 25.0% R 1,720 R 1,685 100 0 R 153.35 R 15,335.00 -R 100.00 -R 168,500.00
2002/06/21 R 1,685 25.0% R 1,720 R 1,685 100 0 R 153.12 R 15,312.00 -R 100.00 -R 168,500.00
2002/06/24 R 1,700 25.0% R 1,720 R 1,700 100 0 R 160.29 R 16,029.00 -R 100.00 -R 170,000.00
2002/06/25 R 1,700 25.0% R 1,720 R 1,700 100 0 R 160.06 R 16,006.00 -R 100.00 -R 170,000.00
2002/06/26 R 1,655 25.0% R 1,720 R 1,655 100 0 R 136.89 R 13,689.00 -R 100.00 -R 165,500.00
2002/06/27 R 1,661 25.0% R 1,720 R 1,661 100 0 R 139.61 R 13,961.00 -R 100.00 -R 166,100.00
2002/06/28 R 1,680 26.0% R 1,720 R 1,680 100 0 R 155.60 R 15,560.00 -R 100.00 -R 168,000.00
2002/07/01 R 1,681 27.0% R 1,720 R 1,681 100 0 R 162.03 R 16,203.00 -R 100.00 -R 168,100.00
2002/07/02 R 1,695 26.5% R 1,720 R 1,695 100 0 R 165.79 R 16,579.00 -R 100.00 -R 169,500.00
2002/07/03 R 1,700 26.5% R 1,720 R 1,700 100 0 R 168.21 R 16,821.00 -R 100.00 -R 170,000.00
2002/07/04 R 1,710 26.5% R 1,720 R 1,710 100 0 R 173.35 R 17,335.00 -R 100.00 -R 171,000.00
2002/07/05 R 1,690 26.5% R 1,720 R 1,690 100 0 R 162.41 R 16,241.00 -R 100.00 -R 169,000.00
2002/07/08 R 1,700 26.0% R 1,720 R 1,700 100 0 R 163.65 R 16,365.00 -R 100.00 -R 170,000.00
2002/07/09 R 1,695 26.0% R 1,720 R 1,695 100 0 R 160.75 R 16,075.00 -R 100.00 -R 169,500.00
2002/07/10 R 1,650 22.0% R 1,720 R 1,650 100 0 R 112.00 R 11,200.00 -R 100.00 -R 165,000.00
2002/07/11 R 1,605 26.0% R 1,720 R 1,605 100 0 R 116.59 R 11,659.00 -R 100.00 -R 160,500.00
2002/07/12 R 1,560 26.0% R 1,720 R 1,560 100 0 R 97.46 R 9,746.00 -R 100.00 -R 156,000.00
2002/07/15 R 1,515 25.0% R 1,720 R 1,515 100 0 R 74.48 R 7,448.00 -R 100.00 -R 151,500.00
2002/07/16 R 1,505 25.0% R 1,720 R 1,505 100 0 R 70.89 R 7,089.00 -R 100.00 -R 150,500.00
2002/07/17 R 1,505 26.0% R 1,720 R 1,505 100 0 R 76.03 R 7,603.00 -R 100.00 -R 150,500.00
2002/07/18 R 1,509 26.5% R 1,720 R 1,509 100 0 R 79.90 R 7,990.00 -R 100.00 -R 150,900.00
2002/07/19 R 1,518 26.0% R 1,720 R 1,518 100 0 R 80.15 R 8,015.00 -R 100.00 -R 151,800.00
2002/07/22 R 1,529 26.0% R 1,720 R 1,529 100 0 R 83.47 R 8,347.00 -R 100.00 -R 152,900.00
2002/07/23 R 1,573 26.5% R 1,720 R 1,573 100 0 R 103.18 R 10,318.00 -R 100.00 -R 157,300.00
2002/07/24 R 1,584 27.0% R 1,720 R 1,584 100 0 R 110.49 R 11,049.00 -R 100.00 -R 158,400.00
2002/07/25 R 1,590 27.5% R 1,720 R 1,590 100 0 R 115.81 R 11,581.00 -R 100.00 -R 159,000.00
2002/07/26 R 1,595 27.5% R 1,720 R 1,595 100 0 R 117.74 R 11,774.00 -R 100.00 -R 159,500.00
2002/07/29 R 1,600 27.5% R 1,720 R 1,600 100 0 R 119.20 R 11,920.00 -R 100.00 -R 160,000.00
2002/07/30 R 1,601 27.5% R 1,720 R 1,601 100 0 R 119.39 R 11,939.00 -R 100.00 -R 160,100.00
2002/07/31 R 1,600 27.5% R 1,720 R 1,600 100 0 R 118.69 R 11,869.00 -R 100.00 -R 160,000.00
2002/08/01 R 1,621 27.5% R 1,720 R 1,621 100 0 R 127.92 R 12,792.00 -R 100.00 -R 162,100.00
2002/08/02 R 1,609 27.5% R 1,720 R 1,609 100 0 R 122.20 R 12,220.00 -R 100.00 -R 160,900.00
2002/08/05 R 1,621 28.0% R 1,720 R 1,621 100 0 R 129.92 R 12,992.00 -R 100.00 -R 162,100.00
2002/08/06 R 1,647 28.0% R 1,720 R 1,647 100 0 R 142.00 R 14,200.00 -R 100.00 -R 164,700.00
2002/08/07 R 1,642 27.0% R 1,720 R 1,642 100 0 R 133.17 R 13,317.00 -R 100.00 -R 164,200.00
2002/08/08 R 1,650 27.0% R 1,720 R 1,650 100 0 R 136.76 R 13,676.00 -R 100.00 -R 165,000.00
2002/08/12 R 1,650 27.0% R 1,720 R 1,650 100 0 R 135.72 R 13,572.00 -R 100.00 -R 165,000.00
2002/08/13 R 1,691 27.0% R 1,720 R 1,691 100 0 R 156.10 R 15,610.00 -R 100.00 -R 169,100.00
2002/08/14 R 1,690 26.0% R 1,720 R 1,690 100 0 R 149.07 R 14,907.00 -R 100.00 -R 169,000.00
2002/08/15 R 1,685 25.0% R 1,720 R 1,685 100 0 R 140.01 R 14,001.00 -R 100.00 -R 168,500.00
2002/08/16 R 1,687 24.0% R 1,720 R 1,687 100 0 R 134.56 R 13,456.00 -R 100.00 -R 168,700.00
2002/08/19 R 1,671 25.0% R 1,720 R 1,671 100 0 R 131.97 R 13,197.00 -R 100.00 -R 167,100.00
2002/08/20 R 1,680 25.0% R 1,720 R 1,680 100 0 R 136.22 R 13,622.00 -R 100.00 -R 168,000.00
2002/08/21 R 1,700 24.0% R 1,720 R 1,700 100 0 R 140.06 R 14,006.00 -R 100.00 -R 170,000.00
2002/08/22 R 1,712 24.5% R 1,720 R 1,712 100 0 R 149.28 R 14,928.00 -R 100.00 -R 171,200.00
2002/08/23 R 1,740 24.5% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/08/26 R 1,745 24.5% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/08/27 R 1,728 25.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/08/28 R 1,743 25.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/08/29 R 1,751 25.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/08/30 R 1,763 25.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00  
196  
VOLUME BELOW VOLUME @ ADDITIONAL BROKING DAILY
DATE  PRICE VOLATILITY CALL-STRIKE DAILY HEDGE MAXIMUM PRICE MAXIMUM PRICE OPTION PREMIUM NET OPTION COST FEES @ R1/TON PROCUREMENT PRICE
2002/09/02 R 1,782 25.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/09/03 R 1,814 26.5% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/09/04 R 1,811 25.5% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/09/05 R 1,810 25.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/09/06 R 1,780 25.5% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/09/09 R 1,785 25.5% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/09/10 R 1,799 25.5% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/09/11 R 1,789 26.5% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/09/12 R 1,765 26.5% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/09/13 R 1,760 27.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/09/16 R 1,770 27.5% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/09/17 R 1,766 27.5% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/09/18 R 1,770 27.5% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/09/19 R 1,780 28.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/09/20 R 1,815 28.5% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/09/23 R 1,820 28.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/09/25 R 1,841 28.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/09/26 R 1,835 28.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/09/27 R 1,823 28.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/09/30 R 1,810 28.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/10/01 R 1,793 28.5% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/10/02 R 1,805 28.5% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/10/03 R 1,812 28.5% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/10/04 R 1,803 28.5% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/10/07 R 1,809 28.5% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/10/08 R 1,825 28.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/10/09 R 1,835 27.5% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/10/10 R 1,840 26.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/10/11 R 1,845 27.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/10/14 R 1,846 27.5% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/10/15 R 1,856 28.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/10/16 R 1,861 28.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/10/17 R 1,866 28.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/10/18 R 1,854 28.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/10/21 R 1,833 28.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/10/22 R 1,799 28.5% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/10/23 R 1,774 28.5% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/10/24 R 1,761 30.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/10/25 R 1,790 31.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/10/28 R 1,769 32.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/10/29 R 1,782 32.5% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/10/30 R 1,783 33.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/10/31 R 1,794 32.3% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/11/01 R 1,786 32.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/11/04 R 1,741 31.5% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/11/05 R 1,752 32.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/11/06 R 1,765 32.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/11/07 R 1,774 32.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/11/08 R 1,753 32.5% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/11/11 R 1,740 32.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/11/12 R 1,760 32.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/11/13 R 1,773 32.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/11/14 R 1,787 31.5% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/11/15 R 1,810 31.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/11/18 R 1,855 32.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/11/19 R 1,854 31.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/11/20 R 1,866 31.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/11/21 R 1,889 30.5% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/11/22 R 1,865 31.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/11/25 R 1,890 31.5% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/11/26 R 1,893 31.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/11/27 R 1,893 31.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/11/28 R 1,905 31.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/11/29 R 1,950 28.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/12/02 R 1,989 29.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/12/03 R 1,958 29.5% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/12/04 R 1,955 29.5% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/12/05 R 1,910 30.5% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/12/06 R 1,865 34.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/12/09 R 1,800 36.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/12/10 R 1,735 34.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/12/11 R 1,689 32.0% R 1,720 R 1,689 100 0 R 143.66 R 14,366.00 -R 100.00 -R 168,900.00
2002/12/12 R 1,727 32.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/12/13 R 1,720 32.0% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00  
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2002/12/17 R 1,675 31.0% R 1,720 R 1,675 100 0 R 129.31 R 12,931.00 -R 100.00 -R 167,500.00
2002/12/18 R 1,645 31.0% R 1,720 R 1,645 100 0 R 114.50 R 11,450.00 -R 100.00 -R 164,500.00
2002/12/19 R 1,640 30.0% R 1,720 R 1,640 100 0 R 106.77 R 10,677.00 -R 100.00 -R 164,000.00
2002/12/20 R 1,682 31.0% R 1,720 R 1,682 100 0 R 131.23 R 13,123.00 -R 100.00 -R 168,200.00
2002/12/23 R 1,724 30.5% R 1,720 R 1,720 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2002/12/24 R 1,713 31.0% R 1,720 R 1,713 100 0 R 145.72 R 14,572.00 -R 100.00 -R 171,300.00
2002/12/27 R 1,668 30.0% R 1,720 R 1,668 100 0 R 116.83 R 11,683.00 -R 100.00 -R 166,800.00
2002/12/30 R 1,640 29.0% R 1,720 R 1,640 100 0 R 98.11 R 9,811.00 -R 100.00 -R 164,000.00
2002/12/31 R 1,672 29.0% R 1,720 R 1,672 100 0 R 112.59 R 11,259.00 -R 100.00 -R 167,200.00
2003/01/02 R 1,681 28.5% R 1,720 R 1,681 100 0 R 113.92 R 11,392.00 -R 100.00 -R 168,100.00
2003/01/03 R 1,663 29.5% R 1,720 R 1,663 100 0 R 109.41 R 10,941.00 -R 100.00 -R 166,300.00
2003/01/06 R 1,620 27.5% R 1,720 R 1,620 100 0 R 80.44 R 8,044.00 -R 100.00 -R 162,000.00
2003/01/07 R 1,599 26.0% R 1,720 R 1,599 100 0 R 65.61 R 6,561.00 -R 100.00 -R 159,900.00
2003/01/08 R 1,580 26.5% R 1,720 R 1,580 100 0 R 60.45 R 6,045.00 -R 100.00 -R 158,000.00
2003/01/09 R 1,550 26.5% R 1,720 R 1,550 100 0 R 50.25 R 5,025.00 -R 100.00 -R 155,000.00
2003/01/10 R 1,572 28.0% R 1,720 R 1,572 100 0 R 62.89 R 6,289.00 -R 100.00 -R 157,200.00
2003/01/13 R 1,527 28.0% R 1,720 R 1,527 100 0 R 47.49 R 4,749.00 -R 100.00 -R 152,700.00
2003/01/14 R 1,515 27.5% R 1,720 R 1,515 100 0 R 42.11 R 4,211.00 -R 100.00 -R 151,500.00
2003/01/15 R 1,562 27.0% R 1,720 R 1,562 100 0 R 54.08 R 5,408.00 -R 100.00 -R 156,200.00
2003/01/16 R 1,594 27.0% R 1,720 R 1,594 100 0 R 64.83 R 6,483.00 -R 100.00 -R 159,400.00
2003/01/20 R 1,536 27.0% R 1,720 R 1,536 100 0 R 44.56 R 4,456.00 -R 100.00 -R 153,600.00
2003/01/21 R 1,549 28.5% R 1,720 R 1,549 100 0 R 53.42 R 5,342.00 -R 100.00 -R 154,900.00
2003/01/22 R 1,566 29.5% R 1,720 R 1,566 100 0 R 62.36 R 6,236.00 -R 100.00 -R 156,600.00
2003/01/23 R 1,561 28.5% R 1,720 R 1,561 100 0 R 56.63 R 5,663.00 -R 100.00 -R 156,100.00
2003/01/24 R 1,516 35.0% R 1,720 R 1,516 100 0 R 64.69 R 6,469.00 -R 100.00 -R 151,600.00
2003/01/27 R 1,471 40.0% R 1,720 R 1,471 100 0 R 66.06 R 6,606.00 -R 100.00 -R 147,100.00
2003/01/28 R 1,406 39.5% R 1,720 R 1,406 100 0 R 45.92 R 4,592.00 -R 100.00 -R 140,600.00
2003/01/29 R 1,434 35.5% R 1,720 R 1,434 100 0 R 41.15 R 4,115.00 -R 100.00 -R 143,400.00
2003/01/30 R 1,432 34.0% R 1,720 R 1,432 100 0 R 36.20 R 3,620.00 -R 100.00 -R 143,200.00
2003/01/31 R 1,424 34.0% R 1,720 R 1,424 100 0 R 34.11 R 3,411.00 -R 100.00 -R 142,400.00
2003/02/03 R 1,379 35.0% R 1,720 R 1,379 100 0 R 26.70 R 2,670.00 -R 100.00 -R 137,900.00
2003/02/04 R 1,334 39.0% R 1,720 R 1,334 100 0 R 27.14 R 2,714.00 -R 100.00 -R 133,400.00
2003/02/05 R 1,320 39.0% R 1,720 R 1,320 100 0 R 24.49 R 2,449.00 -R 100.00 -R 132,000.00
2003/02/06 R 1,360 39.0% R 1,720 R 1,360 100 0 R 31.31 R 3,131.00 -R 100.00 -R 136,000.00
2003/02/07 R 1,382 39.0% R 1,720 R 1,382 100 0 R 35.44 R 3,544.00 -R 100.00 -R 138,200.00
2003/02/10 R 1,337 42.0% R 1,720 R 1,337 100 0 R 32.26 R 3,226.00 -R 100.00 -R 133,700.00
2003/02/11 R 1,292 43.5% R 1,720 R 1,292 100 0 R 26.94 R 2,694.00 -R 100.00 -R 129,200.00
2003/02/12 R 1,285 43.0% R 1,720 R 1,285 100 0 R 24.53 R 2,453.00 -R 100.00 -R 128,500.00
2003/02/13 R 1,240 44.0% R 1,720 R 1,240 100 0 R 19.44 R 1,944.00 -R 100.00 -R 124,000.00
2003/02/14 R 1,195 51.0% R 1,720 R 1,195 100 0 R 24.14 R 2,414.00 -R 100.00 -R 119,500.00
2003/02/17 R 1,130 45.0% R 1,720 R 1,130 100 0 R 8.74 R 874.00 -R 100.00 -R 113,000.00
2003/02/18 R 1,133 42.0% R 1,720 R 1,133 100 0 R 6.26 R 626.00 -R 100.00 -R 113,300.00
2003/02/19 R 1,086 37.0% R 1,720 R 1,086 100 0 R 1.74 R 174.00 -R 100.00 -R 108,600.00
2003/02/20 R 1,021 39.0% R 1,720 R 1,021 100 0 R 1.08 R 108.00 -R 100.00 -R 102,100.00
2003/02/21 R 1,007 38.0% R 1,720 R 1,007 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 100,700.00
2003/02/24 R 1,008 37.0% R 1,720 R 1,008 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 100,800.00
2003/02/25 R 1,016 36.0% R 1,720 R 1,016 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 101,600.00
2003/02/26 R 1,039 39.0% R 1,720 R 1,039 100 0 R 1.13 R 113.00 -R 100.00 -R 103,900.00
2003/02/27 R 1,007 39.0% R 1,720 R 1,007 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 100,700.00
2003/02/28 R 969 39.0% R 1,720 R 969 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 96,900.00
2003/03/03 R 964 38.0% R 1,720 R 964 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 96,400.00
2003/03/04 R 950 36.0% R 1,720 R 950 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 95,000.00
2003/03/05 R 989 37.0% R 1,720 R 989 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 98,900.00
2003/03/06 R 969 36.0% R 1,720 R 969 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 96,900.00
2003/03/07 R 992 39.0% R 1,720 R 992 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 99,200.00
2003/03/10 R 1,037 43.0% R 1,720 R 1,037 100 0 R 1.52 R 152.00 -R 100.00 -R 103,700.00
2003/03/11 R 1,055 44.0% R 1,720 R 1,055 100 0 R 2.14 R 214.00 -R 100.00 -R 105,500.00
2003/03/12 R 1,063 46.0% R 1,720 R 1,063 100 0 R 3.03 R 303.00 -R 100.00 -R 106,300.00
2003/03/13 R 1,022 44.0% R 1,720 R 1,022 100 0 R 1.34 R 134.00 -R 100.00 -R 102,200.00
2003/03/14 R 1,018 43.0% R 1,720 R 1,018 100 0 R 1.03 R 103.00 -R 100.00 -R 101,800.00
2003/03/17 R 992 43.0% R 1,720 R 992 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 99,200.00
2003/03/18 R 1,002 42.0% R 1,720 R 1,002 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 100,200.00
2003/03/19 R 958 41.0% R 1,720 R 958 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 95,800.00
2003/03/20 R 913 47.0% R 1,720 R 913 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 91,300.00
2003/03/24 R 848 45.0% R 1,720 R 848 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 84,800.00
2003/03/25 R 867 45.0% R 1,720 R 867 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 86,700.00
2003/03/26 R 886 43.0% R 1,720 R 886 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 88,600.00
2003/03/27 R 875 43.0% R 1,720 R 875 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 87,500.00
2003/03/28 R 866 40.0% R 1,720 R 866 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 86,600.00
2003/03/31 R 821 37.0% R 1,720 R 821 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 82,100.00
2003/04/01 R 826 35.0% R 1,720 R 826 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 82,600.00
2003/04/02 R 865 35.0% R 1,720 R 865 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 86,500.00
2003/04/03 R 855 34.0% R 1,720 R 855 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 85,500.00
2003/04/04 R 841 33.0% R 1,720 R 841 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 84,100.00  
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2003/04/07 R 886 37.0% R 1,720 R 886 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 88,600.00
2003/04/08 R 891 38.0% R 1,720 R 891 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 89,100.00
2003/04/09 R 876 38.0% R 1,720 R 876 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 87,600.00
2003/04/10 R 847 38.0% R 1,720 R 847 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 84,700.00
2003/04/11 R 859 37.0% R 1,720 R 859 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 85,900.00
2003/04/14 R 867 37.0% R 1,720 R 867 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 86,700.00
2003/04/15 R 864 36.0% R 1,720 R 864 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 86,400.00
2003/04/16 R 851 35.0% R 1,720 R 851 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 85,100.00
2003/04/17 R 842 35.0% R 1,720 R 842 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 84,200.00
2003/04/22 R 824 33.0% R 1,720 R 824 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 82,400.00
2003/04/23 R 806 33.0% R 1,720 R 806 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 80,600.00
2003/04/24 R 782 32.0% R 1,720 R 782 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 78,200.00
2003/04/25 R 780 31.0% R 1,720 R 780 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 78,000.00
2003/04/29 R 763 31.0% R 1,720 R 763 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 76,300.00
2003/04/30 R 743 31.0% R 1,720 R 743 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 74,300.00
2003/05/02 R 763 33.0% R 1,720 R 763 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 76,300.00
2003/05/05 R 808 35.0% R 1,720 R 808 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 80,800.00
2003/05/06 R 813 36.0% R 1,720 R 813 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 81,300.00
2003/05/07 R 801 36.0% R 1,720 R 801 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 80,100.00
2003/05/08 R 794 37.0% R 1,720 R 794 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 79,400.00
2003/05/09 R 800 36.0% R 1,720 R 800 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 80,000.00
2003/05/12 R 841 38.0% R 1,720 R 841 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 84,100.00
2003/05/13 R 839 38.0% R 1,720 R 839 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 83,900.00
2003/05/14 R 872 40.0% R 1,720 R 872 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 87,200.00
2003/05/15 R 917 44.0% R 1,720 R 917 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 91,700.00
2003/05/16 R 962 47.0% R 1,720 R 962 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 96,200.00
2003/05/19 R 954 49.0% R 1,720 R 954 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 95,400.00
2003/05/20 R 951 49.0% R 1,720 R 951 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 95,100.00
2003/05/21 R 907 49.0% R 1,720 R 907 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 90,700.00
2003/05/22 R 938 49.0% R 1,720 R 938 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 93,800.00
2003/05/23 R 940 49.0% R 1,720 R 940 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 94,000.00
2003/05/26 R 933 48.0% R 1,720 R 933 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 93,300.00
2003/05/27 R 930 46.0% R 1,720 R 930 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 93,000.00
2003/05/28 R 975 47.0% R 1,720 R 975 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 97,500.00
2003/05/29 R 1,005 46.0% R 1,720 R 1,005 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 100,500.00
2003/05/30 R 1,001 49.0% R 1,720 R 1,001 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 100,100.00
2003/06/02 R 980 45.0% R 1,720 R 980 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 98,000.00
2003/06/03 R 935 45.0% R 1,720 R 935 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 93,500.00
2003/06/04 R 901 47.0% R 1,720 R 901 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 90,100.00
2003/06/05 R 939 47.0% R 1,720 R 939 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 93,900.00
2003/06/06 R 924 50.0% R 1,720 R 924 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 92,400.00
2003/06/09 R 940 47.0% R 1,720 R 940 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 94,000.00
2003/06/10 R 923 45.0% R 1,720 R 923 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 92,300.00
2003/06/11 R 906 45.0% R 1,720 R 906 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 90,600.00
2003/06/12 R 927 45.0% R 1,720 R 927 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 92,700.00
2003/06/13 R 904 43.0% R 1,720 R 904 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 90,400.00
2003/06/17 R 869 47.0% R 1,720 R 869 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 86,900.00
2003/06/18 R 870 47.0% R 1,720 R 870 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 87,000.00
2003/06/19 R 889 49.0% R 1,720 R 889 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 88,900.00
2003/06/20 R 885 46.0% R 1,720 R 885 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 88,500.00
2003/06/23 R 885 46.0% R 1,720 R 885 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 88,500.00
2003/06/24 R 866 46.0% R 1,720 R 866 8200 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 7,101,200.00
-R 3,612,674.00 -R 37,700.00 -R 30,838,000.00
Total procurement price -R 30,838,000.00
Total option cost -R 3,612,674.00
Additional broking fees -R 37,700.00
Net procurement cost -R 34,488,374.00
Average Price Index R 1,400.50
Maximum price strategy R 1,291.70
Tonnages hedged 26,700  
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2003/06/23 R 1,034 30.0% R 1,040 -R 120.84 -R 3,033,084.00 -R 25,100.00 R 0.00
2003/06/24 R 1,018 31.0% R 1,040 R 1,018 100 0 R 116.05 R 11,605.00 -R 100.00 -R 101,800.00
2003/06/25 R 993 31.0% R 1,040 R 993 100 0 R 102.92 R 10,292.00 -R 100.00 -R 99,300.00
2003/06/26 R 995 31.0% R 1,040 R 995 100 0 R 103.76 R 10,376.00 -R 100.00 -R 99,500.00
2003/06/27 R 975 31.0% R 1,040 R 975 100 0 R 93.76 R 9,376.00 -R 100.00 -R 97,500.00
2003/06/30 R 975 31.0% R 1,040 R 975 100 0 R 93.27 R 9,327.00 -R 100.00 -R 97,500.00
2003/07/01 R 970 31.0% R 1,040 R 970 100 0 R 90.73 R 9,073.00 -R 100.00 -R 97,000.00
2003/07/02 R 970 31.0% R 1,040 R 970 100 0 R 90.56 R 9,056.00 -R 100.00 -R 97,000.00
2003/07/03 R 988 31.0% R 1,040 R 988 100 0 R 99.08 R 9,908.00 -R 100.00 -R 98,800.00
2003/07/04 R 990 31.0% R 1,040 R 990 100 0 R 99.90 R 9,990.00 -R 100.00 -R 99,000.00
2003/07/07 R 982 31.0% R 1,040 R 982 100 0 R 95.46 R 9,546.00 -R 100.00 -R 98,200.00
2003/07/08 R 988 31.0% R 1,040 R 988 100 0 R 98.23 R 9,823.00 -R 100.00 -R 98,800.00
2003/07/09 R 1,006 31.0% R 1,040 R 1,006 100 0 R 107.15 R 10,715.00 -R 100.00 -R 100,600.00
2003/07/10 R 994 31.0% R 1,040 R 994 100 0 R 100.87 R 10,087.00 -R 100.00 -R 99,400.00
2003/07/11 R 990 31.0% R 1,040 R 990 100 0 R 98.70 R 9,870.00 -R 100.00 -R 99,000.00
2003/07/14 R 975 31.0% R 1,040 R 975 100 0 R 90.92 R 9,092.00 -R 100.00 -R 97,500.00
2003/07/15 R 985 31.0% R 1,040 R 985 100 0 R 95.56 R 9,556.00 -R 100.00 -R 98,500.00
2003/07/16 R 982 31.0% R 1,040 R 982 100 0 R 93.93 R 9,393.00 -R 100.00 -R 98,200.00
2003/07/17 R 968 31.0% R 1,040 R 968 100 0 R 87.12 R 8,712.00 -R 100.00 -R 96,800.00
2003/07/18 R 957 31.0% R 1,040 R 957 100 0 R 81.93 R 8,193.00 -R 100.00 -R 95,700.00
2003/07/21 R 942 31.0% R 1,040 R 942 100 0 R 74.86 R 7,486.00 -R 100.00 -R 94,200.00
2003/07/22 R 952 31.0% R 1,040 R 952 100 0 R 79.04 R 7,904.00 -R 100.00 -R 95,200.00
2003/07/23 R 961 36.0% R 1,040 R 961 100 0 R 101.22 R 10,122.00 -R 100.00 -R 96,100.00
2003/07/24 R 940 36.0% R 1,040 R 940 100 0 R 91.26 R 9,126.00 -R 100.00 -R 94,000.00
2003/07/25 R 940 36.0% R 1,040 R 940 100 0 R 91.07 R 9,107.00 -R 100.00 -R 94,000.00
2003/07/28 R 935 36.0% R 1,040 R 935 100 0 R 88.25 R 8,825.00 -R 100.00 -R 93,500.00
2003/07/29 R 949 36.0% R 1,040 R 949 100 0 R 94.40 R 9,440.00 -R 100.00 -R 94,900.00
2003/07/30 R 960 36.0% R 1,040 R 960 100 0 R 99.36 R 9,936.00 -R 100.00 -R 96,000.00
2003/07/31 R 976 36.0% R 1,040 R 976 100 0 R 106.91 R 10,691.00 -R 100.00 -R 97,600.00
2003/08/01 R 983 36.0% R 1,040 R 983 100 0 R 110.19 R 11,019.00 -R 100.00 -R 98,300.00
2003/08/04 R 986 36.0% R 1,040 R 986 100 0 R 111.08 R 11,108.00 -R 100.00 -R 98,600.00
2003/08/05 R 1,000 37.0% R 1,040 R 1,000 100 0 R 121.81 R 12,181.00 -R 100.00 -R 100,000.00
2003/08/06 R 966 37.0% R 1,040 R 966 100 0 R 104.44 R 10,444.00 -R 100.00 -R 96,600.00
2003/08/07 R 970 37.0% R 1,040 R 970 100 0 R 106.18 R 10,618.00 -R 100.00 -R 97,000.00
2003/08/08 R 981 37.0% R 1,040 R 981 100 0 R 111.42 R 11,142.00 -R 100.00 -R 98,100.00
2003/08/11 R 990 37.0% R 1,040 R 990 100 0 R 115.34 R 11,534.00 -R 100.00 -R 99,000.00
2003/08/12 R 981 37.0% R 1,040 R 981 100 0 R 110.57 R 11,057.00 -R 100.00 -R 98,100.00
2003/08/13 R 1,010 37.0% R 1,040 R 1,010 100 0 R 125.37 R 12,537.00 -R 100.00 -R 101,000.00
2003/08/14 R 985 37.0% R 1,040 R 985 100 0 R 112.15 R 11,215.00 -R 100.00 -R 98,500.00
2003/08/15 R 995 36.0% R 1,040 R 995 100 0 R 113.37 R 11,337.00 -R 100.00 -R 99,500.00
2003/08/18 R 1,000 36.0% R 1,040 R 1,000 100 0 R 115.32 R 11,532.00 -R 100.00 -R 100,000.00
2003/08/19 R 990 36.0% R 1,040 R 990 100 0 R 109.98 R 10,998.00 -R 100.00 -R 99,000.00
2003/08/20 R 993 36.0% R 1,040 R 993 100 0 R 111.29 R 11,129.00 -R 100.00 -R 99,300.00
2003/08/21 R 1,018 36.0% R 1,040 R 1,018 100 0 R 124.20 R 12,420.00 -R 100.00 -R 101,800.00
2003/08/22 R 1,026 36.0% R 1,040 R 1,026 100 0 R 128.34 R 12,834.00 -R 100.00 -R 102,600.00
2003/08/25 R 1,031 36.0% R 1,040 R 1,031 100 0 R 130.44 R 13,044.00 -R 100.00 -R 103,100.00
2003/08/26 R 1,046 36.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2003/08/27 R 1,033 37.0% R 1,040 R 1,033 100 0 R 134.81 R 13,481.00 -R 100.00 -R 103,300.00
2003/08/28 R 1,022 37.0% R 1,040 R 1,022 100 0 R 128.51 R 12,851.00 -R 100.00 -R 102,200.00
2003/08/29 R 1,030 37.0% R 1,040 R 1,030 100 0 R 132.69 R 13,269.00 -R 100.00 -R 103,000.00
01/09/200 R 1,020 37.0% R 1,040 R 1,020 100 0 R 126.51 R 12,651.00 -R 100.00 -R 102,000.00
2003/09/02 R 1,014 37.0% R 1,040 R 1,014 100 0 R 123.05 R 12,305.00 -R 100.00 -R 101,400.00
2003/09/03 R 1,012 37.0% R 1,040 R 1,012 100 0 R 121.75 R 12,175.00 -R 100.00 -R 101,200.00
2003/09/04 R 1,029 37.0% R 1,040 R 1,029 100 0 R 130.76 R 13,076.00 -R 100.00 -R 102,900.00
2003/09/05 R 1,048 38.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2003/09/08 R 1,044 38.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2003/09/09 R 1,043 38.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2003/09/10 R 1,056 38.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2003/09/11 R 1,060 38.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2003/09/12 R 1,058 38.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2003/09/15 R 1,033 38.0% R 1,040 R 1,033 100 0 R 134.00 R 13,400.00 -R 100.00 -R 103,300.00
2003/09/16 R 1,050 38.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2003/09/17 R 1,044 38.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2003/09/18 R 1,026 38.0% R 1,040 R 1,026 100 0 R 129.40 R 12,940.00 -R 100.00 -R 102,600.00
2003/09/19 R 1,028 38.0% R 1,040 R 1,028 100 0 R 130.26 R 13,026.00 -R 100.00 -R 102,800.00
2003/09/22 R 1,039 38.0% R 1,040 R 1,039 100 0 R 135.67 R 13,567.00 -R 100.00 -R 103,900.00
2003/09/23 R 1,035 38.0% R 1,040 R 1,035 100 0 R 133.17 R 13,317.00 -R 100.00 -R 103,500.00
2003/09/25 R 1,029 37.0% R 1,040 R 1,029 100 0 R 125.83 R 12,583.00 -R 100.00 -R 102,900.00  
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2003/09/26 R 1,029 36.0% R 1,040 R 1,029 100 0 R 122.08 R 12,208.00 -R 100.00 -R 102,900.00
2003/09/29 R 1,038 36.0% R 1,040 R 1,038 100 0 R 126.36 R 12,636.00 -R 100.00 -R 103,800.00
2003/09/30 R 1,025 36.0% R 1,040 R 1,025 100 0 R 118.97 R 11,897.00 -R 100.00 -R 102,500.00
2003/10/01 R 1,000 36.0% R 1,040 R 1,000 100 0 R 105.57 R 10,557.00 -R 100.00 -R 100,000.00
2003/10/02 R 1,009 37.0% R 1,040 R 1,009 100 0 R 113.41 R 11,341.00 -R 100.00 -R 100,900.00
2003/10/03 R 994 37.0% R 1,040 R 994 100 0 R 105.45 R 10,545.00 -R 100.00 -R 99,400.00
2003/10/06 R 1,039 37.0% R 1,040 R 1,039 100 0 R 128.72 R 12,872.00 -R 100.00 -R 103,900.00
2003/10/07 R 1,017 38.0% R 1,040 R 1,017 100 0 R 119.85 R 11,985.00 -R 100.00 -R 101,700.00
2003/10/08 R 1,014 38.0% R 1,040 R 1,014 100 0 R 118.00 R 11,800.00 -R 100.00 -R 101,400.00
2003/10/09 R 1,027 38.0% R 1,040 R 1,027 100 0 R 124.77 R 12,477.00 -R 100.00 -R 102,700.00
2003/10/10 R 999 39.0% R 1,040 R 999 100 0 R 113.00 R 11,300.00 -R 100.00 -R 99,900.00
2003/10/13 R 1,006 39.0% R 1,040 R 1,006 100 0 R 115.88 R 11,588.00 -R 100.00 -R 100,600.00
2003/10/14 R 986 38.0% R 1,040 R 986 100 0 R 102.11 R 10,211.00 -R 100.00 -R 98,600.00
2003/10/15 R 959 36.0% R 1,040 R 959 100 0 R 82.64 R 8,264.00 -R 100.00 -R 95,900.00
2003/10/16 R 948 37.0% R 1,040 R 948 100 0 R 80.63 R 8,063.00 -R 100.00 -R 94,800.00
2003/10/17 R 961 38.0% R 1,040 R 961 100 0 R 89.40 R 8,940.00 -R 100.00 -R 96,100.00
2003/10/20 R 967 39.0% R 1,040 R 967 100 0 R 94.64 R 9,464.00 -R 100.00 -R 96,700.00
2003/10/21 R 961 38.0% R 1,040 R 961 100 0 R 88.44 R 8,844.00 -R 100.00 -R 96,100.00
2003/10/22 R 962 38.0% R 1,040 R 962 100 0 R 88.66 R 8,866.00 -R 100.00 -R 96,200.00
2003/10/23 R 976 38.0% R 1,040 R 976 100 0 R 95.01 R 9,501.00 -R 100.00 -R 97,600.00
2003/10/24 R 997 39.0% R 1,040 R 997 100 0 R 108.38 R 10,838.00 -R 100.00 -R 99,700.00
2003/10/27 R 999 40.0% R 1,040 R 999 100 0 R 111.85 R 11,185.00 -R 100.00 -R 99,900.00
2003/10/28 R 984 40.0% R 1,040 R 984 100 0 R 103.99 R 10,399.00 -R 100.00 -R 98,400.00
2003/10/29 R 993 40.0% R 1,040 R 993 100 0 R 108.24 R 10,824.00 -R 100.00 -R 99,300.00
2003/10/30 R 983 39.0% R 1,040 R 983 100 0 R 99.80 R 9,980.00 -R 100.00 -R 98,300.00
2003/10/31 R 980 40.0% R 1,040 R 980 100 0 R 101.22 R 10,122.00 -R 100.00 -R 98,000.00
2003/11/03 R 992 40.0% R 1,040 R 992 100 0 R 106.38 R 10,638.00 -R 100.00 -R 99,200.00
2003/11/04 R 979 41.0% R 1,040 R 979 100 0 R 102.77 R 10,277.00 -R 100.00 -R 97,900.00
2003/11/05 R 970 41.0% R 1,040 R 970 100 0 R 98.13 R 9,813.00 -R 100.00 -R 97,000.00
2003/11/06 R 994 42.0% R 1,040 R 994 100 0 R 112.87 R 11,287.00 -R 100.00 -R 99,400.00
2003/11/07 R 987 42.0% R 1,040 R 987 100 0 R 109.03 R 10,903.00 -R 100.00 -R 98,700.00
2003/11/10 R 1,003 42.0% R 1,040 R 1,003 100 0 R 116.37 R 11,637.00 -R 100.00 -R 100,300.00
2003/11/11 R 988 42.0% R 1,040 R 988 100 0 R 108.38 R 10,838.00 -R 100.00 -R 98,800.00
2003/11/12 R 988 42.0% R 1,040 R 988 100 0 R 108.09 R 10,809.00 -R 100.00 -R 98,800.00
2003/11/13 R 1,004 41.0% R 1,040 R 1,004 100 0 R 112.88 R 11,288.00 -R 100.00 -R 100,400.00
2003/11/14 R 991 42.0% R 1,040 R 991 100 0 R 109.03 R 10,903.00 -R 100.00 -R 99,100.00
2003/11/17 R 984 41.0% R 1,040 R 984 100 0 R 101.60 R 10,160.00 -R 100.00 -R 98,400.00
2003/11/18 R 986 41.0% R 1,040 R 986 100 0 R 102.30 R 10,230.00 -R 100.00 -R 98,600.00
2003/11/19 R 978 41.0% R 1,040 R 978 100 0 R 98.09 R 9,809.00 -R 100.00 -R 97,800.00
2003/11/20 R 976 41.0% R 1,040 R 976 100 0 R 96.84 R 9,684.00 -R 100.00 -R 97,600.00
2003/11/21 R 972 41.0% R 1,040 R 972 100 0 R 94.64 R 9,464.00 -R 100.00 -R 97,200.00
2003/11/24 R 978 41.0% R 1,040 R 978 100 0 R 96.66 R 9,666.00 -R 100.00 -R 97,800.00
2003/11/25 R 980 39.0% R 1,040 R 980 100 0 R 91.41 R 9,141.00 -R 100.00 -R 98,000.00
2003/11/26 R 977 39.0% R 1,040 R 977 100 0 R 89.70 R 8,970.00 -R 100.00 -R 97,700.00
2003/11/27 R 976 37.0% R 1,040 R 976 100 0 R 83.08 R 8,308.00 -R 100.00 -R 97,600.00
2003/11/28 R 968 36.0% R 1,040 R 968 100 0 R 76.25 R 7,625.00 -R 100.00 -R 96,800.00
2003/12/01 R 996 37.0% R 1,040 R 996 100 0 R 91.61 R 9,161.00 -R 100.00 -R 99,600.00
2003/12/02 R 1,015 38.0% R 1,040 R 1,015 100 0 R 103.98 R 10,398.00 -R 100.00 -R 101,500.00
2003/12/03 R 1,020 38.0% R 1,040 R 1,020 100 0 R 106.33 R 10,633.00 -R 100.00 -R 102,000.00
2003/12/04 R 1,045 38.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2003/12/05 R 1,080 39.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2003/12/08 R 1,125 41.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2003/12/09 R 1,138 42.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2003/12/10 R 1,139 42.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2003/12/11 R 1,147 42.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2003/12/12 R 1,192 43.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2003/12/15 R 1,237 47.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2003/12/17 R 1,245 47.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
18/'12/2003 R 1,206 48.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2003/12/19 R 1,212 50.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2003/12/22 R 1,247 50.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2003/12/23 R 1,209 50.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2003/12/24 R 1,254 54.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2003/12/29 R 1,209 54.5% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2003/12/30 R 1,192 53.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2003/12/31 R 1,225 52.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/01/02 R 1,246 51.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/01/05 R 1,205 50.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/01/06 R 1,172 47.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/01/07 R 1,185 47.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/01/08 R 1,230 49.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/01/09 R 1,275 53.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/01/12 R 1,283 51.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/01/13 R 1,328 54.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00  
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2004/01/14 R 1,373 60.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/01/15 R 1,380 55.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/01/16 R 1,425 54.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/01/19 R 1,380 52.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/01/20 R 1,335 53.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/01/21 R 1,400 51.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/01/22 R 1,396 49.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/01/23 R 1,408 47.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/01/26 R 1,453 48.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/01/27 R 1,494 46.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/01/28 R 1,500 44.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/01/29 R 1,492 45.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/01/30 R 1,533 45.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/02/02 R 1,578 46.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/02/03 R 1,543 44.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/02/04 R 1,500 46.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/02/05 R 1,536 46.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/02/06 R 1,491 47.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/02/09 R 1,446 48.5% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/02/10 R 1,423 46.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/02/11 R 1,378 45.5% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/02/12 R 1,333 47.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/02/13 R 1,342 47.5% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/02/16 R 1,387 48.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/02/17 R 1,380 46.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/02/18 R 1,364 46.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/02/19 R 1,372 45.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/02/20 R 1,368 43.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/02/23 R 1,323 43.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/02/24 R 1,278 45.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/02/25 R 1,287 45.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/02/26 R 1,270 43.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/02/27 R 1,225 42.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/03/01 R 1,212 41.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/03/02 R 1,167 39.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/03/03 R 1,125 40.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/03/04 R 1,160 41.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/03/05 R 1,166 42.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/03/08 R 1,121 45.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/03/09 R 1,076 45.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/03/10 R 1,100 44.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/03/11 R 1,145 45.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/03/12 R 1,132 45.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/03/15 R 1,135 43.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/03/16 R 1,207 44.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/03/17 R 1,176 44.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/03/18 R 1,206 44.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/03/19 R 1,203 44.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/03/23 R 1,158 48.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/03/24 R 1,113 46.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/03/25 R 1,100 44.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/03/26 R 1,103 43.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/03/29 R 1,086 42.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/03/30 R 1,091 41.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/03/31 R 1,136 40.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/04/01 R 1,164 41.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/04/02 R 1,187 42.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/04/05 R 1,223 42.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/04/06 R 1,178 42.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/04/07 R 1,165 41.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/04/08 R 1,171 41.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/04/13 R 1,142 41.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/04/15 R 1,167 41.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/04/16 R 1,122 40.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/04/19 R 1,097 39.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/04/20 R 1,100 38.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/04/21 R 1,134 39.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/04/22 R 1,151 39.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/04/23 R 1,129 37.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/04/26 R 1,119 36.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/04/28 R 1,150 38.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/04/29 R 1,150 36.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/04/30 R 1,140 35.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/05/03 R 1,139 34.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00  
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2004/05/04 R 1,116 33.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/05/05 R 1,088 33.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/05/06 R 1,057 32.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/05/07 R 1,064 34.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/05/10 R 1,090 34.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/05/11 R 1,069 33.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/05/12 R 1,074 33.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/05/13 R 1,081 32.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/05/14 R 1,079 32.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/05/17 R 1,048 33.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/05/18 R 1,063 33.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/05/19 R 1,054 32.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/05/20 R 1,062 32.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/05/21 R 1,055 32.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/05/24 R 1,064 30.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/05/25 R 1,076 30.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/05/26 R 1,069 28.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/05/27 R 1,057 26.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/05/28 R 1,052 26.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/05/31 R 1,055 28.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/06/01 R 1,073 29.5% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/06/02 R 1,086 31.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/06/03 R 1,073 30.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/06/04 R 1,071 30.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/06/07 R 1,056 30.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/06/08 R 1,059 28.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/06/09 R 1,051 26.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/06/10 R 1,044 25.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/06/11 R 1,016 28.0% R 1,040 R 1,016 100 0 R 10.98 R 1,098.00 -R 100.00 -R 101,600.00
2004/06/14 R 1,017 30.0% R 1,040 R 1,017 100 0 R 9.96 R 996.00 -R 100.00 -R 101,700.00
2004/06/15 R 997 33.0% R 1,040 R 997 100 0 R 5.33 R 533.00 -R 100.00 -R 99,700.00
2004/06/17 R 962 37.0% R 1,040 R 962 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 96,200.00
2004/06/18 R 975 39.0% R 1,040 R 975 100 0 R 1.63 R 163.00 -R 100.00 -R 97,500.00
2004/06/21 R 930 41.0% R 1,040 R 930 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 93,000.00
2004/06/22 R 927 45.0% R 1,040 R 927 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 92,700.00
2004/06/23 R 906 45.0% R 1,040 R 906 13700 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 12,412,200.00
-R 1,890,528.00 -R 36,200.00 -R 23,701,200.00
Total procurement price -R 23,701,200.00
Total option cost -R 1,890,528.00
Additional broking fees -R 36,200.00
Net procurement cost -R 25,627,928.00
Average Price Index R 1,086.16
Maximum price strategy R 1,021.03
Tonnages hedged 25100  
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2004/07/08 R 1,045 26.0% R 1,040 -R 108.12 -R 2,594,880.00 -R 24,000.00
2004/07/09 R 1,032 26.0% R 1,040 R 1,032 100 0 R 100.84 R 10,084.00 -R 100.00 -R 103,200.00
2004/07/12 R 1,019 26.0% R 1,040 R 1,019 100 0 R 93.53 R 9,353.00 -R 100.00 -R 101,900.00
2004/07/13 R 1,022 26.5% R 1,040 R 1,022 100 0 R 96.91 R 9,691.00 -R 100.00 -R 102,200.00
2004/07/14 R 1,016 26.5% R 1,040 R 1,016 100 0 R 93.65 R 9,365.00 -R 100.00 -R 101,600.00
2004/07/15 R 999 26.5% R 1,040 R 999 100 0 R 84.96 R 8,496.00 -R 100.00 -R 99,900.00
2004/07/16 R 989 26.5% R 1,040 R 989 100 0 R 80.01 R 8,001.00 -R 100.00 -R 98,900.00
2004/07/19 R 946 26.5% R 1,040 R 946 100 0 R 60.72 R 6,072.00 -R 100.00 -R 94,600.00
2004/07/20 R 930 26.5% R 1,040 R 930 100 0 R 54.33 R 5,433.00 -R 100.00 -R 93,000.00
2004/07/21 R 964 29.0% R 1,040 R 964 100 0 R 77.09 R 7,709.00 -R 100.00 -R 96,400.00
2004/07/22 R 965 30.0% R 1,040 R 965 100 0 R 81.05 R 8,105.00 -R 100.00 -R 96,500.00
2004/07/23 R 995 31.0% R 1,040 R 995 100 0 R 98.93 R 9,893.00 -R 100.00 -R 99,500.00
2004/07/26 R 987 32.0% R 1,040 R 987 100 0 R 98.21 R 9,821.00 -R 100.00 -R 98,700.00
2004/07/27 R 1,032 32.0% R 1,040 R 1,032 100 0 R 121.50 R 12,150.00 -R 100.00 -R 103,200.00
2004/07/28 R 1,044 32.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/07/29 R 1,036 34.0% R 1,040 R 1,036 100 0 R 131.10 R 13,110.00 -R 100.00 -R 103,600.00
2004/07/30 R 1,023 34.0% R 1,040 R 1,023 100 0 R 123.73 R 12,373.00 -R 100.00 -R 102,300.00
2004/08/02 R 1,013 36.0% R 1,040 R 1,013 100 0 R 125.36 R 12,536.00 -R 100.00 -R 101,300.00
2004/08/03 R 1,058 36.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/08/04 R 1,059 36.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/08/05 R 1,049 37.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/08/06 R 1,069 37.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/08/10 R 1,048 38.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/08/11 R 1,070 37.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/08/12 R 1,042 37.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/08/13 R 1,075 38.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/08/16 R 1,053 38.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/08/17 R 1,060 38.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/08/18 R 1,060 38.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/08/19 R 1,045 38.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/08/20 R 1,055 38.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/08/23 R 1,081 39.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/08/24 R 1,110 39.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/08/25 R 1,100 39.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/08/26 R 1,093 39.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/08/27 R 1,095 40.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/08/30 R 1,095 40.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/08/31 R 1,078 42.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/09/01 R 1,033 41.0% R 1,040 R 1,033 100 0 R 148.08 R 14,808.00 -R 100.00 -R 103,300.00
2004/09/02 R 1,025 41.0% R 1,040 R 1,025 100 0 R 143.33 R 14,333.00 -R 100.00 -R 102,500.00
2004/09/03 R 1,024 41.0% R 1,040 R 1,024 100 0 R 142.52 R 14,252.00 -R 100.00 -R 102,400.00
2004/09/06 R 1,038 41.0% R 1,040 R 1,038 100 0 R 149.65 R 14,965.00 -R 100.00 -R 103,800.00
2004/09/07 R 1,031 41.0% R 1,040 R 1,031 100 0 R 145.52 R 14,552.00 -R 100.00 -R 103,100.00
2004/09/08 R 1,050 41.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/09/09 R 1,052 41.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/09/10 R 1,057 40.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/09/13 R 1,034 39.0% R 1,040 R 1,034 100 0 R 138.39 R 13,839.00 -R 100.00 -R 103,400.00
2004/09/14 R 1,022 39.0% R 1,040 R 1,022 100 0 R 131.49 R 13,149.00 -R 100.00 -R 102,200.00
2004/09/15 R 1,020 40.0% R 1,040 R 1,020 100 0 R 133.70 R 13,370.00 -R 100.00 -R 102,000.00
2004/09/16 R 1,035 41.0% R 1,040 R 1,035 100 0 R 145.35 R 14,535.00 -R 100.00 -R 103,500.00
2004/09/17 R 1,023 41.0% R 1,040 R 1,023 100 0 R 138.38 R 13,838.00 -R 100.00 -R 102,300.00
2004/09/20 R 1,011 41.0% R 1,040 R 1,011 100 0 R 131.04 R 13,104.00 -R 100.00 -R 101,100.00
2004/09/21 R 1,003 41.0% R 1,040 R 1,003 100 0 R 126.51 R 12,651.00 -R 100.00 -R 100,300.00
2004/09/22 R 1,023 41.0% R 1,040 R 1,023 100 0 R 137.07 R 13,707.00 -R 100.00 -R 102,300.00
2004/09/23 R 1,030 42.0% R 1,040 R 1,030 100 0 R 144.21 R 14,421.00 -R 100.00 -R 103,000.00
2004/09/27 R 1,030 42.0% R 1,040 R 1,030 100 0 R 143.13 R 14,313.00 -R 100.00 -R 103,000.00
2004/09/28 R 1,025 42.0% R 1,040 R 1,025 100 0 R 140.06 R 14,006.00 -R 100.00 -R 102,500.00
2004/09/29 R 1,030 42.0% R 1,040 R 1,030 100 0 R 142.58 R 14,258.00 -R 100.00 -R 103,000.00
2004/09/30 R 1,020 42.0% R 1,040 R 1,020 100 0 R 136.76 R 13,676.00 -R 100.00 -R 102,000.00
2004/10/01 R 1,022 42.0% R 1,040 R 1,022 100 0 R 137.59 R 13,759.00 -R 100.00 -R 102,200.00
2004/10/04 R 1,023 41.0% R 1,040 R 1,023 100 0 R 133.89 R 13,389.00 -R 100.00 -R 102,300.00
2004/10/05 R 1,010 41.0% R 1,040 R 1,010 100 0 R 126.56 R 12,656.00 -R 100.00 -R 101,000.00
2004/10/06 R 965 41.0% R 1,040 R 965 100 0 R 103.38 R 10,338.00 -R 100.00 -R 96,500.00
2004/10/07 R 978 41.0% R 1,040 R 978 100 0 R 109.50 R 10,950.00 -R 100.00 -R 97,800.00
2004/10/08 R 967 41.0% R 1,040 R 967 100 0 R 103.84 R 10,384.00 -R 100.00 -R 96,700.00
2004/10/11 R 938 42.0% R 1,040 R 938 100 0 R 92.65 R 9,265.00 -R 100.00 -R 93,800.00
2004/10/12 R 953 43.0% R 1,040 R 953 100 0 R 102.48 R 10,248.00 -R 100.00 -R 95,300.00
2004/10/13 R 967 42.0% R 1,040 R 967 100 0 R 105.75 R 10,575.00 -R 100.00 -R 96,700.00
2004/10/14 R 956 43.0% R 1,040 R 956 100 0 R 103.37 R 10,337.00 -R 100.00 -R 95,600.00
2004/10/15 R 945 42.0% R 1,040 R 945 100 0 R 94.81 R 9,481.00 -R 100.00 -R 94,500.00
2004/10/18 R 965 42.0% R 1,040 R 965 100 0 R 103.44 R 10,344.00 -R 100.00 -R 96,500.00
2004/10/19 R 957 41.0% R 1,040 R 957 100 0 R 96.22 R 9,622.00 -R 100.00 -R 95,700.00
2004/10/20 R 965 41.0% R 1,040 R 965 100 0 R 99.75 R 9,975.00 -R 100.00 -R 96,500.00
2004/10/21 R 983 41.0% R 1,040 R 983 100 0 R 108.29 R 10,829.00 -R 100.00 -R 98,300.00
2004/10/22 R 982 41.0% R 1,040 R 982 100 0 R 107.52 R 10,752.00 -R 100.00 -R 98,200.00
2004/10/25 R 1,027 42.5% R 1,040 R 1,027 100 0 R 135.28 R 13,528.00 -R 100.00 -R 102,700.00
2004/10/26 R 1,065 43.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/10/27 R 1,042 43.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00  
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2004/10/28 R 1,048 43.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/10/29 R 1,093 44.5% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/11/01 R 1,100 44.5% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/11/02 R 1,088 44.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/11/03 R 1,059 45.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/11/04 R 1,050 46.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/11/05 R 1,040 46.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/11/08 R 995 46.0% R 1,040 R 995 100 0 R 125.03 R 12,503.00 -R 100.00 -R 99,500.00
2004/11/09 R 998 47.0% R 1,040 R 998 100 0 R 129.41 R 12,941.00 -R 100.00 -R 99,800.00
2004/11/10 R 983 47.0% R 1,040 R 983 100 0 R 121.27 R 12,127.00 -R 100.00 -R 98,300.00
2004/11/11 R 1,007 46.0% R 1,040 R 1,007 100 0 R 130.43 R 13,043.00 -R 100.00 -R 100,700.00
2004/11/12 R 997 46.0% R 1,040 R 997 100 0 R 124.80 R 12,480.00 -R 100.00 -R 99,700.00
2004/11/15 R 1,042 49.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/11/16 R 1,081 48.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/11/17 R 1,050 47.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/11/18 R 1,050 47.5% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/11/19 R 1,062 48.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/11/22 R 1,090 49.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/11/23 R 1,087 49.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/11/24 R 1,072 49.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/11/25 R 1,075 49.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/11/26 R 1,054 49.0% R 1,040 R 1,040 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00
2004/11/29 R 1,009 51.0% R 1,040 R 1,009 100 0 R 140.62 R 14,062.00 -R 100.00 -R 100,900.00
2004/11/30 R 964 54.0% R 1,040 R 964 100 0 R 125.45 R 12,545.00 -R 100.00 -R 96,400.00
2004/12/01 R 944 52.0% R 1,040 R 944 100 0 R 109.54 R 10,954.00 -R 100.00 -R 94,400.00
2004/12/02 R 940 51.0% R 1,040 R 940 100 0 R 104.49 R 10,449.00 -R 100.00 -R 94,000.00
2004/12/03 R 927 49.0% R 1,040 R 927 100 0 R 92.67 R 9,267.00 -R 100.00 -R 92,700.00
2004/12/06 R 882 50.0% R 1,040 R 882 100 0 R 75.34 R 7,534.00 -R 100.00 -R 88,200.00
2004/12/07 R 902 50.0% R 1,040 R 902 100 0 R 83.18 R 8,318.00 -R 100.00 -R 90,200.00
2004/12/08 R 929 51.0% R 1,040 R 929 100 0 R 97.30 R 9,730.00 -R 100.00 -R 92,900.00
2004/12/09 R 904 52.0% R 1,040 R 904 100 0 R 88.56 R 8,856.00 -R 100.00 -R 90,400.00
2004/12/10 R 901 53.0% R 1,040 R 901 100 0 R 89.51 R 8,951.00 -R 100.00 -R 90,100.00
2004/12/13 R 917 54.0% R 1,040 R 917 100 0 R 98.08 R 9,808.00 -R 100.00 -R 91,700.00
2004/12/14 R 900 53.0% R 1,040 R 900 100 0 R 87.67 R 8,767.00 -R 100.00 -R 90,000.00
2004/12/15 R 906 50.5% R 1,040 R 906 100 0 R 83.48 R 8,348.00 -R 100.00 -R 90,600.00
2004/12/17 R 897 48.5% R 1,040 R 897 100 0 R 74.07 R 7,407.00 -R 100.00 -R 89,700.00
2004/12/20 R 852 49.0% R 1,040 R 852 100 0 R 57.53 R 5,753.00 -R 100.00 -R 85,200.00
2004/12/21 R 807 50.0% R 1,040 R 807 100 0 R 44.93 R 4,493.00 -R 100.00 -R 80,700.00
2004/12/22 R 804 50.0% R 1,040 R 804 100 0 R 43.79 R 4,379.00 -R 100.00 -R 80,400.00
2004/12/23 R 795 51.5% R 1,040 R 795 100 0 R 43.81 R 4,381.00 -R 100.00 -R 79,500.00
2004/12/24 R 798 51.5% R 1,040 R 798 100 0 R 44.41 R 4,441.00 -R 100.00 -R 79,800.00
2004/12/28 R 784 51.0% R 1,040 R 784 100 0 R 38.49 R 3,849.00 -R 100.00 -R 78,400.00
2004/12/29 R 767 50.0% R 1,040 R 767 100 0 R 32.18 R 3,218.00 -R 100.00 -R 76,700.00
2004/12/30 R 812 52.0% R 1,040 R 812 100 0 R 47.86 R 4,786.00 -R 100.00 -R 81,200.00
2004/12/31 R 816 52.0% R 1,040 R 816 100 0 R 48.80 R 4,880.00 -R 100.00 -R 81,600.00
2005/01/03 R 861 54.0% R 1,040 R 861 100 0 R 67.41 R 6,741.00 -R 100.00 -R 86,100.00
2005/01/04 R 855 54.0% R 1,040 R 855 100 0 R 64.85 R 6,485.00 -R 100.00 -R 85,500.00
2005/01/05 R 880 53.0% R 1,040 R 880 100 0 R 71.66 R 7,166.00 -R 100.00 -R 88,000.00
2005/01/06 R 845 53.0% R 1,040 R 845 100 0 R 58.46 R 5,846.00 -R 100.00 -R 84,500.00
2005/01/07 R 814 53.0% R 1,040 R 814 100 0 R 48.03 R 4,803.00 -R 100.00 -R 81,400.00
2005/01/10 R 769 55.0% R 1,040 R 769 100 0 R 37.95 R 3,795.00 -R 100.00 -R 76,900.00
2005/01/11 R 725 53.0% R 1,040 R 725 100 0 R 24.48 R 2,448.00 -R 100.00 -R 72,500.00
2005/01/12 R 742 51.0% R 1,040 R 742 100 0 R 24.94 R 2,494.00 -R 100.00 -R 74,200.00
2005/01/13 R 698 50.0% R 1,040 R 698 100 0 R 15.70 R 1,570.00 -R 100.00 -R 69,800.00
2005/01/14 R 709 51.0% R 1,040 R 709 100 0 R 18.40 R 1,840.00 -R 100.00 -R 70,900.00
2005/01/17 R 724 49.0% R 1,040 R 724 100 0 R 17.98 R 1,798.00 -R 100.00 -R 72,400.00
2005/01/18 R 697 48.0% R 1,040 R 697 100 0 R 12.71 R 1,271.00 -R 100.00 -R 69,700.00
2005/01/19 R 659 47.0% R 1,040 R 659 100 0 R 7.54 R 754.00 -R 100.00 -R 65,900.00
2005/01/20 R 678 47.5% R 1,040 R 678 100 0 R 9.70 R 970.00 -R 100.00 -R 67,800.00
2005/01/21 R 687 46.5% R 1,040 R 687 100 0 R 9.73 R 973.00 -R 100.00 -R 68,700.00
2005/01/24 R 648 45.0% R 1,040 R 648 100 0 R 4.93 R 493.00 -R 100.00 -R 64,800.00
2005/01/25 R 603 44.0% R 1,040 R 603 100 0 R 2.21 R 221.00 -R 100.00 -R 60,300.00
2005/01/26 R 580 45.0% R 1,040 R 580 100 0 R 1.69 R 169.00 -R 100.00 -R 58,000.00
2005/01/27 R 614 47.0% R 1,040 R 614 100 0 R 3.67 R 367.00 -R 100.00 -R 61,400.00
2005/01/28 R 615 48.5% R 1,040 R 615 100 0 R 4.31 R 431.00 -R 100.00 -R 61,500.00
2005/01/31 R 625 48.0% R 1,040 R 625 100 0 R 4.45 R 445.00 -R 100.00 -R 62,500.00
2005/02/01 R 621 48.5% R 1,040 R 621 100 0 R 4.36 R 436.00 -R 100.00 -R 62,100.00
2005/02/02 R 624 48.5% R 1,040 R 624 100 0 R 4.46 R 446.00 -R 100.00 -R 62,400.00
2005/02/03 R 638 47.5% R 1,040 R 638 100 0 R 4.78 R 478.00 -R 100.00 -R 63,800.00
2005/02/04 R 662 47.5% R 1,040 R 662 100 0 R 6.44 R 644.00 -R 100.00 -R 66,200.00
2005/02/07 R 672 46.5% R 1,040 R 672 100 0 R 6.32 R 632.00 -R 100.00 -R 67,200.00
2005/02/08 R 627 49.0% R 1,040 R 627 100 0 R 4.38 R 438.00 -R 100.00 -R 62,700.00
2005/02/09 R 601 50.0% R 1,040 R 601 100 0 R 3.30 R 330.00 -R 100.00 -R 60,100.00
2005/02/10 R 598 50.0% R 1,040 R 598 100 0 R 3.09 R 309.00 -R 100.00 -R 59,800.00
2005/02/11 R 605 48.0% R 1,040 R 605 100 0 R 2.67 R 267.00 -R 100.00 -R 60,500.00
2005/02/14 R 601 47.0% R 1,040 R 601 100 0 R 2.06 R 206.00 -R 100.00 -R 60,100.00
2005/02/15 R 595 45.0% R 1,040 R 595 100 0 R 1.36 R 136.00 -R 100.00 -R 59,500.00
2005/02/16 R 580 44.0% R 1,040 R 580 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 58,000.00
2005/02/17 R 579 44.0% R 1,040 R 579 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 57,900.00
2005/02/18 R 555 44.0% R 1,040 R 555 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 55,500.00
2005/02/21 R 536 43.0% R 1,040 R 536 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 53,600.00
2005/02/22 R 548 41.0% R 1,040 R 548 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 54,800.00
2005/02/23 R 542 39.0% R 1,040 R 542 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 54,200.00
2005/02/24 R 531 37.0% R 1,040 R 531 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 53,100.00  
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2005/02/25 R 522 35.0% R 1,040 R 522 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 52,200.00
2005/02/28 R 548 36.0% R 1,040 R 548 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 54,800.00
2005/03/01 R 538 35.0% R 1,040 R 538 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 53,800.00
2005/03/02 R 554 34.0% R 1,040 R 554 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 55,400.00
2005/03/03 R 561 36.0% R 1,040 R 561 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 56,100.00
2005/03/04 R 554 37.5% R 1,040 R 554 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 55,400.00
2005/03/07 R 544 36.5% R 1,040 R 544 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 54,400.00
2005/03/08 R 532 36.5% R 1,040 R 532 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 53,200.00
2005/03/09 R 537 37.5% R 1,040 R 537 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 53,700.00
2005/03/10 R 553 39.5% R 1,040 R 553 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 55,300.00
2005/03/11 R 581 41.5% R 1,040 R 581 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 58,100.00
2005/03/14 R 586 43.0% R 1,040 R 586 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 58,600.00
2005/03/15 R 594 43.0% R 1,040 R 594 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 59,400.00
2005/03/16 R 597 43.0% R 1,040 R 597 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 59,700.00
2005/03/17 R 587 42.0% R 1,040 R 587 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 58,700.00
2005/03/18 R 577 40.0% R 1,040 R 577 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 57,700.00
2005/03/22 R 559 40.0% R 1,040 R 559 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 55,900.00
2005/03/23 R 576 41.0% R 1,040 R 576 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 57,600.00
2005/03/24 R 570 39.5% R 1,040 R 570 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 57,000.00
2005/03/29 R 594 38.5% R 1,040 R 594 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 59,400.00
2005/03/30 R 592 38.0% R 1,040 R 592 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 59,200.00
2005/03/31 R 585 39.0% R 1,040 R 585 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 58,500.00
2005/04/01 R 580 39.0% R 1,040 R 580 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 58,000.00
2005/04/04 R 578 39.0% R 1,040 R 578 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 57,800.00
2005/04/05 R 587 40.0% R 1,040 R 587 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 58,700.00
2005/04/06 R 573 39.0% R 1,040 R 573 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 57,300.00
2005/04/07 R 583 39.0% R 1,040 R 583 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 58,300.00
2005/04/08 R 580 38.0% R 1,040 R 580 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 58,000.00
2005/04/11 R 570 37.0% R 1,040 R 570 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 57,000.00
2005/04/12 R 567 37.0% R 1,040 R 567 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 56,700.00
2005/04/13 R 563 38.0% R 1,040 R 563 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 56,300.00
2005/04/14 R 560 39.0% R 1,040 R 560 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 56,000.00
2005/04/15 R 570 39.0% R 1,040 R 570 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 57,000.00
2005/04/18 R 561 39.0% R 1,040 R 561 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 56,100.00
2005/04/19 R 556 38.0% R 1,040 R 556 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 55,600.00
2005/04/20 R 544 40.0% R 1,040 R 544 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 54,400.00
2005/04/21 R 543 39.0% R 1,040 R 543 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 54,300.00
2005/04/22 R 550 38.0% R 1,040 R 550 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 55,000.00
2005/04/25 R 550 37.0% R 1,040 R 550 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 55,000.00
2005/04/26 R 555 36.0% R 1,040 R 555 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 55,500.00
2005/04/28 R 558 35.0% R 1,040 R 558 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 55,800.00
2005/04/29 R 558 35.0% R 1,040 R 558 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 55,800.00
2005/05/03 R 564 35.0% R 1,040 R 564 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 56,400.00
2005/05/04 R 560 35.5% R 1,040 R 560 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 56,000.00
2005/05/05 R 551 34.0% R 1,040 R 551 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 55,100.00
2005/05/06 R 552 33.0% R 1,040 R 552 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 55,200.00
2005/05/09 R 561 33.0% R 1,040 R 561 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 56,100.00
2005/05/10 R 568 34.0% R 1,040 R 568 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 56,800.00
2005/05/11 R 567 34.0% R 1,040 R 567 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 56,700.00
2005/05/12 R 575 35.0% R 1,040 R 575 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 57,500.00
2005/05/13 R 579 35.0% R 1,040 R 579 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 57,900.00
2005/05/16 R 587 35.0% R 1,040 R 587 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 58,700.00
2005/05/17 R 586 35.0% R 1,040 R 586 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 58,600.00
2005/05/18 R 578 35.0% R 1,040 R 578 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 57,800.00
2005/05/19 R 564 36.0% R 1,040 R 564 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 56,400.00
2005/05/20 R 556 36.0% R 1,040 R 556 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 55,600.00
2005/05/23 R 577 36.0% R 1,040 R 577 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 57,700.00
2005/05/24 R 585 36.0% R 1,040 R 585 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 58,500.00
2005/05/25 R 579 36.0% R 1,040 R 579 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 57,900.00
2005/05/26 R 571 36.0% R 1,040 R 571 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 57,100.00
2005/05/27 R 588 37.0% R 1,040 R 588 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 58,800.00
2005/05/30 R 581 38.0% R 1,040 R 581 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 58,100.00
2005/05/31 R 593 39.0% R 1,040 R 593 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 59,300.00
2005/06/01 R 602 39.0% R 1,040 R 602 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 60,200.00
2005/06/02 R 603 41.0% R 1,040 R 603 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 60,300.00
2005/06/03 R 592 42.0% R 1,040 R 592 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 59,200.00
2005/06/06 R 591 42.0% R 1,040 R 591 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 59,100.00
2005/06/07 R 585 42.0% R 1,040 R 585 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 58,500.00
2005/06/08 R 591 42.0% R 1,040 R 591 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 59,100.00
2005/06/09 R 594 42.0% R 1,040 R 594 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 59,400.00
2005/06/10 R 588 41.0% R 1,040 R 588 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 58,800.00
2005/06/13 R 595 40.0% R 1,040 R 595 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 59,500.00
2005/06/14 R 594 39.0% R 1,040 R 594 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 59,400.00
2005/06/15 R 594 40.0% R 1,040 R 594 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 59,400.00
2005/06/17 R 588 39.0% R 1,040 R 588 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 58,800.00
2005/06/20 R 581 39.0% R 1,040 R 581 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 58,100.00
2005/06/21 R 582 39.0% R 1,040 R 582 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 58,200.00
2005/06/22 R 579 39.0% R 1,040 R 579 100 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 57,900.00
2005/06/23 R 569 39.0% R 1,040 R 569 4400 0 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 2,503,600.00
-R 1,710,807.00 -R 35,100.00 -R 17,155,200.00  
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Total procurement price -R 17,155,200.00
Total option cost -R 1,710,807.00
Additional broking fees -R 35,100.00
Net procurement cost -R 18,901,107.00
Average Price Index R 810.74
Maximum price strategy R 787.55
Tonnages hedged 24,000
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2005/03/29 R 671 35.0% R 680 -R 99.75 -R 3,082,275.00 -R 30,900.00 R 0.00
2005/03/30 R 671 35.0% R 680 R 671 100 0 R 99.63 R 9,963.00 -R 100.00 -R 67,100.00
2005/03/31 R 674 35.0% R 680 R 674 100 0 R 101.22 R 10,122.00 -R 100.00 -R 67,400.00
2005/04/01 R 674 35.0% R 680 R 674 100 0 R 101.10 R 10,110.00 -R 100.00 -R 67,400.00
2005/04/04 R 674 35.0% R 680 R 674 100 0 R 100.76 R 10,076.00 -R 100.00 -R 67,400.00
2005/04/05 R 674 35.0% R 680 R 674 100 0 R 100.64 R 10,064.00 -R 100.00 -R 67,400.00
2005/04/06 R 698 35.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/04/07 R 698 35.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/04/08 R 698 35.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/04/11 R 692 35.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/04/12 R 693 35.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/04/13 R 689 35.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/04/14 R 685 35.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/04/15 R 695 35.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/04/18 R 687 35.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/04/19 R 683 35.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/04/20 R 675 38.0% R 680 R 675 100 0 R 108.08 R 10,808.00 -R 100.00 -R 67,500.00
2005/04/21 R 675 38.0% R 680 R 675 100 0 R 107.96 R 10,796.00 -R 100.00 -R 67,500.00
2005/04/22 R 678 38.0% R 680 R 678 100 0 R 109.56 R 10,956.00 -R 100.00 -R 67,800.00
2005/04/25 R 677 38.0% R 680 R 677 100 0 R 108.60 R 10,860.00 -R 100.00 -R 67,700.00
2005/04/26 R 683 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/04/28 R 683 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/04/29 R 683 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/03 R 683 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/04 R 683 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/05 R 682 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/06 R 682 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/09 R 683 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/10 R 690 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/11 R 690 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/12 R 675 38.0% R 680 R 675 100 0 R 105.25 R 10,525.00 -R 100.00 -R 67,500.00
2005/05/13 R 690 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/16 R 695 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/17 R 695 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/18 R 695 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/19 R 695 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/20 R 680 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/23 R 695 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/24 R 695 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/25 R 694 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/26 R 694 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/27 R 705 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/30 R 705 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/05/31 R 719 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/01 R 719 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/02 R 717 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/03 R 704 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/06 R 704 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/07 R 700 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/08 R 700 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/09 R 715 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/10 R 715 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/13 R 715 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/14 R 715 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/15 R 707 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/17 R 707 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/20 R 707 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/21 R 715 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/22 R 714 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/23 R 705 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/24 R 705 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/27 R 710 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/28 R 699 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/29 R 700 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/06/30 R 703 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/01 R 703 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/04 R 707 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/05 R 720 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/06 R 728 35.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/07 R 718 35.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/08 R 718 35.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/11 R 718 35.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/12 R 717 35.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00  
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2005/07/13 R 716 35.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/14 R 732 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/15 R 725 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/18 R 733 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/19 R 750 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/20 R 733 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/21 R 733 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/22 R 733 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/25 R 733 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/26 R 741 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/27 R 745 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/28 R 745 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/07/29 R 759 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/01 R 759 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/02 R 759 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/03 R 757 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/04 R 752 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/05 R 749 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/08 R 749 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/10 R 749 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/11 R 749 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/12 R 750 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/15 R 750 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/16 R 752 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/17 R 764 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/18 R 762 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/19 R 762 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/22 R 775 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/23 R 780 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/24 R 796 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/25 R 790 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/26 R 797 36.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/29 R 792 36.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/30 R 797 36.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/08/31 R 803 38.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/01 R 815 40.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/02 R 805 41.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/05 R 797 43.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/06 R 822 44.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/07 R 825 47.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/08 R 839 48.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/09 R 860 48.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/12 R 882 49.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/13 R 839 47.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/14 R 860 49.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/15 R 842 49.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/16 R 849 49.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/19 R 877 49.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/20 R 875 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/21 R 864 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/22 R 852 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/23 R 866 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/26 R 858 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/27 R 866 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/28 R 869 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/29 R 867 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/09/30 R 877 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/03 R 904 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/04 R 893 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/05 R 893 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/06 R 896 49.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/07 R 897 49.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/10 R 870 49.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/11 R 851 48.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/12 R 856 47.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/13 R 875 47.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/14 R 839 47.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/17 R 846 47.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/18 R 868 47.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/19 R 874 47.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/20 R 880 48.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/21 R 890 48.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/24 R 900 48.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/25 R 880 48.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/26 R 880 48.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/27 R 875 48.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/28 R 860 48.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/10/31 R 880 48.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/01 R 862 48.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/02 R 862 48.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/03 R 856 48.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00  
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2005/11/04 R 867 48.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/07 R 886 48.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/08 R 890 47.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/09 R 894 47.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/10 R 898 44.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/11 R 905 44.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/14 R 950 44.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/15 R 983 44.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/16 R 971 46.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/17 R 979 46.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/18 R 969 46.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/21 R 960 46.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/22 R 1,005 52.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/23 R 997 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/24 R 956 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/25 R 959 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/28 R 988 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/29 R 970 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/11/30 R 980 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/01 R 990 49.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/02 R 998 49.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/05 R 1,023 49.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/06 R 1,022 49.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/07 R 1,052 49.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/08 R 1,067 48.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/09 R 1,070 45.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/12 R 1,115 47.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/13 R 1,135 45.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/14 R 1,127 45.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/15 R 1,128 45.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/19 R 1,173 47.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/20 R 1,128 47.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/21 R 1,120 47.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/22 R 1,120 47.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/23 R 1,150 48.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/27 R 1,195 49.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/28 R 1,154 51.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/29 R 1,140 53.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2005/12/30 R 1,095 53.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/03 R 1,050 56.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/04 R 1,079 56.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/05 R 1,065 55.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/06 R 1,110 54.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/09 R 1,144 50.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/10 R 1,151 47.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/11 R 1,141 44.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/12 R 1,096 44.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/13 R 1,078 45.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/16 R 1,081 45.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/17 R 1,123 45.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/18 R 1,116 43.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/19 R 1,119 42.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/20 R 1,141 40.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/23 R 1,096 39.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/24 R 1,088 37.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/25 R 1,110 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/26 R 1,091 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/27 R 1,076 36.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/30 R 1,036 37.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/01/31 R 994 38.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/01 R 962 39.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/02 R 1,006 40.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/03 R 1,007 40.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/06 R 962 40.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/07 R 933 41.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/08 R 977 41.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/09 R 984 41.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/10 R 985 40.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/13 R 988 38.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/14 R 1,006 37.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/15 R 1,006 35.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/16 R 976 35.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/17 R 992 36.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/20 R 987 35.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/21 R 978 35.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/22 R 1,022 36.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/23 R 1,019 35.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/24 R 1,045 35.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/27 R 1,090 37.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/02/28 R 1,090 37.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/02 R 1,092 37.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00  
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2006/03/03 R 1,109 36.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/06 R 1,132 36.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/07 R 1,124 35.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/08 R 1,096 35.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/09 R 1,117 34.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/10 R 1,127 33.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/13 R 1,132 33.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/14 R 1,126 33.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/15 R 1,141 32.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/16 R 1,132 30.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/17 R 1,114 30.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/20 R 1,129 29.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/22 R 1,166 30.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/23 R 1,159 31.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/24 R 1,161 30.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/27 R 1,163 28.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/28 R 1,171 27.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/29 R 1,164 28.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/30 R 1,147 29.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/03/31 R 1,146 29.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/04/03 R 1,134 29.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/04/04 R 1,113 28.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/04/05 R 1,120 26.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/04/06 R 1,105 26.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/04/07 R 1,117 24.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/04/10 R 1,122 24.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/04/11 R 1,120 24.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/04/12 R 1,119 24.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/04/13 R 1,106 24.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/04/18 R 1,077 25.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/04/19 R 1,068 25.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/04/20 R 1,080 26.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/04/21 R 1,098 26.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/04/24 R 1,093 26.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/04/25 R 1,087 26.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/04/26 R 1,099 25.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/04/28 R 1,090 25.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/02 R 1,094 24.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/03 R 1,088 24.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/04 R 1,089 24.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/05 R 1,089 24.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/08 R 1,088 24.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/09 R 1,100 23.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/10 R 1,140 23.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/11 R 1,143 23.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/12 R 1,169 24.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/15 R 1,197 27.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/16 R 1,187 25.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/17 R 1,189 24.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/18 R 1,206 24.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/19 R 1,218 25.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/22 R 1,216 25.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/23 R 1,226 25.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/24 R 1,216 24.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/25 R 1,201 25.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/26 R 1,209 25.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/29 R 1,207 23.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/30 R 1,221 22.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/05/31 R 1,233 22.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/06/01 R 1,244 21.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/06/02 R 1,244 21.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/06/05 R 1,266 22.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/06/06 R 1,272 24.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/06/07 R 1,270 23.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/06/08 R 1,290 22.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/06/09 R 1,285 20.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/06/12 R 1,302 24.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/06/13 R 1,335 25.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/06/14 R 1,314 26.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/06/15 R 1,295 23.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/06/19 R 1,287 25.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/06/20 R 1,270 27.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/06/21 R 1,288 28.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/06/22 R 1,320 28.5% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
2006/06/23 R 1,340 29.0% R 680 R 680 0 100 R 0.00 R 0.00 -R 68,000.00
-R 2,977,995.00 -R 31,900.00 -R 21,006,700.00
Total procurement price -R 21,006,700.00
Total option cost -R 2,977,995.00
Additional broking fees -R 31,900.00
Net procurement cost -R 24,016,595.00
Average Price Index R 958.11
Maximum price strategy R 777.24
Tonnages hedged 30,900
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APPENDIX V 
INDEXED STRANGLE STRATEGY 2001 – 2006 
 
2001  
(*The 5-year volatility average is used since no 2001 volatility data exists) 
BROKING NET PREMIUM
DATE JULY FUTURES PRICE VOLATILITY* SHORT PUT STRIKE VOLUME PUTS PUT PREMIUM/TON SHORT CALL STRIKE VOLUME CALLS CALL PREMIUM/TON TOTAL OPTION PREMIUM FEES @ R1/TON RECEIVED
2000/12/27 R 729 45.20% R 440 4,300 R 4.07 R 1,020 4300 R 19.71 R 102,254.00 -R 8,600.00 R 93,654.00
2000/12/28 R 736 45.20% R 440 4,300 R 3.75 R 1,020 4300 R 20.83 R 105,694.00 -R 8,600.00 R 97,094.00
2000/12/29 R 739 45.20% R 440 4,300 R 3.59 R 1,020 4300 R 21.22 R 106,683.00 -R 8,600.00 R 98,083.00
2001/01/02 R 757 45.20% R 440 4,300 R 2.84 R 1,020 4300 R 24.07 R 115,713.00 -R 8,600.00 R 107,113.00
2001/01/03 R 756 45.20% R 440 4,300 R 2.82 R 1,020 4300 R 23.67 R 113,907.00 -R 8,600.00 R 105,307.00
2001/01/04 R 779 45.20% R 440 4,300 R 2.20 R 1,020 4300 R 28.54 R 132,182.00 -R 8,600.00 R 123,582.00
2001/01/05 R 800 45.20% R 440 4,100 R 1.75 R 1,020 4100 R 33.52 R 144,607.00 -R 8,200.00 R 136,407.00
2001/06/22 R 796 R 761,240.00
Tonnages hedged (1 contract/day) 29,900
Average long position (index) R 739.40
Net option premium R 761,240.00
Option premium/ton R 25.46
Net procurement cost R 713.94
 
 
 
 
2002 
(*The 5-year volatility average is used since 2002 volatility is only available from 2 January 
2002) 
BROKING NET PREMIUM
DATE JULY FUTURES PRICE VOLATILITY* SHORT PUT STRIKE VOLUME PUTS PUT PREMIUM/TON SHORT CALL STRIKE VOLUME CALLS CALL PREMIUM/TON TOTAL OPTION PREMIUM FEES @ R1/TON RECEIVED
2001/12/27 R 1,599 45.20% R 960 5,800 R 8.78 R 2,240 5800 R 43.68 R 304,268.00 -R 11,600.00 R 292,668.00
2001/12/28 R 1,554 45.20% R 960 5,800 R 10.55 R 2,240 5800 R 35.66 R 268,018.00 -R 11,600.00 R 256,418.00
2001/12/31 R 1,599 45.20% R 960 5,800 R 8.32 R 2,240 5800 R 42.18 R 292,900.00 -R 11,600.00 R 281,300.00
2002/01/02 R 1,644 45.20% R 960 5,800 R 6.60 R 2,240 5800 R 49.93 R 327,874.00 -R 11,600.00 R 316,274.00
2002/01/03 R 1,689 45.20% R 960 5,800 R 5.30 R 2,240 5800 R 59.08 R 373,404.00 -R 11,600.00 R 361,804.00
2002/01/04 R 1,680 45.20% R 960 6,000 R 5.44 R 2,240 6000 R 56.62 R 372,360.00 -R 12,000.00 R 360,360.00
2002/06/24 R 1,802 R 1,868,824.00
Tonnages hedged (1 contract/day) 35,000
Average long position (index) R 1,254.24
Net option premium R 1,868,824.00
Option premium/ton R 53.39
Net procurement cost R 1,200.85
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2003 
BROKING NET PREMIUM
DATE JULY FUTURES PRICE VOLATILITY SHORT PUT STRIKE VOLUME PUTS PUT PREMIUM/TON SHORT CALL STRIKE VOLUME CALLS CALL PREMIUM/TON TOTAL OPTION PREMIUM FEES @ R1/TON RECEIVED
2002/12/27 R 1,668 30.00% R 1,000 0 R 0.66 R 2,340 5700 R 9.35 R 53,295.00 -R 5,700.00 R 47,595.00
2002/12/30 R 1,640 29.00% R 1,000 0 R 0.59 R 2,340 5700 R 6.12 R 34,884.00 -R 5,700.00 R 29,184.00
2002/12/31 R 1,672 29.00% R 1,000 0 R 0.80 R 2,340 5700 R 7.71 R 43,947.00 -R 5,700.00 R 38,247.00
2003/01/02 R 1,681 28.50% R 1,000 0 R 0.32 R 2,340 5700 R 7.34 R 41,838.00 -R 5,700.00 R 36,138.00
2003/01/03 R 1,663 29.50% R 1,000 0 R 0.50 R 2,340 5900 R 7.52 R 44,368.00 -R 5,900.00 R 38,468.00
2003/06/24 R 866
R 218,332.00 -R 28,700.00 R 189,632.00
Tonnages hedged (1 contract/day) 28,700
Average long position (index) R 1,400.50
Net option premium R 189,632.00
Option premium/ton R 6.61
Net procurement cost R 1,393.89
 
 
 
 
2004 
BROKING NET PREMIUM
DATE JULY FUTURES PRICE VOLATILITY SHORT PUT STRIKE VOLUME PUTS PUT PREMIUM/TON SHORT CALL STRIKE VOLUME CALLS CALL PREMIUM/TON TOTAL OPTION PREMIUM FEES @ R1/TON RECEIVED
2003/12/29 R 1,209.00 54.50% R 720 5,400 R 13.82 R 1,700 5400 R 54.24 R 367,524.00 -R 10,800.00 R 356,724.00
2003/12/30 R 1,192.00 53.00% R 720 5,400 R 13.20 R 1,700 5400 R 46.18 R 320,652.00 -R 10,800.00 R 309,852.00
2003/12/31 R 1,225.00 52.00% R 720 5,400 R 10.34 R 1,700 5400 R 50.72 R 329,724.00 -R 10,800.00 R 318,924.00
2004/01/02 R 1,246.00 51.00% R 720 5,400 R 8.35 R 1,700 5400 R 52.27 R 327,348.00 -R 10,800.00 R 316,548.00
2004/01/05 R 1,205.00 50.00% R 720 5,500 R 9.03 R 1,700 5500 R 39.66 R 267,795.00 -R 11,000.00 R 256,795.00
2004/06/23 R 906.00
R 1,613,043.00 -R 54,200.00 R 1,558,843.00
Tonnages hedged (1 contract/day) 27,100
Average long position (index) R 1,086.16
Net option premium R 1,558,843.00
Option premium/ton R 57.52
Net procurement cost R 1,028.64
 
 
 
 
2005 
BROKING NET PREMIUM
DATE JULY FUTURES PRICE VOLATILITY SHORT PUT STRIKE VOLUME PUTS PUT PREMIUM/TON SHORT CALL STRIKE VOLUME CALLS CALL PREMIUM/TON TOTAL OPTION PREMIUM FEES @ R1/TON RECEIVED
2004/12/28 R 784 51.0% R 480 4,000 R 8.23 R 1,100 4000 R 29.78 R 152,040.00 -R 8,000.00 R 144,040.00
2004/12/29 R 767 50.0% R 480 4,000 R 8.53 R 1,100 4000 R 24.44 R 131,880.00 -R 8,000.00 R 123,880.00
2004/12/30 R 812 52.0% R 480 4,000 R 7.13 R 1,100 4000 R 37.52 R 178,600.00 -R 8,000.00 R 170,600.00
2004/12/31 R 816 52.0% R 480 4,000 R 6.84 R 1,100 4000 R 38.27 R 180,440.00 -R 8,000.00 R 172,440.00
2005/01/03 R 861 54.0% R 480 4,000 R 5.70 R 1,100 4000 R 54.20 R 239,600.00 -R 8,000.00 R 231,600.00
2005/01/04 R 855 54.0% R 480 4,000 R 5.86 R 1,100 4000 R 51.99 R 231,400.00 -R 8,000.00 R 223,400.00
2005/01/05 R 880 53.0% R 480 3,700 R 4.44 R 1,100 3700 R 57.54 R 229,326.00 -R 7,400.00 R 221,926.00
2005/06/23 R 569
R 1,343,286.00 -R 55,400.00 R 1,287,886.00
Tonnages hedged (1 contract/day) 27,700
Average long position (index) R 810.74
Net option premium R 1,287,886.00
Option premium/ton R 46.49
Net procurement cost R 764.25
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2006 
BROKING NET PREMIUM
DATE JULY FUTURES PRICE VOLATILITY SHORT PUT STRIKE VOLUME PUTS PUT PREMIUM/TON SHORT CALL STRIKE VOLUME CALLS CALL PREMIUM/TON TOTAL OPTION PREMIUM FEES @ R1/TON RECEIVED
2005/12/27 R 1,195 49.0% R 720 4,700 R 9.62 R 1,680 4700 R 40.37 R 234,953.00 -R 9,400.00 R 225,553.00
2005/12/28 R 1,154 51.0% R 720 4,700 R 13.72 R 1,680 4700 R 36.51 R 236,081.00 -R 9,400.00 R 226,681.00
2005/12/29 R 1,140 53.0% R 720 4,700 R 16.72 R 1,680 4700 R 37.86 R 256,526.00 -R 9,400.00 R 247,126.00
2005/12/30 R 1,095 53.0% R 720 4,700 R 20.32 R 1,680 4700 R 29.57 R 234,483.00 -R 9,400.00 R 225,083.00
2006/01/03 R 1,050 56.0% R 720 4,700 R 28.28 R 1,680 4700 R 26.72 R 258,500.00 -R 9,400.00 R 249,100.00
2006/01/04 R 1,079 56.0% R 720 4,700 R 24.78 R 1,680 4700 R 31.03 R 262,307.00 -R 9,400.00 R 252,907.00
2006/01/05 R 1,065 55.0% R 720 4,600 R 24.71 R 1,680 4600 R 26.75 R 236,716.00 -R 9,200.00 R 227,516.00
2006/06/23 R 1,340
R 1,719,566.00 -R 65,600.00 R 1,653,966.00
Tonnages hedged (1 contract/day) 32,800
Average long position (index) R 958.11
Net option premium R 1,653,966.00
Option premium/ton R 50.43
Net procurement cost R 907.68
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
